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Pay secrecy is a burgeoning debate in compensation research.  On one side of the debate, 
it is argued that pay secrecy is a useful and beneficial practice because it can prevent potential 
dissatisfaction and destructive competition possible when people make unfavorable pay 
comparisons.  On the other side, it is argued that pay secrecy is undesirable because it obscures 
the motivational properties of pay and does not prevent people from making pay comparisons, 
nor safeguard them from the resulting dissatisfaction.  Despite the popularity of pay secrecy in 
organizations today, extant research has failed to provide any definitive answers as to whether 
secrecy is a beneficial pay communication practice.  For both academics and practitioners, the 
effects of pay secrecy largely remain unclear.  The current dissertation represents one attempt to 
address these shortcomings.  
First, this dissertation seeks to clarify our comprehension of the pay secrecy construct.  
Toward this end, problems in existing research are outlined, including the conflation of outcomes 
that often occurs in pay secrecy studies.  As a remedy, the incentive and sorting effects of 
compensation are introduced as distinct theoretical tracks for separating secrecy’s effects.  The 
pay secrecy construct is further elucidated by building on prior work (Holtzen & Gupta, 2014) to 
develop a comprehensive matrix of pay secrecy. 
Second, this dissertation aims to enhance and refine our understanding of the effects of 
pay secrecy.  Using the incentive and sorting tracks, motivation and satisfaction dynamics are 
explored in conjunction with other relevant compensation system characteristics.  This approach 
allows us to discern the underlying mechanisms that uniquely affect motivation/performance in 
the context of expectancy theory, and satisfaction/turnover in terms of equity theory principles.  
To provide a more nuanced examination of the unique behavioral responses to these dynamics, 
 
functional versus dysfunctional effects are explored by conceptualizing the effects as two 
separate continua.  Within this framework, functional effects occur both when desirable 
behaviors are promoted and when undesirable behaviors are hindered.  Conversely, 
dysfunctional effects manifest when desirable behaviors are hindered and when undesirable 
behaviors are promoted.  This distinct conceptualization allows for a comprehensive examination 
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Pay is powerful.  Adequate pay provides individuals with the means to satisfy a variety of 
needs (Lawler, 1971), ranging from lower-order concerns such as food and shelter (Maslow, 
1943) to social status and other higher-order needs (Frank, 1999).  Research consequently 
indicates that pay is a compelling motivator (Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2002).  Despite the 
importance of pay to individuals, it is also a topic of conversation that many organizations prefer 
their employees avoid.  Although pay discussions are legally-protected as a concerted employee 
activity (National Labor Relations Act, 1935; Gely & Bierman, 2003), organizations often aim to 
discourage employee discussions about pay concerns by limiting employee access to vital pay 
information through a variety of pay secrecy policies (Colella et al., 2007; Belogolovsky & 
Bamberger, 2014). 
  Studies suggest that policies of pay secrecy are prevalent in organizations today.  
Almost half of all workers in the U.S. are strongly discouraged or contractually forbidden from 
discussing pay with coworkers (Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 2011).  Managers and 
organizations generally support secrecy, claiming it minimizes social comparisons and 
destructive competition among employees (Burroughs, 1982).  Even employees themselves may 
favor secrecy.  For workers in the U.S., the taboo nature of discussing pay is a deep-seated belief, 
evidenced by the “squirm factor” (Lytle, 2014: 30) that often accompanies compensation 
discussions.  Together, these complementary forces have produced an environment in which 





 Despite the widespread use and acceptance of pay secrecy, our current understanding of 
both the construct and its effects remains limited.  Despite lacking a generally-accepted 
definition for what constitutes “pay secrecy,” both scholars and practitioners have focused 
instead on uncovering its effects.  These efforts have yielded perplexing results. On the one hand, 
evidence suggests that when organizations choose to limit the pay information that is formally 
shared, employees still discuss pay with one another (Day, 2012) but may form grossly incorrect 
assumptions about the pay of others (Lawler, 1965, 1966, 1967; Milkovich & Anderson, 1972).  
On the other hand, transparency in pay communication has been found to elicit strong feelings of 
envy toward higher-paid others, causing lower-paid individuals to withhold helping behaviors 
that could benefit the organization and its employees (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017).  In the 
debate over the possible effects of pay secrecy, published evidence exists for both sides. 
 Despite the popularity of secrecy policies in organizations today, research on its effects 
has produced conflicting results, and a comprehensive definition of the construct remains 
elusive.  In short, our understanding of pay secrecy largely remains secret.  Our ability to 
understand the nuances of the construct and its effects has been limited by superficial expositions 
of pay secrecy in existing research.  While there appears to be a growing interest in the topic, 
both among academic researchers (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Marasi, Wall, & 
Bennett, 2018; Scheller & Harrison, 2018; Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018) and compensation 
professionals (e.g., Lytle, 2014; Trotter, Zacur, & Stickney, 2017), theoretical development has 
lagged behind empirical investigations.  By taking a step back to focus on construct definition 
and theory development, this dissertation represents one attempt to address these limitations.  




First, this dissertation seeks to clarify the construct of pay secrecy.  Extant research 
provides several disparate conceptualizations of the construct.  Though there is some degree of 
consensus that pay secrecy theoretically represents a continuum of information (Burroughs, 
1982; Collela et al., 2007), scholars have largely circumvented more precise theoretical 
development to instead focus on empirical examinations of secrecy’s effects.  In order to identify 
the impediments to theoretical development, the remainder of this chapter outlines some of the 
major problems in existing pay communication research.  In Chapter 2, organizational justice 
concepts are then used to build on the prior work of Holtzen and Gupta (2014) to conceptualize 
pay secrecy as the intersection of two continua of information – a distributive continuum that 
communicates information about pay outcomes, and a procedural continuum containing 
information about pay processes. 
Second, this dissertation aims to enhance and refine our understanding of the effects of 
pay secrecy on critical employee behaviors and attitudes.  As a remedy to the conflation of 
outcomes that occurs in many extant empirical investigations of the topic, I contend here that 
distinct theoretical tracks are needed to untangle the separate influence of different forms and 
degrees of pay communication.  Toward this end, the incentive and sorting effects of 
compensation are introduced as pertinent frameworks for separating secrecy’s distinctive effects.  
By using the proposed pay secrecy matrix as a theoretical framework, this dissertation 
investigates how different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information may alter 
the established incentive and sorting properties of performance-based pay.  Using these distinct 
theoretical tracks, I then explore how different forms of secrecy may uniquely affect motivation 
and performance in the context of expectancy theory (Chapter 3), and attraction, satisfaction, and 




discusses implications and limitations of the dissertation, and presents suggested directions for 
empirical testing of the stated propositions and other future research. 
Statement of the Problem 
A review of the literature highlights several problems currently plaguing pay 
communication research.  First, no consensus on a definition for the construct has been reached.  
Furthermore, empirical specifications have failed to match the many theoretical 
conceptualizations of pay secrecy that exist in the literature.  More specifically, despite a general 
agreement that pay secrecy/transparency is best represented as a continuum of shared 
information (Burroughs, 1982; Colella, Paetzold, & Wesson, 2007; Marasi & Bennett, 2016; 
Marasi, Wall, & Bennett, 2018), most empirical operationalizations continue to measure secrecy 
as though it were binary.  Experimental studies often utilize secrecy versus transparency 
conditions, with transparency manipulated as nothing more than the dissemination of 
participants’ pay amounts (e.g., Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner, 2011), often by code number 
alone (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014).  Such binary 
distinctions oversimplify the broad range of pay information that an organization can choose to 
communicate. 
Survey measures of pay secrecy are similarly deficient.  For example, Rosenfeld (2017) 
measured pay secrecy with a single item, and classified answers into transparent (i.e., wage and 
salary information is public and/or can be discussed in the workplace) and secret categories (i.e., 
discussion of wage and salary information is discouraged and/or formally prohibited).  Measures 
targeting the specific dimensions of pay secrecy have also been developed.  Distinctions have 
been made regarding employee versus organizational restriction of pay information (Marasi et 




that shape perceived organizational pay secrecy (Noy, 2007), and preferences for the sharing and 
seeking of information during information exchange (Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018).  Despite these 
efforts, consensus on the definitive dimensions of pay secrecy remains elusive. 
Finally, pay secrecy research has been limited by its simultaneous consideration of 
multiple outcomes.  Examples of conflated outcomes found in the literature include satisfaction 
with pay and motivation for promotion (Lawler, 1966, 1967), satisfaction with pay and the 
perceived performance-reward relationship (Thompson & Pronsky, 1975), job performance and 
job satisfaction (Futrell & Jenkins, 1978), and pay satisfaction and affective commitment (Day, 
2012).  Often yielding conflicting results, these conflated findings continue to be relied upon to 
debate the merits of secrecy versus transparency.  On one side of the debate, it is argued that pay 
secrecy is a useful and beneficial practice because it prevents the dissatisfaction and destructive 
competition that arises when people make unfavorable pay comparisons.  On the other side, it is 
argued that pay secrecy is undesirable because it obscures the motivational properties of pay 
while also failing to prevent people from making pay comparisons with one another.  
The pay secrecy debate has been hindered by the above limitations, producing a muddled 
understanding of both how and why secrecy impacts employee attitudes and behaviors.  This 
practice perpetuates the contention that secrecy produces either invariably positive or negative 
outcomes for organizations and their employees.  Although early research examined motivation 
and satisfaction dynamics simultaneously, compensation theory suggests that distinctive 
mechanisms may operate independently to influence distinct outcomes.  This is not a novel 
concept in compensation research. 
 Pay exerts its influence through two unique mechanisms.  The incentive effect, or the 




Gerhart, 2014), explains how pay influences productivity and performance in current employees 
while holding attributes of the workforce constant (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005).  In contrast, 
sorting effects are used to describe how pay can alter an organization’s workforce composition 
by attracting and retaining the most capable employees (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Lazear, 1986).  
Together, the incentive and sorting effects explain how performance-based pay can be used to 
attract, retain, and motivate higher-performing employees. 
In attempting to untangle the effects of pay secrecy on employee attitudes and behaviors, 
the study of separate incentive and sorting properties arises as a suitable approach.  Focusing on 
the incentive effect allows for an emphasis to be placed on performance and other outcomes 
driven by motivational forces.  Conversely, a focus on sorting mechanisms allows for a separate 
examination of turnover, attraction, and other outcomes driven by satisfaction, equity, and 
perceptions of fit.  Examining these two paths in isolation allows us to pinpoint the unique 
mechanisms that interact with the communication of pay information to influence motivation, 
satisfaction, and more distal behavioral outcomes.  When effects are studied separately via these 
two tracks, clearer insight into the differential effects of secrecy becomes possible.   
In summary, in order to understand its effects, we must first clarify what constitutes pay 
secrecy.  Toward this end, this dissertation aims to illuminate the construct of pay secrecy by 
building a coherent theoretical framework.  In turn, this framework is then used to investigate 
how different forms of secrecy may alter the incentive and sorting properties of performance-
based pay, and how these effects influence employee attitudes and behaviors.  By pausing to 
focus on the theoretical precision of a pay secrecy matrix, this dissertation develops a testable 






ELUCIDATION OF THE PAY SECRECY CONSTRUCT 
Overview 
 Chapter 2 aims to clarify the construct of pay secrecy by addressing some specific 
shortcomings of prior research.  Toward that end, pertinent pay terminology is first reviewed, 
and boundary conditions for the current investigation are presented.  Organizational justice 
concepts are then invoked to expand the skeletal pay secrecy matrix developed by Holtzen and 
Gupta (2014).  In contrast to the historically binary conceptualization and measurement of pay 
secrecy, the matrix produces nine distinct cells.  The information content of each cell is then 
individually examined to explore the distinct forms of secrecy that can arise when different 
combinations of pay information are communicated to varying degrees.  Next, the possibility of 
secrecy in other areas of HRM is considered by exploring the construct of performance secrecy.  
Finally, to begin untangling the conflated outcomes of prior empirical research, expectancy 
theory and equity theory are introduced as appropriate frameworks for investigating how pay 
secrecy affects the incentive and sorting properties of performance-based pay raises. 
Pay Terminology 
Organizations must compensate employees in exchange for their labor.  While this 
suggests that compensation is a relatively straightforward exchange between employer and 
employee, compensation is “complex and often confusing” (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003: 1), both in 
theory and in practice.  This complexity and confusion arise, in part, because organizations 
facing similar environmental conditions often make very different compensation decisions 




do compensation strategies and practices vary across organizations, research indicates that 
employees may hold quite divergent perceptions of the same compensation system.  For 
example, employees may view compensation as a return in exchange for the work performed, a 
reward for a job well done, or as an entitlement for being an organizational member (Milkovich, 
Newman, & Gerhart, 2014). 
Because pay varies in both form (e.g., through compensation design, administration, and 
other elements dictated by business strategy; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003) and how that is perceived 
by employees (Milkovich et al., 2014), a precise definition of “pay” must precede clarification of 
the pay secrecy construct.  Broadly defined, employee compensation represents “all forms of 
financial returns and tangible services and benefits employees receive as part of an employment 
relationship” (Milkovich et al., 2014: 13).  As shown below in Figure 1, total compensation is 
comprised of two principal components: direct cash compensation, including base pay, increases 
to base pay, and other financial returns, and indirect benefits such as pensions, medical 









































Figure 1                                                                                                                                          
Pay Definition Figure 
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Direct Cash Compensation versus Indirect Benefits 
Despite the noted paucity of attention directed to employee benefits as a topic of 
investigation in the HRM literature (Dulebohn, Molloy, Pickler, & Murray, 2009), available 
evidence suggests that indirect benefits may fail to elicit the same effects on employee attitudes 
and behaviors as does direct cash compensation.  For example, Milkovich and colleagues (2014) 
note that “no strong data exist linking benefits level and employee productivity” (p. 440).  
Furthermore, no cumulative evidence suggests a relationship between benefit coverage and 
turnover (Williams & MacDermid, 1994).  Taken together, the available research provides no 
evidence to indicate that indirect benefits have clear incentive and sorting effects. 
Compared to direct cash compensation, benefits are also perceived differently by 
employees.  Many benefits (e.g., employer-sponsored health insurance, pensions, contributions 
to retirement and health savings accounts, etc.) are not performance-contingent but are instead 
awarded primarily for organizational membership and tenure (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 
2000).  As a result, employees may view some benefits as rights or entitlements (Williams, 1993; 
Weathington & Tetrick, 2000).  Other benefits (e.g., social security benefits for retired workers) 
are legally required and standardized (Dencker, Joshi, & Martocchio, 2007).  Because employees 
can view benefits as entitlements and/or legal requirements, organizations may find obscuring 
benefits information through secrecy to be inefficacious.  
In contrast to the dearth of benefits research (Dulebohn et al., 2009), an abundance of 
empirical evidence demonstrates that financial incentives are strongly and positively related to 
individual performance (for recent reviews, see Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Gupta & Shaw, 2015).  In 
short, there is “overwhelming meta-analytic evidence that incentives drive behavior and that the 




found a negative relationship between pay and turnover (Cotton & Tuttle, 1986; Griffeth, Hom, 
& Gaertner, 2000).  Collectively then, the available research indicates that direct cash 
compensation has clear incentive and sorting properties that shape employee performance and 
turnover.  In contrast, benefits do not exhibit these same effects (Milkovich et al., 2014) and may 
be more difficult to obscure through secrecy as a result of government regulation and 
standardization (Dencker et al., 2007).  The foregoing suggests that indirect benefits do not 
warrant inclusion when investigating how secrecy influences the incentive and sorting properties 
of pay.  Direct cash compensation is instead the more appropriate focus. 
Base Pay versus Increases to Base Pay 
Direct cash compensation has two distinct components – base pay and the various 
increases that can be made to base pay.  Base pay is provided to employees in exchange for their 
labor (Milkovich et al., 2014).  The specific base pay amount is determined using a combination 
of internal (e.g., job evaluation) and external (e.g., market survey) worth assessments of the job 
or the work performed (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000).  Consequently, base pay rates are 
attached to the job itself rather than to personal characteristics of individual employees (Gerhart 
& Milkovich, 1990).  For example, although the 2015-2016 national average base salary for new 
assistant professors of engineering ($83,000) was close to one-and-a-half times that for new 
assistant professors of English ($57,000), this difference is more a reflection of pay gaps between 
academic disciplines rather than the personal characteristics of individuals who occupy these 
jobs (Jaschik, 2016). 
Despite this seemingly straightforward definition, base pay can be conceptualized and 
defined in several different ways.  While some define base pay as that part of an individual’s pay 




based raises and other increases will be a percent).  Regardless of the definition that is used, base 
pay is primarily job-based.  However, other features such as the individual’s prior performance 
and pay negotiations may also be incorporated.  Thus, these considerations are all built into an 
individual’s base pay rate. 
In part because base pay is job-based (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), it is also less likely to 
be kept secret.  When setting base pay, organizations can choose to match, lead, or lag the rates 
paid by competitors (Klaas & McClendon, 1996).  These choices are often strategic.  For 
example, a lead pay level policy that pays higher wages than the competition can be used to 
attract higher quality applicants that require reduced training time if hired, thereby shortening 
vacancy periods (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003).  Benefits of these strategic choices may be lost if 
organizations do not disclose base pay information.  Furthermore, even if an organization prefers 
this information to remain secret, several websites (e.g., Salary.com, Glassdoor.com, and 
Payscale.com) allow users to publicly share base pay information for a variety of jobs and 
organizations. 
In contrast to the job-based nature of base pay (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), increases to 
base pay are often more person-based and variable (Milkovich et al., 2014).  Increases may be 
given for market-based factors, reflecting changes in the cost of living or other geographic 
differences (Milkovich et al., 2014).  Increases to base pay may also be distributed based on 
merit.  In contrast to the more narrowly-defined, traditional “merit pay” plans (i.e., raises given 
based on the individual’s rated performance in a previous time period; Heneman, 1990, 1992), 
here the term “merit-based increases” is used in a broader sense to describe pay increases that are 
given for a variety of merit-based reasons.  For example, many Korean companies distribute 




Kim, Kang, & Kim, 2008).  Other firms distribute merit increases for skill or knowledge 
acquisition, as when teachers are given increases for demonstrating the skills and knowledge 
thought to be requirements for improving student performance (Heneman, Milanowski, Kimball, 
& Odden, 2006).  However, my focus here is on merit increases that are distributed on the basis 
of performance. 
Performance-Based Pay Increases 
Performance-based pay increases are common in organizations today.  A 2018 survey of 
public companies in the U.S. cites performance as the top reason for distributing pay raises 
(PayScale Compensation Best Practices Report, 2019).  Accordingly, a preponderance of the 
research conducted on the incentive and sorting properties of compensation has focused on 
performance-based pay (see Cadsby et al., 2007 for a summary).  When pay increases are 
performance-based, employees are rewarded for their performance contributions, as opposed to 
seniority, need, equality, or other non-performance factors (Cappelli, 1999; Castilla & Benard, 
2010).  To refine this broad definition, performance-based pay increases can be further divided 
along several dimensions, including performance measurement criteria (results- versus behavior-
based measures) and the level at which performance is measured and at which pay increases are 
distributed (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Gerhart & Fang, 2014).  Understanding the nuances of these 
differences is imperative, as variations along these dimensions are later proposed to have 
differential effects on employee attitudes and behaviors. 
Performance Measurement Criteria 
Performance-based pay increases can be categorized by the criterion that is used to 




objective measures requiring little to no judgment (Murphy, 2008).  For example, paying tree 
planters using a per-tree-planted piece rate system directly links planters’ effort with their 
earnings (Paarsch & Shearer, 1999).  Objectivity makes results-based measures desirable, but 
they are often criticized for exhibiting criterion deficiency in failing to measure the full range of 
performance-related behaviors (Austin & Villanova, 1992; Murphy, 2008).  
Performance measures can also emphasize behaviors (Milkovich et al., 2014).  In contrast 
to results-based measures that are primarily objective (Murphy, 2008), behavior-based measures 
may be either objective (e.g., number of employee absences) or subjective (e.g., supervisory 
ratings of subordinate performance).  Subjective measures are often criticized for relying on “the 
evaluative judgment of fallible judges” (Murphy, 2008: 149), which can allow biases to affect 
performance ratings (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995).  Subjective measures may also capture 
behaviors outside the domain of task performance, a phenomenon known as criterion 
contamination (Austin & Villanova, 1992; Murphy, 2008).   
Implicit in prior studies of performance measurement is that the criteria – whether 
results- or behavior-based – are known to employees.  When the communication of pay 
information is restricted through secrecy, performance measurement criteria information may 
also be obscured, altering the incentive and sorting properties of performance-based pay.  For 
example, if sales employees paid on the basis of sales volume are told neither the raise amount 
nor the criteria used to distribute pay (i.e., distributive and procedural secrecy in the matrix 
framework, detailed later in this chapter), the incentive effect may fail to motivate increased 
sales if a clear link between pay and performance is not perceived.   
Research indicates that different performance criteria can motivate a range of behavioral 




organization, others are decidedly not.  For example, a study of department store employees 
being paid on the basis of sales volume (a results-based, objective measure of performance) 
found that while total sales initially increased, employees also ignored many unmeasured and 
unrewarded functions of the job such as stocking and arranging merchandise (Babchuk & Goode, 
1951).  In contrast, behavior-based measures may elicit different responses, as occurs when 
production workers intentionally work at a slower pace when time-study rate setters are present 
(Whyte, 1955).  Results- and behavior-based criteria may therefore elicit different behavioral 
responses (through motivation via the incentive effect, or through affective mechanisms via the 
sorting effect) depending on the combination of pay information that is communicated. 
Level of Performance Measurement 
In addition to performance measurement criteria, a second aspect of performance-based 
pay increases that warrants discussion is the level (a) at which performance is measured and (b) 
at which pay increases are distributed.  Performance-based pay increases can be based on 
performance measured at the level of the individual, group/team, and/or the organization.  For 
example, individual performance may be rewarded through commission or piece rate plans 
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003).  Group, team, or unit performance may be emphasized through 
gainsharing, where bonus payouts are given for performance gains at the facility level (Hollensbe 
& Guthrie, 2000).  Finally, organizational performance may be emphasized through profit-
sharing, with payouts for meeting organization-wide profitability targets such as return on assets 
or net income (Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009). 
The level at which performance is measured may not always match the level at which the 
corresponding performance-based pay increase is distributed.  To illustrate, consider profit-




profitability measures (Gerhart et al., 2009).  While profitability increases may be measured at 
the organizational level, actual pay increases may be distributed according to performance 
differences at the level of the individual or group.  The basis for this distribution depends on 
established allocation rules – equity versus equality – that specify the criteria for reward 
distribution (Leventhal, 1976).  An equity allocation rule distributes rewards based on the 
performance contribution of each individual, whereas an equality allocation rule distributes equal 
shares of the reward to all (Conroy, Gupta, Shaw, & Park, 2014).     
Applying allocation rules to profit-sharing, for example, means that pay increases are 
determined by performance measured at the organizational level, but distributed at the individual 
level.  If an equity allocation rule is used, an employee with relatively higher individual 
performance receives a larger share of the profit-sharing pool.  In contrast, if increases are 
distributed according to an equality allocation rule, each individual receives an equal share of the 
profit-sharing pool, regardless of differences in individual performance.  Similar issues occur at 
the level of the team or group.  For example, pay increases can be determined by team 
performance, but may then be distributed according to differences in individual performance 
(i.e., an equity allocation rule), or distributed equally to all team members regardless of 
individual performance (i.e., an equality allocation rule). 
Prior research indicates that secrecy alters an allocator’s behavior when distributing 
rewards.  Understanding levels issues of performance measurement and reward allocation is 
therefore crucial for exploring the incentive and sorting properties under varying degrees of 
secrecy.  For example, Leventhal and colleagues found that when pay information was kept 
secret, allocators tended to increase the difference between rewards distributed to high and low 




based allocations under secrecy.  In contrast, when information about reward distribution was 
fully disclosed to study participants, allocators increased the rewards of low performers 
(Leventhal et al., 1972), suggesting that transparency may prompt a more equal distribution of 
rewards.   
Just as transparency in pay communication can alter allocation decisions, so too may it 
alter the motivation- and satisfaction-related outcomes of these decisions.  For example, a 
manager in an organization with a high degree of transparency (e.g., specific distributive and 
specific procedural transparency, as illustrated in Cell 9 of the matrix and discussed in detail in 
the following sections) may distribute rewards with the goal of motivating individual 
performance.  Because overrewarding the under-contributors (i.e., lower performers) may 
prevent dissatisfaction and disruptive behaviors among other employees (Goode, 1967; Steiner, 
1972), managers may be more likely to invoke an equality allocation rule and distribute pay 
increases equally across all employees – in part, because pay information is absolutely 
transparent.  Nevertheless, the same equality allocation rule that pleases low performers may 
have negative effects on the satisfaction and motivation of high performers, whose individual 
performance contributions have gone unrewarded. 
Summary 
Based on the preceding arguments, the theoretical propositions presented in this 
dissertation are restricted to performance-based pay raises for several reasons.  First, pay-for-
performance (PFP) is ubiquitous in both practice and research.  PFP has received the 
preponderance of scholarly attention in both the compensation literature generally (e.g., Gerhart 
& Fang, 2014), and pay secrecy research specifically (e.g., Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; 




today, salary increases are often tied to performance ratings or ranking (WorldatWork, 2016).  
Understanding how secrecy alters PFP therefore has important implications, both theoretically 
for management scholars, and practically for organizations and managers. 
Second, performance-based pay increases are the focus here because they are more likely 
to both (a) affect individual responses to the incentive and sorting properties of compensation, 
and (b) be obscured through secrecy.  Individuals seek and monitor information about their 
progress in the workplace, and the direction and rate of change of allocation decisions such as 
pay increases are often more salient with individual employees than static base pay 
considerations (Hsee & Abelson, 1991).  Because research also indicates considerable variability 
in individual reactions to pay raises (Mitra, Gupta, & Jenkins, 1997), performance-based pay 
increases therefore represent a particularly appropriate domain for studying the range of 
attitudinal and behavioral outcomes that may arise when varying degrees of pay secrecy interact 
with other compensation system elements to influence motivation and satisfaction.  Before 
turning to a detailed exposition of the pay secrecy construct, two additional boundary conditions 












The compensation literature makes a clear distinction between executive compensation 
and the pay of rank-and-file employees, for several reasons.  First, executive pay differs in 
magnitude.  The average CEO of the 350 largest U.S. firms in 2017 received $18.9 million in 
compensation, roughly 271 times that of the $58,000 earned by the average U.S. worker (Mishel 
& Schieder, 2017, 2018).  Similarly, executive pay is unique in form.  Executive compensation 
packages, on average, are comprised of approximately 40% base pay and short-term bonuses, 
with the remaining 60% taking the form of long-term incentives such as stock options (Krantz & 
Hansen, 2012; Milkovich et al., 2014).  The pay of rank-and-file employees relies much less on 
stock-based components (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2014).   
Executive compensation also receives a relatively high degree of regulatory scrutiny and 
public interest, making it difficult for organizations to keep executive pay information secret.  
Many organizations must now disclose the ratio of their CEO’s pay to that of their median 
employee (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010), and public interest in executive compensation ensures the 
topic is a near-constant presence in news headlines (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  Differences 
in magnitude and form, combined with increased regulatory scrutiny and public interest suggests 
that executive compensation has unique secrecy issues that fall outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  As such, the theorizing and propositions presented here are limited to non-






Geographic and Cultural Constraints  
Many HR practices are culture specific, affecting how organizations in varied locations 
choose to design and administer employee pay (Townsend, Scott, & Markham, 1990).  
Organizations in the U.S. have a “pronounced incidence” of individual pay-for-performance 
(Gooderham, Fenton-O’Creevy, Croucher, & Brookes, 2015: 1483), attributable in part to a 
highly individualistic culture (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).  In contrast, collectivist 
cultures exhibit a preference for rewards being distributed equally among group members (Hui, 
Triandis, & Yee, 1991).  Because collectivist cultures may place less emphasis on pay-for-
performance, a highly individualistic culture such as exists in the U.S. presents a more 
appropriate domain for understanding how secrecy affects the incentive and sorting effects of 
performance-based pay raises. 
Differences in national culture also affect how employees perceive and respond to pay 
generally, and pay secrecy specifically.  For example, employees in highly individualistic 
cultures such as the U.S. often associate personal success with financial status (Hofstede, 1980), 
and may therefore exhibit a “deep seated belief that talking about pay is taboo” (Lytle, 2014: 30).  
These beliefs and preferences reinforce workplace and cultural norms in the U.S. that largely 
support secrecy in pay discussions (Bierman & Gely, 2004).  Other cultures have different 
norms, and pay secrecy may be a culturally bound construct (Colella et al., 2007).   
Studying the effects of pay secrecy cross-culturally could prove a fruitful direction for 
future research.  However, it falls outside the scope of this dissertation’s focus on how pay 
secrecy interacts with additional elements of the compensation system to influence motivation, 
satisfaction, and behavioral outcomes via the incentive and sorting effects.  While an 




cultural influences on behavior persist.  As secrecy and its effects are clarified, then the influence 
of culture and other individual differences can be incorporated.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, propositions are restricted to rank-and-file (non-executive) U.S. employees.  With 
relevant terminology and boundary conditions defined, I now turn to a clarification of the pay 
secrecy construct. 
Development of the Pay Secrecy Matrix 
“Pay secrecy” or “pay openness” have traditionally been treated as binary.  However, pay 
secrecy/openness may be best conceptualized as the intersection of two continua of information 
that vary in complexity.  Recent surveys support this perspective.  In the IWPR (2011) survey, 
restrictions in pay communication varied: 31% of U.S. workers reported that pay discussions 
with coworkers were discouraged, and 19% reported that they were formally prohibited and 
punishable (IWPR, 2011).  Employees also do not view pay secrecy as binary.  Lawler (1981) 
reported that employees did not want individual bonus amounts publicized, but the majority 
supported public disclosure of both the range (57%) and the size (60%) of bonuses.  Almost all 
(92%) also wanted bonus processes clarified (Lawler, 1981). 
Variations in the conceptualization of pay secrecy are also evident in empirical research.  
Lawler (1965, 1966) defined transparency as information on pay scales (without information on 
individual pay), Futrell and Jenkins (1978) defined it as information about low and high merit 
raise amounts, the overall average raise amount, and salary levels based on tenure, while 
Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) defined transparency as compensation ranges and midpoints for 
adjacent managerial levels.  Thus, a binary view of pay secrecy does not correspond with 
theoretical and empirical viewpoints; it also does not correspond with managerial practice or 




Several authors have acknowledged that pay secrecy theoretically involves some 
continuum of information.  Burroughs (1982), one of the first to explicitly recognize pay secrecy 
as non-binary, identified four (rather than two) levels of pay secrecy, but his analysis was mostly 
practitioner oriented: 1) “Type Red” organizations, in which employees receive no formal 
information regarding pay (with the exception of their own pay); 2) “Type Orange” 
organizations, in which pay ranges and medians for certain jobs are made available, as is 
information regarding the factors that were used to determine pay; 3) “Type Yellow” 
organizations, in which employees are told both the size of raises, as well as which employees 
receive them; and 4) “Type Green” organizations, in which the specific pay levels for unique 
individuals are made public. 
Burroughs’ exposition represents some progress but is limited in capturing the 
complexity of pay secrecy in two ways.  First, only a most basic description of the four proposed 
types of organizations is provided.  This likely oversimplifies the reality of pay secrecy.  A more 
critical shortcoming is that the categories relate solely to the characteristics of pay and who is 
receiving it, while essentially ignoring the processes through which pay is determined.  Put 
differently, the four categories address the “what” and the “who” of pay secrecy while essentially 
ignoring the “how” and “why”.  Alternatively, paralleling justice research, the categories 
represent “distributive” (Adams, 1965) pay issues while ignoring “procedural” (Greenberg, 
1987, 1990; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) ones. 
Recent investigations into pay secrecy have done little to remedy this shortcoming.  For 
example, Colella et al. (2007) acknowledge Burroughs’ exposition while agreeing that pay 
secrecy “is best understood along a continuum…conceptualized as representing the amount of 




(2007) offer no additional theorizing as to the specific information content of such a continuum.  
Contemporary research has attempted to further refine the continuum content.  For example, 
Marasi and Bennett (2016) proposed a 2x2 matrix illustrating pay secrecy as the intersection of 
two continua reflecting the degree to which organizations disseminate pay information 
(“organizational restriction”) and the extent to which employees are allowed to discuss pay 
information with one another (“employee restriction”).  This conceptualization again overlooks 
key parts of the secrecy construct.  Here, distributive information expresses “who” is sending and 
receiving pay information, but the specific type of information being shared is disregarded.  
Procedural information regarding how and why pay is determined is not addressed. 
Despite a lack of consensus regarding the information content of a pay secrecy 
continuum, scholars have begun to develop and validate scales for measuring the construct.  Noy 
(2007) conceptualized pay secrecy as having two distinct forms, including pay secrecy initiated 
and maintained through employees’ individual motives and intentions, and pay secrecy that is 
initiated and maintained by the organization through structure, strategy, and policy decisions.  In 
the same study, a measure for Perceived Organizational Pay Secrecy (POPS) was developed and 
validated (Noy, 2007), though a literature search fails to find the scale in any subsequent 
published research.  Most recently, a series of studies by Smit and Montag-Smit (2018a, 2018b) 
have focused on developing scales that capture employee preferences for the communication of 
pay information.  In the first study, the authors conceptualize pay secrecy policy as the 
interaction of two dimensions determined by the organization: pay non-disclosure (i.e., 
regulating the amount of information that can be shared about employee pay distributions) and 
pay communication restriction (i.e., restricting employees’ ability to discuss pay with one 




motives to exchange pay information by developing and validating a Pay Information Exchange 
Preferences scale.  Across eight samples, evidence supported the conceptualization of employee 
pay communication preferences as pay information seeking preference (driven by instrumental 
motives such as uncertainty reduction and justice concerns) and pay information sharing 
preference (driven by social motives, including relationship management and reputation 
preservation; Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018b). 
The foregoing review suggests that two separate continua are necessary for a 
comprehensive conceptualization of pay secrecy.  Prior work has largely focused on identifying 
the source or motives of who controls the dissemination of pay information (e.g., Marasi & 
Bennett, 2016; Noy, 2007), or understanding employee preferences toward the communication of 
pay information (e.g., Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018a, 2018b).  In contrast, my focus here is on 
clarifying the distinct information that can be shared (or obscured) when pay communication is 
relatively more open (or secret).  As originally developed by Holtzen and Gupta (2014), one 
continuum is needed to address the range of information that can be communicated with respect 
to “people” or distributive information (i.e., linking pay to specific individuals).  Another is 
needed to address the range of information that can be communicated with respect to “process” 
or procedural information (i.e., the specific means through which pay is determined).  Within 
each continuum, the range of information can also vary, from none to general, to the most 
specific.  Combining the two information dimensions with varying degrees of openness, a matrix 
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Distributive Pay Information 
The proposed matrix challenges the traditional premise that pay secrecy is a 
unidimensional and binary phenomenon.  By conceptualizing pay secrecy as the interaction of 
two continua of distributive and procedural pay information, the matrix goes beyond simply 
recognizing pay secrecy as a continuum (e.g., Colella et al., 2007) to explicitly specify the 
information content of the pay secrecy construct.  The organizational justice literature provides 
guidance in this regard.  In justice research, distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of 
outcome distributions or allocations (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, 
Porter, & Ng, 2001), while procedural justice describes the perceived fairness of the processes 
used in determining outcomes (Greenberg, 1987, 1990; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 
1975).  Paralleling this distinction, the pay information contained in the matrix consists of a 
distributive continuum (communicating information about pay raise outcomes) and a procedural 
continuum (with information about pay raise administration and decision-making processes 
communicated).  When these two continua are crossed, it produces nine unique forms of pay 
secrecy. 
Just as the organizational justice literature has established that fairness perceptions have 
different dimensions with unique correlates (Colquitt et al., 2001), the compensation literature 
must consider that the communication of pay information also has separate dimensions.  For 
example, research has shown that the distinction between different forms of justice “arises 
naturally in people’s cognitions” (van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997: 95), suggesting that 
people form different cognitive evaluations depending on whether the outcomes or processes of a 




communication of distributive versus procedural pay information aligns with this cognitive 
distinction between outcome and process. 
Research in organizational justice has shown that distributive and procedural justice are 
distinct constructs, though not independent of one another (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005).  For 
example, meta-analyses have produced correlations between measures of distributive and 
procedural justice that ranged from .57 to .77 (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 
2001; Hauenstein et al., 2001).  One explanation for the interrelatedness of the two constructs is 
the “substitutability effect” (Lind, 2001).  The substitutability effect suggests that different facets 
of justice can substitute for one another when individuals judge a situation, such that “if 
procedural fairness information is available…and distributive fairness information is missing, the 
procedural information is used” (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005: 70).  Similarly, distributive and 
procedural pay information may exhibit a similar substitutability effect when individuals form 
perceptions about performance-based pay raises.  Before exploring the interaction between the 
communication of distributive and procedural pay information, a separate description of each of 
the two continua is warranted.    
Secret Distributive Pay Information 
Even when no distributive information about pay raise outcomes is formally 
communicated by the organization, individuals still know the amount of their own pay raise.  
This represents absolute distributive pay secrecy, as no formal information about the pay raise 
amounts of others is shared.  With formal distributive pay information secret, the accuracy of 
informal information about who receives what amount of performance-based pay increases could 
vary widely.  Drawing on work from Smit and Montag-Smit (2018b), the exchange of pay 




data to the extent that the organization has made it available (Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018b).  
With absolute distributive secrecy however, no information about the pay raise amounts of others 
is formally available. 
One alternative option for obtaining pay information is through direct conversation 
between coworkers (Colella et al., 2007).  However, pay is often a taboo topic (Lytle, 2014), 
with discussions limited by concerns for privacy and conflict avoidance that can arise when 
specific pay outcomes of unique individuals are made public (Bierman & Gely, 2004).  As a 
result, individuals working in organizations with absolute distributive secrecy may feel 
uncomfortable directly discussing pay with coworkers.  As an alternative, employees may turn to 
workplace gossip, defined as informal and evaluative talk about a member of the organization 
who is not present (Brady, Brown, & Liang, 2017).  As Smit and Montag-Smit note (2018b), 
workplace gossip allows individuals to “obtain pay information without hazarding the social 
costs of probing taboo topics (Wert & Salovey, 2004)” (p.542).  Taken together, even when 
distributive pay information is formally secret, individuals can still turn to other sources – 
including direct conversations with coworkers or indirect gossip about others – to obtain 
distributive pay information.  However, the possibility of receiving invalid and inaccurate 
information through these informal sources is likely to be high, as research indicates that 
employees are not always truthful when discussing pay (Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004). 
General Distributive Pay Information 
Moving down the distributive axis of the matrix, organizations may choose to disclose 
general distributive pay information by sharing the ranges and medians of pay increases for 
distinct job categories.  This general level of distributive openness has been examined in prior 




university employees following a collective bargaining agreement requiring the minimum and 
maximum salaries of university ranks to be made public.  Similarly, Mahoney and Weitzel 
(1978) studied manufacturing employees in a company where compensation ranges and 
midpoints for immediately adjacent levels were public.  In a series of experimental studies 
(Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Belogolovsky & 
Bamberger, 2014), pay openness was operationalized as sharing information about the pay of 
fellow participants.  Because these pay amounts were not linked to unique individuals but were 
instead “listed by code numbers in order to ensure privacy” (Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014: 
976), this experimental manipulation typifies the communication of general distributive pay 
information. 
In each of the above studies, sharing information about pay ranges and medians 
represents general distributive transparency because it communicates broad information about 
pay raise outcomes.  It also provides information about the organization’s pay structure, or the 
internal alignment of pay (raise) amounts for jobs of differential worth (Milkovich et al., 2014).  
With general distributive information open, employees can compare their own pay raise amount 
to the minimum, maximum, and median raise amount for their organizational rank (e.g., 
Subbarao & deCarufel, 1983) or adjacent levels (e.g., Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978).  As a result, 
individuals can clearly see if their pay raise amount is above or below the median, and near the 
top or bottom of the range.   
The communication of general distributive information is common in both research (e.g., 
Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978; Subbarao & deCarufel, 1983) and practice.  With the proliferation of 
several third-party websites, the extent to which general distributive information is publicly 




individuals to anonymously report pay-related information including “salaries, wages, tips, 
bonuses, and hourly pay based upon employee reports and estimates” (www.glassdoor.com).  
This self-report data is then compiled to produce a searchable database where prospective 
applicants can view general distributive pay information (e.g., salary ranges arranged by job title) 
across a variety of organizations.  To monitor the accuracy of these anonymous self-reports, the 
company uses a two-step process of both technological and human moderators to review content 
(www.glassdoor.com).  Even if the reported distributive information is accurate, individuals still 
lack the formal procedural information needed to understand why their own pay is above or 
below the reported averages. 
Specific Distributive Pay Information 
Finally, the most specific distributive pay information that can be shared occurs when an 
organization communicates the specific raise amount and name of each recipient.  Though 
sharing unique raise amounts may prompt privacy and conflict concerns (Bierman & Gely, 
2004), several organizations already share this information – either with the general public 
and/or organizational members.  For example, public universities in the U.S. are subject to a 
requirement that salaries of individual faculty members be publicly accessible (Day, 2011).  In 
contrast, other organizations only share specific distributive information internally among 
organizational members.  For example, the Seattle-based Molly Moon’s Homemade Ice Cream 
company circulates an internal spreadsheet with the compensation amounts received by each 
individual at its seven locations (Belle, 2019).  Similarly, the popular natural grocer Whole 
Foods allows employees to easily look up salary and bonus information for any other employee, 
up to and including the CEO (Griswold, 2014).  Specific pay raise amounts, when tied to 




regarding who makes what.  However, a range of procedural pay information may also be 
communicated, and it is to this issue I turn next. 
Procedural Pay Information 
Prior pay secrecy research has focused almost exclusively on the communication of 
distributive pay information, including pay scales and levels (Lawler, 1966, 1967), pay ranges 
for adjacent managerial levels (Milkovich & Anderson, 1972), pay ranges and midpoints 
(Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978), and salary minimum and maximums by position rank (Subbarao & 
deCarufel, 1983).  Similarly, organizational justice scholars first focused on distributive justice 
concerns before proposing that procedural justice, or the perceived fairness of the processes used 
to determine outcome distribution, had been disregarded (Greenberg, 1987, 1990; Leventhal, 
1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).  As shown on the horizontal axis of the pay secrecy matrix, the 
procedural pay information continuum represents the extent to which information is shared about 
how and why pay raises are determined and distributed.  Again, different degrees of procedural 
pay information may be communicated, ranging from no information to the most specific. 
Secret Procedural Pay Information  
When no procedural information is communicated, individuals lack any formal 
information about pay raise processes.  Research indicates this absolute procedural secrecy may 
be relatively common, as “employees understand what it is they receive, but are not as sure of 
the process used to make this determination” (Mulvey et al., 2002: 36).  As with conditions of 
absolute distributive secrecy, employees experiencing absolute procedural secrecy may turn to 




or other informal sources to better understand how and why their own pay raise amounts were 
determined.  This informal information may be inaccurate.  
General Procedural Pay Information    
An organization may choose to communicate general procedural information about the 
pay raise process.  For example, employees may be told when to expect pay raises and how 
raises are determined (Miner, 1974), which may include sharing information about the raise basis 
and the measurement criteria used to determine pay increases.  By communicating this general 
procedural information, an organization can improve the accuracy of performance expectations 
among employees.  As noted earlier, when performance is the basis for pay raise distribution, 
measures can be categorized as either results-based (and often objective) or behavior-based 
(including objective and/or subjective measures).  Communicating this general procedural 
information clarifies employees’ understanding of both the basis (e.g., performance) for pay 
increases and the specific type of measure (e.g., results- or behavior-based) that is used for 
evaluation.  When individuals do not know which criterion is used to distribute pay raises, they 
may be “unable to alter behavior to meet the criterion adequately” (Gupta, 1980: 816).  Sharing 
general procedural information about pay raise measurement criteria can therefore clarify 
performance expectations and improve role clarity, or an individual’s understanding about the 
task and social interaction behaviors expected on the job (Beehr, 1976; Ritter, Matthews, Ford, & 
Henderson, 2016; Rizzo et al., 1970). 
Furthermore, general procedural information may be shared by the organization to 
clarify, explain, and/or justify compensation decisions.  This may include disclosing the 
principles and rationale behind the design of pay raises, as well as explaining why certain 




McMullen, & Bowbin, 2008).  Taken together, general procedural pay information can enhance 
the accuracy of employees’ performance expectations and clarify the specific results and/or 
behaviors that are required for a pay raise.   
Specific Procedural Pay Information  
Finally, an organization may choose to communicate specific procedural information, 
including the unique formulas used to determine pay raise amounts.  Again, some organizations 
already do this.  Buffer, a tech startup company, publicly shares both salaries (i.e., specific 
distributive information) and the formulas used to determine these amounts (Lytle, 2014), the 
latter of which is an example of specific procedural information.  The Buffer formula indicates 
that all company salaries are benchmarked to a single city, and that multipliers are added for cost 
of living, role, and experience (“The Next Evolution of Transparent Salaries,” 2018).  This 
provides employees with the most specific procedural information available – the precise 
calculations used to determine pay amounts – and therefore represents absolute procedural 
transparency.   
Although the Buffer Benchmark provides a formula for pay levels, formulas could also be 
shared to further clarify performance expectations by indicating how pay raise mounts are 
determined.  For example, salespeople who are told that raise amounts are determined by 
multiplying the number of an individual’s annual sales by $x should have a more accurate 
understanding of how performance is determined (annual sales numbers), as well as the relative 
value or importance of this aspect of performance in determining the overall raise amount.  In 
this example, performance and subsequent raises are determined entirely by the individual’s 
sales numbers, suggesting that the organization views individual sales as the most important 




explored in more detail at the end of this chapter) individuals can then use open specific 
procedural information to calculate the specific raise amounts received by unique others.  This 
example illustrates the interactive nature of the two matrix dimensions. 
 When specific procedural information is shared, an organization’s espoused pay policy 
should be more consistent with its actual pay policy.  With procedural secrecy, an organization 
can make claims that it distributes performance-based raises (i.e., its espoused pay policy) when 
in fact it may distribute raises for any variety of non-performance-related factors (i.e., the 
organization’s enacted pay policy).  Because people make inferences based on the behaviors of 
others, employees may turn to the enacted or visible pay policies for confirmation that it is in 
alignment with the espoused policy.  For example, an employee who is told that raises are based 
on performance may question the truthfulness of this formal information if coworkers receiving 
raises also exhibit poor performance behaviors (e.g., arriving late, making visible mistakes, etc.).  
Enacted polices therefore reflect an organization’s “ideals embodied by its actions” (Okulicz-
Kozaryn, Holmes, & Avery, 2014: 1302), communicating important information about the 
results and/or behaviors that are valued and rewarded.  When specific procedural information is 
open, employees can clearly see if the stated pay policy is congruent with the actual pay 
increases received. 
Summary 
In summary, prior pay secrecy research has been limited by its near exclusive focus on 
the study of pay levels and other distributive information.  This narrow focus does not match the 
broad scope of pay information that an organization can potentially share with its employees.  To 
clarify the construct, pay secrecy is conceptualized here as the communication of varying 




sections have treated the communication of distributive and procedural pay information as if the 
two constructs were orthogonal.  In reality, these two dimensions of pay information interact. 
Pay Secrecy Form: Content Across Cells 
A principal benefit of the proposed framework is that it allows for an examination of the 
interactive effects that arise from the formal communication of different combinations of 
distributive and procedural pay information.  When accurate distributive and procedural pay 
information is formally communicated by the organization, individuals should hold more 
accurate perceptions regarding both the outcomes of and procedures behind pay raise decisions. 
Cell 1: No Distributive, No Procedural Information 
Cell 1 represents absolute (formal) pay secrecy, or the least amount of pay information an 
organization can officially provide.  No distributive information regarding the pay raise amounts 
of others is communicated, nor is any procedural information shared about the processes used to 
determine pay raises.  Employees formally know the amount of their own raise only.  If 
employees seek informal information from other sources (e.g., through workplace gossip; Brady 
et al., 2017), the probability of obtaining inaccurate information is likely to be high.  An example 
of the absolute secrecy in Cell 1 can be found in the experimental laboratory simulation 
conducted by Greiner and colleagues, where the communication of pay information was 
manipulated to create private versus public conditions (Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner, 2011).  
Participants in the private pay condition were “told only their own wage” (Greiner et al., 2011: 






Cell 2: No Distributive, General Procedural Information 
 As an alternative to absolute secrecy, an organization may choose to disclose general 
procedural information while keeping distributive pay information secret.  As a result of 
distributive secrecy, individuals still know only the amount of their own raise.  However, the 
communication of general procedural information should clarify some of the processes used to 
determine the individual’s own pay raise amount.  For example, employees may be told when to 
expect raises, as well as how raises are determined (Miner, 1974).   
When pay increases are based on performance, information about the performance 
measurement criteria can also be shared.  In a laboratory study investigating the effects of 
secrecy on individual task performance, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) informed 
participants in the secret pay condition that bonus pay would be awarded for earning points by 
successfully turning rows into “gold” in a “magic stone” game, accomplished by matching 
adjacent rows of stones according to color, shape, or both (p. 975).  By clearly communicating 
that pay raises are based on a specific performance measurement criterion (i.e., points awarded 
for turning rows into gold) as well as how to influence the measure (i.e., matching adjacent 
stones according to color and/or shape), this general procedural information clarifies how and 
why pay raise amounts (known only to each individual) are determined. 
Cell 3: No Distributive, Specific Procedural Information 
Cell 3 represents distributive secrecy combined with specific procedural transparency.  
An organization using Management by Objectives (MBO) could fall in this cell.  Under MBO, 
supervisors and their subordinates agree on specific objectives that are to be achieved in a certain 




achievement of the agreed upon objectives (Drucker, 1954; Patten, 1976).  Though MBO may 
not necessarily be tied to pay raise decisions, communicating this combination of information 
provides specific information regarding the processes (i.e., the achievement of agreed-upon 
objectives) used in determining pay.  As a result of distributive secrecy however, employees still 
lack formal information regarding others’ raise amounts.  In Cell 3, individuals must continue to 
rely on what they know they make and what they think others make (Lawler, 1967), despite 
having accurate knowledge of specific pay raise processes. 
Cell 4: General Distributive, No Procedural Information 
In Cell 4, general distributive information such as pay raise ranges and medians is open 
but procedural pay information is secret.  Several examples of this form of secrecy can be found 
in the literature.  For example, Lawler (1965) investigated three government agencies where 
“some information about management pay scales was released, but each manager’s exact salary 
was kept confidential” (p. 18).  Similarly, Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) surveyed managers in a 
large Canadian manufacturing organization who were told only “compensation ranges and 
midpoints, particularly for immediately adjacent managerial levels” (p. 246-247).  Finally, 
Milkovich and Anderson (1972) investigated the extent to which supervisors disclosed to 
subordinates the pay range for their own level and one level above, as well as the median salary 
for their current level.  Each of the above examples reflects the general distributive openness 
(e.g., pay range and median information) and procedural secrecy of Cell 4.   
Cell 5: General Distributive, General Procedural Information   
In Cell 5, general information about both people and processes is communicated.  The 




medians for certain jobs.  More detailed information tying unique individuals to specific pay 
raise amounts remains secret.  General procedural information illuminates the processes used to 
determine raise amounts, and may include sharing information about measurement criteria and 
other general features of the pay raise distribution process.  For example, Beer and Gery (1972) 
developed a 6-item measure to capture participants’ pay system knowledge.  Three items asked 
whether participants knew their salary grade classification, and the range minimum and 
maximum – both reflective of general distributive pay information.  Another three items assessed 
participants’ knowledge of general procedural information such as the type and frequency of 
merit increases (Beer & Gery, 1972). 
With general information about both pay raise outcomes and the processes used to 
determine those outcomes communicated, Cell 5 provides the minimum combination of 
information that individuals need to form accurate pay perceptions.  As a result of general 
distributive transparency, individuals working under this form of pay secrecy should better 
understand how their pay raise amount compares to the raise median and range.  Combined with 
general procedural transparency, individuals in Cell 5 also have some information with which to 
evaluate why their pay raise amount is high or low.  For example, individuals in the Beer and 
Gery (1972) study can see if their own pay raise amount is near the top or bottom of the range for 
their salary grade classification.  If this information is combined with accurate procedural 
information about the type of merit increases provided (e.g., clarifying pay basis and 
measurement), individuals should better understand the reasoning behind the relative position of 






Cell 6: General Distributive, Specific Procedural Information 
 Although individuals in Cell 6 do not know the specific raise amounts of others, pay raise 
ranges and medians for jobs are open (i.e., general distributive transparency).  Specific 
procedural information is also transparent, and may include the sharing of pay raise formulas or 
other details of the pay raise process beyond measurement criteria information.  This form of pay 
secrecy appears in Thompson and Pronsky’s (1975) comparative study of two companies.  In the 
“partially public” company, the pay communication policy “was to reveal almost everything 
about pay except the amount paid to each individual” (p. 69).  Information shared included salary 
ranges and averages (i.e., general distributive information), as well as the factors that constitute 
performance and the performance levels necessary to attain certain raises (i.e., specific 
procedural information).  When all procedural information has been formally shared, as well as 
“everything…except the amount paid to each individual” (Thompson & Pronsky, 1975: 69), 
secrecy of the Cell 6 variety is present. 
Individuals in Cell 6 have a general sense of the pay raise outcomes received by others as 
a result of open raise ranges and medians for different job categories.  Specific procedural 
transparency means these individuals should also have accurate information about the decision-
making processes behind these outcome determinations.  For example, individuals in the 
Thompson and Pronsky (1975) study who indicated they understood both the factors that 
constitute performance and the performance levels necessary for raise attainment should 
theoretically have an accurate understanding of the relationship between pay and performance.  
Thus, individuals in Cell 6 who receive a below-average pay raise should be able to infer that the 





Cell 7: Specific Distributive, No Procedural Information 
In Cell 7, the exact pay raise amount given to each individual is open, reflecting specific 
distributive transparency.  However, the processes used to determine these raise amounts remain 
secret.  As a result, employees know only what raise amounts were received, but are not told 
why.  Cell 7 secrecy is typical of many public universities in the U.S., where there is a legal 
requirement that individual salary amounts be publicly accessible (Day, 2011).  Although this 
legal requirement does not guarantee that employees actually view this information (Day, 2011), 
individuals in this example do have access to the specific pay amounts of other individuals. 
Again, the value of the matrix framework is that it allows for the exploration of the 
interactive effects of different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information.  In 
Cell 7, the combination of information communicated may be particularly problematic.  With 
procedural secrecy in place, individuals may make inferences or turn to informal sources such as 
workplace gossip (Brady et al., 2017) to understand why certain individuals received specific 
pay raise amounts (which are known to be accurate through specific distributive transparency).  
With procedural information secret, even if pay raises are distributed on the basis of 
performance, individuals cannot accurately know this to be true.  Instead of viewing raises as 
determined by performance-driven factors such as effort, work quality, and/or productivity, 
individuals may instead be inclined to attribute pay raises to non-performance factors.  These 
non-performance factors may be perceived as legitimate (e.g., education, training, job experience 
and responsibility, etc.) or not (e.g., favoritism, politics, and nepotism).   
If pay raise differentials are attributed to illegitimate factors when procedural information 
is secret, individuals may assume that the dispersion of pay raise amounts is non-performance-




motivating for individuals and creates positive outcomes for organizations (see Downes & Choi, 
2014, for a recent summary of empirical findings), illegitimate and non-performance-based 
dispersion is unlikely to elicit positive behavioral responses.  The communication of procedural 
information may correct help correct inaccurate employee perceptions, but only if the underlying 
pay system indeed has legitimate performance factors as the raise basis. 
Cell 8: Specific Distributive, General Procedural Information 
 In Cell 8, employees know the exact pay raise amount given to each individual (i.e., 
specific distributive transparency), but only general procedural information is communicated.  
Again, public universities in the U.S. can be used to illustrate.  With the requirement that salaries 
be made publicly accessible (Day, 2011), distributive information is open.  General procedural 
information is also communicated about the procedures used to determine pay raise amounts.  
For instance, employees at one public university were told that all salary increases must be merit 
based and distributed according to supervisory performance appraisal ratings (Day, 2011).  When 
combined with the legal requirement that salary amounts be public (i.e., specific distributive 
information), this secrecy of the Cell 8 variety occurs.  As a result of this information 
combination, individuals in Day’s (2011) study, for example, can clearly see who received what 
amount of pay.  They also know the specific performance basis (i.e., merit) and the criteria used 
to measure it (i.e., supervisory performance appraisals).  In a PFP system, this combination of 
specific distributive and general procedural information further clarifies the relationship between 






Cell 9: Specific Distributive, Specific Procedural Information   
Finally, Cell 9 represents absolute (formal) pay transparency.  Here, employees have 
access to both specific distributive and specific procedural pay information that is accurate.  
Buffer, the tech start-up that posts salaries and pay formulas online (Lytle, 2014), illustrates 
absolute formal transparency in pay communication.  The company’s publicly accessible 
“Transparency Dashboard” posts salary amounts (listed by individual name and location, 
representing specific distributive information), along with the current pay formula (“The Next 
Evolution of Transparent Salaries,” 2018).  Absolute transparency also appears in the Thompson 
and Pronsky (1975) comparative study in the “public” group of sales division employees in both 
companies.  Because sales employees were paid using a commission plan, and the “amount of 
commission per dollar sales was known and monthly sales for each individual was published” 
(Thompson & Pronsky, 1975: 69), the unique pay amount of each individual can be calculated. 
In Cell 9, individuals can make direct comparisons between their own raise amount and 
the raises received by unique others.  As a result of specific distributive transparency, these 
comparisons should be based on accurate information.  The addition of specific procedural 
information communicates why these amounts were received.  For example, consider two 
salespersons working at a commission rate of $5 per sale.  Salesperson A makes 100 sales while 
salesperson B makes 200 sales.  With the combination of pay information found in Cell 9, it 
becomes easy to calculate that salesperson A received twice as much pay when compared to 
salesperson B (i.e., $1,000 versus $500).  Also known is that salesperson A received twice as 
much pay because his or her sales were double the sales of salesperson B (i.e., 200 versus 100).  
The communication of specific, accurate information related to both the distributive and 




As a result, individuals’ pay-related perceptions should be more accurate in Cell 9 than in any 
other matrix cell. 
Summary 
 As illustrated across the nine matrix cells, pay secrecy can take many forms, depending 
on the combination of distributive and procedural information that an organization chooses to 
formally communicates.  The matrix framework adds value to the pay secrecy literature by 
reconceptualizing what was once viewed as a binary phenomenon as a multi-faceted construct.  
It goes beyond simply acknowledging pay secrecy as a continuum of information to delineating 
the specific information content of each continua, and – perhaps most notably – interactions 














Secrecy in Other Areas of Human Resource Management (HRM) 
The near-exclusive focus of secrecy research in the HRM literature has been the 
communication of pay information.  Extant research has failed to consider that secrecy may exist 
in other areas of HRM, separate from, or perhaps even in addition to policies of pay secrecy.  In 
particular, when pay raises are distributed on the basis of performance, the stated goals of using a 
pay secrecy policy may be achieved by obscuring performance information instead.  The 
following section addresses performance secrecy in more detail. 
Performance Secrecy 
Several scholars have implicitly suggested the existence of a performance secrecy 
construct.  For example, Miner (1974) defined pay openness, in part, by whether the organization 
communicates how pay raises are determined.  Similarly, Day’s (2011) study of pay 
communication policies in a public U.S. university measured transparency, in part, by 
determining whether written information about how pay is determined was provided to 
employees.  Just as secrecy in pay communication can alter perceptions of the relationship 
between pay and performance (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010), secrecy in the 
communication of performance information may similarly cloud these perceptions.  The primary 
difference is that while performance secrecy obscures the performance component of the 
performance-pay link, pay secrecy obscures the pay component of the relationship.  
Nevertheless, the end result remains the same – the perceived link between performance and pay 
may be obscured. 
 Secrecy in the communication of performance-related information has appeared in extant 




developed by Day (2012) includes two items assessing the degree to which management either 
explicitly or implicitly discourages the discussion of performance appraisal ratings with other 
employees.  If pay is based on performance appraisals, then knowing the ratings of individual 
employees becomes critical in assessing whether performance improvements lead to a pay raise 
(i.e., the performance-outcome expectancy; Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973).  One of the few 
empirical studies to explicitly incorporate performance secrecy was conducted by Fossum 
(1976), who explored individual reactions to pay and performance communications.  For this 
quasi-experimental study, subjects completed a data coding exercise to examine the effects of 
both pay (public versus private) and performance feedback (public versus no feedback) on 
satisfaction.  Though none of the stated hypotheses were supported or statistically significant, 
Fossum’s (1976) work represents one of the few attempts to explicitly consider performance 
secrecy as a distinct construct.   
More recent empirical work in the pay secrecy domain suggests that performance secrecy 
warrants further examination.  In a series of lab studies, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010; 
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014) used a binary pay communication manipulation.  Individuals 
in the secret condition were given information about the absolute level of their own individual 
performance and bonus pay only, while individuals randomly assigned to the open condition 
were also provided information about the pay of fellow experimental group members.  However, 
the authors chose to disseminate performance information “listed by code-numbers in order to 
ensure privacy” (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 976).  This design choice is problematic, as 
code numbers obscure the identifying information individuals need to make direct performance-
pay comparisons with others.  For instance, participants in the open condition of both studies 




study, 95% of participants in the open condition disclosed pay-related information (typically 
their code number) to at least one other group member (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 976).  
Similarly, 90% of participants in the open pay condition of the 2014 study disclosed pay- and 
performance-related information (again, most often their assigned study code number; 
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014: 1716).  These results indicate that participants in the secret 
condition both desired and sought out the information needed to make direct performance-pay 
comparisons with others. 
Taken together, the evidence indicates that performance information is capable of being 
obscured.  Aside from the studies noted here, management scholars have not systematically 
explored the possibility of a performance secrecy construct.  Similar to the pay secrecy 
framework, one can imagine a matrix of performance secrecy that arises from the restriction of 
distributive performance information, procedural performance information, or both.  In turn, 
performance secrecy may be used to achieve the benefits of asserting a policy of pay openness, 
while still obscuring critical information needed to assess the true relationship between 
performance and pay.  As an example of how performance secrecy may be used to achieve the 
same effects of pay secrecy, Cell 1 of a hypothetical performance secrecy matrix is considered 
below.   
Performance Secrecy as a Substitute for Pay Secrecy  
Absolute performance secrecy exists when organizations formally provide no distributive 
or procedural performance information to employees.  While employees working under absolute 
pay secrecy will still know the exact amount of their own pay raise (as a direct function of being 
the recipient), employees working under absolute performance secrecy may or may not know the 




performance ratings during annual performance reviews, not all supervisors conduct such 
discussions in practice (Day, 2011).  Similarly, the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 requires that 
federal government employees and contractors be given access to personnel records, including 
performance appraisal data.  However, no federal law grants all employees the right to access 
their personnel files, and no law requires employers to send the complete file in its entirety 
(“Access to Personnel Files: 50 State Laws,” 2016).  When employees do not know who received 
what performance rating, this reflects absolute distributive secrecy in the communication of 
performance information. 
In addition to distributive performance secrecy, Cell 1 of a performance secrecy matrix 
also includes secrecy in the communication of procedural performance information.  When no 
information about the performance appraisal process is provided, employees may not clearly 
understand how and why performance appraisal decisions are made.  For example, an 
organization may choose to obscure the specifics of who is in charge of conducting appraisals, or 
to restrict information regarding the appeals process available for addressing performance 
appraisal disputes. 
Taken together, distributive and procedural secrecy in the communication of performance 
information may be used to achieve the same effects of a pay secrecy policy.  For example, 
consider an organization that distributes pay raises to all employees receiving an “excellent” 
appraisal rating.  If the organization chooses to obscure procedural performance information, 
employees are unlikely to understand the performance appraisal process (i.e., what behaviors or 
results justify a rating of “excellent”).  Combined with distributive performance secrecy, 
employees in Cell 1 of the performance secrecy matrix do not know the exact rating of their own 




information produces a situation that is conceptually similar to that which is illustrated in Cell 1 
of the pay secrecy matrix. 
Investigating the Effects of Pay Secrecy 
Construct clarification is but one step towards illuminating pay secrecy.  The specific 
mechanisms through which secrecy affects outcomes of interest remain unclear.  The pay secrecy 
matrix developed here provides a framework for beginning to understand how different 
combinations of pay information may alter employee behaviors and attitudes traditionally 
associated with the incentive and sorting effects of performance-based pay.  In general, as we 
move from left to right or top to bottom in the pay secrecy matrix (Figure 2), the “line of sight” 
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Lawler & Jenkins, 1992) between performance and individual pay 
raises should strengthen, and motivation should improve.  Beyond this observation, many 
questions remain unanswered.  For example, what are the specific behavioral outcomes 
associated with sharing different types and degrees of pay information?  Are employees 
motivated to perform, even when pay information is secret?  Are employees more or less 
satisfied when different combinations of pay information are communicated?   
To explore these questions, the subsequent chapters of this dissertation invoke two 
theories – expectancy theory and equity theory – to isolate and explore the incentive and sorting 
properties of performance-based pay raises in the context of secrecy.  First, expectancy theory 
(Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973) is used in Chapter 3 to investigate how motivation, performance, 
and other behaviors associated with the incentive effect may be altered when different forms of 
secrecy are present.  Next, equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler, 




influenced by the communication of pay information to alter the attraction and retention 
mechanisms of the sorting effect. 
Motivation and Behavior via the Incentive Effect 
When an organization’s goal is to improve performance, pay-for-performance (PFP) is 
often adopted as a compensation strategy.  Improvements in organizational performance stem 
from the incentive and sorting properties of PFP that operate at the individual level.  The 
incentive effect describes how PFP affects productivity and performance in current employees 
while holding attributes of the workforce constant (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005; Gerhart & 
Fang, 2014).  Evidence supporting the incentive effect of PFP is well-documented, with positive 
effects on performance and productivity reported.  For example, a 10-study meta-analysis 
conducted by Locke and colleagues found that productivity increased an average of 30% 
following the introduction of individual pay incentives (Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & 
Denny, 1980).  Similar results were also found in a qualitative summary analysis indicating that 
financial incentives have a positive effect on performance quantity, with similar effect sizes 
across studies conducted in the laboratory, field, and simulations (Jenkins, 1986).  One of the 
dominant theories used to explain the positive incentive effect of PFP on performance and 
productivity is expectancy theory. 
Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory (Lawler, 1973, 1981; Vroom, 1964) is an individual-level, choice-
based theory of motivation.  In short, it argues that an individual’s motivation to choose to exert 
effort toward a certain course of action is influenced by the multiplicative combination of three 




particular level of effort will lead to a particular level of performance), 2) the performance-
outcome (PO) expectancy, also referred to as “instrumentality” (i.e., the subjective probability 
that a particular behavior will lead to a particular outcome), and 3) the perceived attractiveness 
(or “valence”) of the outcome.  Taken together, these components form an equation where 
motivational force (MF) is determined by the multiplicative association among the three factors: 
MF = [EP * ∑ (PO * V)].   
All three factors are critical, but in the context of pay secrecy, PO beliefs (i.e., PPay 
expectancies) are especially germane.  Although the theory allows for the incorporation of 
several outcomes (as indicated by the summation in the equation), the current investigation is 
restricted to the specific outcome of performance-based pay raises.  As such, only PPay 
expectancies are relevant.  Because this dissertation is focused on the singular outcome of 
performance-based pay raises, the inclusion of valence as a theoretical mechanism of motivation 
becomes redundant.  This is because pay raises are almost always desirable (i.e., relatively 
attractive, motivating, satisfying, etc.).  For example, while we know that a $1,000 raise has a 
higher valence (i.e., is more motivating, satisfying, etc.) than a $100 raise, there are no real 
differences to contrast – except magnitude – when considering performance-based pay raises as 
the only outcome of interest.  If multiple outcomes were considered here, valence would be 
expected to vary across different outcomes and would therefore be a sensible component to 
include. 
Pay secrecy obscures pay-related perceptions by restricting the communication of 
distributive and procedural pay information.  As a result, the accuracy of two determinants of 
PPay expectancies – the objective situation and communication from others (Lawler, 1973) – 




determinants, these are not relevant to the current discussion.  For example, PPay expectancies 
are also determined by an individual’s past experience in similar situations (Lawler, 1973).  
However, an individual’s past experience with pay received in previous jobs is unlikely to have 
any bearing on pay perceptions in the current employment arrangement.  PPay expectancies 
are also influenced by beliefs about internal versus external locus of control (i.e., beliefs about 
the responsiveness or controllability of one’s environment; Rotter, 1966; Lawler, 1973).  Locus 
of control is an individual difference.  Because this dissertation focuses on system characteristics 
related to secrecy, emphasis is placed on the objective situation and communication from others 
as the primary determinants of PPay expectancies. 
First, pay secrecy affects PPay expectancies by clouding a person’s perception of the 
objective situation.  As Lawler (1973) notes, “Sometimes…a person’s perception of the situation 
is not accurate, and as a result the objective situation may not completely determine a 
person’s…expectancies” (p. 68).  As the matrix illustrates, pay secrecy may be used to restrict 
the amount of distributive and/or procedural pay information that an individual receives.  When 
this information is restricted, it should influence how an individual perceives (and ultimately 
responds to) the objective situation. 
Empirical evidence supports this contention.  It also suggests that when individuals 
misperceive the objective situation when pay information is restricted, these misperceptions may 
exhibit a predictable pattern of perceived wage compression.  Early studies found that 
individuals tended to overestimate the pay of peers and subordinates while also underestimating 
the pay of their superiors (Lawler, 1965, 1966, 1967).  In a later study of exempt employees in a 
Canadian manufacturing organization, Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) also found that the majority 




equally split between over-and under-estimation of superiors’ pay.  While the specific direction 
of these perceptions (i.e., over- versus under-estimation) may vary depending on the referent 
other that is selected for comparison (e.g., subordinate/peer versus superior), the available 
evidence indicates that secrecy can alter an individual’s perception of the objective situation.   
Second, pay secrecy may also affect PPay expectancies by influencing communication 
from others (Lawler, 1973).  Research on incentives indicates that communication from others 
helps employees develop beliefs about the consequences of high productivity (e.g., that an 
individual’s high productivity may cause other workers to resent and reject the high producer; 
Whyte, 1955).  When pay information is secret, individuals may rely more heavily on informal 
information obtained from communications with others.  For example, a study of employees in 
an organization that discouraged any discussion of salary except between supervisor and 
subordinate found that these individuals were significantly less likely to make pay comparisons 
exclusively within the company (Thompson & Pronsky, 1975).  One possible explanation for this 
behavior is that secrecy influences communication with others within the organization, forcing 
individuals in more secretive organizations to turn to outside sources for pay information. 
When secrecy clouds perceptions of PPay expectancies, motivational force should be 
affected.  This theoretical contention has received some empirical support.  For example, 
employees in an organization with both merit pay and pay secrecy perceived a moderate 
relationship between pay and performance until the organization became more open about pay, at 
which time employees’ perceptions of the PPay relationship increased significantly (Lawler, 
1971).  Because employees are likely to be more committed to tasks for which a clear PO 
contingency is perceived (Naylor, Pritchard, & Ilgen, 1980; Vroom, 1964), pay secrecy may 




performance and pay.  The Bamberger and Belogolovsky studies (2010, 2014) suggest a negative 
effect of pay secrecy on task performance that is mediated by perceived instrumentality (i.e., the 
PPay expectancy), though the relationship may be moderated by individual differences (e.g., 
tolerance for inequity; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010).  These effects may be further 
influenced by additional elements of the compensation system. 
Compensation System Characteristics 
Pay communication is only one characteristic of an organization’s compensation system.  
As with any system, it is doubtful that the different components operate in isolation.  For 
example, Belogolovsky and Bamberger’s laboratory study (2014) found that while secrecy had a 
negative effect on individual task performance (mediated by performance-pay instrumentality 
perceptions), this negative effect was amplified with relative (versus absolute) pay determination 
criteria and attenuated with objective (versus subjective) performance assessment.  These results 
indicate that other aspects of the compensation system (i.e., pay determination criteria, 
performance assessment measures, etc.) may interact with secrecy to alter motivation and 
performance 
The matrix framework presented here allows for the incorporation of neglected system 
elements into the study of secrecy and motivation.  Turning to the expectancy calculation for 
motivational force, [EP * ∑ (PO * V)], pertinent compensation system characteristics 
emerge.  For example, because “P” or performance is included as a component of both 
expectancy (EP) and instrumentality (PPay), performance characteristics are relevant.   
Influenceable performance measures are those that an individual believes he or she can 




influenceable should strengthen the EP expectancy, or the belief that a specific amount of 
effort will result in a certain level of performance (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973, 1981).  For 
example, consider a factory worker whose organization awards a $1 raise if 1,000 units are 
produced annually.  If a worker feels capable of producing 1,000 units annually, the EP 
expectancy strengthens, increasing the overall motivational force to exert effort toward 
producing 1,000 units.  However, the communication of varying degrees of distributive and 
procedural pay information may obscure the perceived influenceability of the performance 
measure, producing inaccurate EP perceptions.  For example, if procedural pay information is 
secret, it is less likely that individuals have the needed information to determine if the 
measurement criteria are influenceable.  When procedural secrecy combines with transparent 
specific distributive information (i.e., Cell 7 of the matrix), individuals can see others’ pay raise 
amounts but lack the accurate information to know why these amounts were awarded.  In the 
absence of accurate procedural information, individuals may attribute high raise amounts to non-
performance factors such as nepotism or organizational politics.  The inaccurate inferences may 
later motivational force and subsequent behavior.   
Summary 
 The restricted communication of pay information can alter employee perceptions, 
including (a) PPay expectancies, by altering how the objective situation is perceived, as well 
as communication from others; and (b) EP expectancies, by influencing the perceived 
influenceability of the performance measure.  Taken together, these perceptions drive an 
individual’s overall motivational force to follow a certain course of action (Vroom, 1964; 
Lawler, 1973, 1981) and can be used to predict behavioral choice.  Just as expectancy theory can 




theory (Adams, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler, 1971) be used to explore an individual’s 
affective responses when secrecy alters equity perceptions and satisfaction. 
Satisfaction and Behavior via the Sorting Effect 
In addition to its incentive effect, PFP also functions as a sorting device that identifies 
and attracts the most capable employees (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003).  Through this sorting effect, 
PFP “improves performance not by changing the behavior of current employees, but rather by 
changing who the current employees are (and what attributes they bring to the organization)” 
(Gerhart & Fang, 2014: 45).  For example, in a study of automobile glass installation workers, a 
44% increase in productivity was noted following the switch from salary to an individual piece 
rate pay system (Lazear, 1999, 2000).  Approximately half of this productivity improvement was 
the result of less productive workers leaving the organization and being replaced by new, more 
productive individuals (Lazear, 1999, 2000).  This illustrates the complementary forces of 
attraction and retention that drive the sorting effect.  Similarly, a multi-wave survey study of key 
informants in a sample of independent grocery stores found that quit rates of poor performers 
(those whose job performance was in the lowest 20%) were higher when pay was dispersed and 
explained by the use of a pay-for-performance system (Shaw, 2015).  In turn, the quit rates of 
these poor performers were associated with increased organizational performance.  For high 
performers (those with job performance in the top 20%), quite rates were highest when pay was 
compressed and a PFP system was not used.  Although quit rates of these high performers were 
unrelated to organizational performance, Shaw (2015) suggests that this may be a feature of the 
grocery store industry used for sampling.  This industry is typically viewed as low-skill (Shaw, 
2015), lacking the outlying “star performers” whose individual performance has a 




 In short, research on the sorting effect indicates that employees are uniquely attracted to, 
and retained by, different compensation systems.  When a compensation system links pay to 
employee inputs (i.e., through the use of PFP), human capital advantages can increase “by 
attracting and retaining higher-ability, better-performing employees” (Trevor, Reily, & Gerhart, 
2012: 586).  PFP not only attracts high performers.  As the Shaw (2015) study illustrates, PFP 
also encourages low performers to voluntarily turnover (Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007).  Studies 
indicate that employees who choose to leave an organization are generally poorer performers 
than their counterparts who remain (Harrison, Virick & William, 1996), especially when pay is 
based on individual performance (Milkovich et al., 2014).  To understand how the 
communication of pay information alters the attraction and retention mechanisms as the sorting 
effect, equity theory and discrepancy theory arise as complementary theoretical frameworks. 
Equity Theory   
Equity theory is primarily concerned with fairness in reward allocations (Adams, 1963, 
1965), while discrepancy theory has been used to make specific predictions about the 
determinants of pay satisfaction (Lawler, 1971).  Together, the two theories are appropriate for 
investigating how secrecy  - through its effect on individual perceptions of fairness or feelings of 
pay raise satisfaction – may influence the sorting mechanism of PFP.  According to Adams 
(1963, 1965), equity theory is a theory of social exchange that suggests individuals assess their 
outcomes (including pay) in relation to their inputs, which can include education, experience, 
training, and effort.  Next, individuals compare their own outcome/input or O/I ratio to that of a 
referent other, chosen for the purpose of making salient comparisons because they are 
“comparable to the comparer on one or more attributes” (Adams, 1965: 280).  Because of this 




relative assessment, if an individual perceives his or her O/I ratio as being equal to that of the 
selected referent, then equity is said to exist.  Conversely, if the ratios are viewed as unequal, 
perceptions of inequity result and the individual experiences emotional distress. 
The specific type of emotional distress that is experienced depends on the unique type of 
inequity that is perceived.  First, positive inequity or overreward occurs when an individual’s O/I 
ratio is perceived as being greater than that of the comparison other (Adams, 1965).  The 
affective response to positive inequity is often guilt for failing to pull one’s weight, or 
unworthiness for the disproportionate amount of outcomes received (Perry, 1993; Scheer, 
Kumar, & Steenkamp, 2003).  The distress caused by these feelings of guilt or unworthiness then 
motivates the individual to restore balance through a variety of behavioral and/or psychological 
techniques (Adams, 1965).  For example, an individual experiencing positive inequity may 
distort perceptions of inputs and outcomes to restore balance and remove feelings of guilt.  
Second, negative inequity occurs when an individual’s O/I ratio is perceived as being less 
than that of the referent other.  Here, the individual perceives he or she is being underrewarded 
and experiences feelings of deprivation or being cheated (Adams, 1965; Perry, 1993), or perhaps 
even hostility from being “shortchanged” (Scheer et al., 2003: 304).  The negative feelings 
associated with perceived underreward again motivate the individual to restore balance towards 
equity.  For example, an individual who feels underrewarded may reduce the amount of effort 
put into the job to alter self inputs and restore equity (Adams, 1965).  Conversely, underrewarded 
individuals may also choose to remove themselves from the situation by exiting the organization 
through voluntary turnover. 
In short, inequity perceptions create dissatisfaction and prompt cognitive dissonance 




experienced when expectations or normative rules are violated, in turn motivates the individual 
to restore balance by invoking certain behavioral or cognitive tools (Festinger, 1954, 1957).  To 
restore equity, individuals may alter the inputs and outcomes of the self and/or the referent other, 
distort perceptions of inputs and outcomes, choose a different referent other for comparison, or 
leave the situation entirely (Adams, 1965).  While leaving the situation entirely often manifests 
as turnover, organizational performance only improves if low performers are leaving and 
simultaneously being replaced by more productive workers.  Several questions remain 
unanswered.  For example, under what pay communication conditions are poor performers likely 
to leave and better performers likely to stay?  When dissatisfied workers remain, what other 
behavioral responses may arise when attempting to restore equity?  Chapter 4 explores these 
questions in detail. 
Exploration of Outcomes 
Research indicates that pay communication practices have behavioral implications 
beyond individual task performance and employee attraction and retention (e.g., employees’ 
tendency to offer help; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017).  By isolating the psychological 
mechanisms of motivation from the affective responses driven by perceived inequity and pay 
raise satisfaction, distal behavioral outcomes beyond performance and turnover can be 
considered.  Behavioral outcomes can be broadly categorized as functional or dysfunctional – a 
seemingly straightforward distinction.  Functional outcomes arise from “good” behaviors, or 
actions that are desirable from the organization’s point of view (e.g., task performance, 
organizational citizenship behaviors).  In contrast, dysfunctional outcomes result from “bad” 




counterproductive work behaviors).  In the context of motivation, dysfunctional outcomes also 
occur when the system motivates no behavior at all. 
This binary distinction may oversimplify the range of behaviors that can result when pay 
secrecy clouds individual perception.  To conduct a more nuanced examination of these 
behavioral responses, a comprehensive understanding of functional versus dysfunctional effects 
is warranted.  Toward this end, behavioral outcomes are conceptualized here as comprising two 
separate continua.  One continuum illustrates the range of desirable behaviors that can occur, 
while a separate continuum illustrates the range of undesirable behaviors that may result.  Taken 
together, these continua can be used to delineate functional versus dysfunctional effects.  
Functional effects occur in two instances: both when desirable behaviors are promoted, and when 
undesirable behaviors are hindered.  Conversely, dysfunctional effects manifest when desirable 
behaviors are hindered, and undesirable behaviors are promoted.   
The benefits of this conceptualization of outcomes or effects are two-fold.  First, it 
facilitates a thorough exploration and categorization of behaviors that arise, in part, in response 
to the varying types of secrecy illustrated by the matrix.  As such, it provides a starting point for 
developing a typology of behavioral outcomes that result when inaccurate pay information 
distorts employee perceptions.  It has long been recognized that pay can have unintended 
consequences (e.g., Kerr, 1975; Lawler & Rhode, 1976), though empirical evidence on the topic 
has been “less systematic and organized” (Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009: 276).  The proposed 
outcome conceptualization is a useful step toward remedying this deficiency.  It can easily be 
extended into the broader compensation literature to systematically explore and organize the 




A second benefit of this conceptualization is that it allows for perspective to be 
considered when determining if a given behavior is functional.  Simply put, the same behavior 
that is dysfunctional for the organization may be largely functional when viewed from the 
perspective of the individual actor.  For example, consider an organization with a known policy 
of awarding only the top-ranking performer in each work team with a pay raise.  This policy of 
“one raise per team” may motivate individuals to engage in destructive competition with team 
members, in the hopes of becoming the top performer and sole recipient of the pay raise.  At the 
individual level, this behavior may be viewed as having functional ends (i.e., increasing 
motivation and performance), albeit achieved through dysfunctional means (i.e., encouraging 
undermining and other behaviors associated with destructive competition).  The 
conceptualization of effects presented here makes it is possible to explore when certain behaviors 
are functional or dysfunctional, and for whom they are so.  Before exploring these outcomes in 
the following chapters, undesirable behavior must first be defined. 
Defining Undesirable Behavior  
Deviance, counterproductive work behavior (CWB), and a host of other “bad behaviors” 
in organizations (Griffin & Lopez, 2005: 988) can be encompassed under the category of 
undesirable behavior.  CWB and other bad behaviors refer to intentional (versus accidental) 
behaviors that are possibly injurious to the organization and/or organizational members (Griffin 
& Lopez, 2005; Spector & Fox, 2005).  CWB has traditionally been conceptualized as a reactive, 
emotion-driven response to workplace events (Spector & Fox, 2010).  For example, the stressor-
emotion model (Spector & Fox, 2005) views CWB as arising from negative emotions 
experienced when environmental conditions known as job stressors are perceived by the 




instrumental concerns, arising from “cold cognitions, plans, and personal or professional 
strategies” (Fox & Spector, 2010: 94).  This distinction between reactive versus instrumental 
CWB can be aligned with the incentive and sorting properties of PFP, to refine the range of 
behaviors that an organization may view as undesirable. 
Both perspectives of CWB share perceptual processes as a common factor (Fox & 
Spector, 2010).  Using the incentive effect, employee perceptions can be framed around the 
components of motivation using expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973).  Undesirable 
behaviors that are triggered by cognitive mechanisms of motivation can therefore be viewed as 
instrumentally motivated.  This is because perceptions of instrumentality (PPay), expectancy 
(EP), and valence (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973) require some level of cognitive evaluation on 
the individual’s part.  The individual must take time to cognitively consider if they are capable of 
performing at the desired level (i.e., EP), if performing at a certain level will be followed by a 
pay raise (i.e., PPay), and if the expected pay raise is a relatively desirable outcome (i.e., 
valence). 
In contrast to the cognitive mechanisms and instrumental outcomes associated with the 
incentive path, the sorting path illustrates how perceptions of inequity can trigger affective 
responses such as anger or guilt (Adams, 1963, 1965).  Undesirable behaviors that are triggered 
by affective responses are therefore more likely to be reactive in nature.   In contrast to the “cold 
cognitive” approach of the incentive path, this “hot affective” (Fox & Spector, 2010: 93) 
response to inequity is likely to be more emotion-based and reactionary.  When individuals 
engage in comparison processes with referent others, affective responses such as hostility 
(following perceived underreward; Scheer et al., 2003) or guilt (following perceived overreward; 




negative workplace emotions (Neuman & Baron, 2005), undesirable behaviors that are triggered 
by these affective mechanisms are more likely to be immediate and impulsive as opposed to the 
more calculated, instrumental forms of behavior that arise when cognitive mechanisms dominate 
(Fox & Spector, 2010).  Taken together, undesirable behavior can be defined here as behavior 
that is intentional and causes harm to an organization and/or its members, with either 
instrumental motives (when motivation is the driving force), or reactive motives (when different 
combinations of (in)equity and (dis)satisfaction are perceived).  In contrast, desirable behavior 
can be conceptualized as intentional behaviors that benefit the organization and/or its members. 
Summary 
Chapter 2 clarifies the construct of pay secrecy and sets the stage for an exploration of its 
effects on employee behaviors and attitudes.  Conceptualizing secrecy as a matrix of distributive 
and procedural information restriction can help direct the field away from the historically binary 
conceptualization that has plagued past research.  Furthermore, empirical studies have focused 
on investigating how secrecy influences performance (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010, 
2014), satisfaction (e.g., Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978), or some combination of the two (e.g., 
Futrell & Jenkins, 1978).  By instead conceptualizing behavioral outcomes as either broadly 
functional (i.e., promoting desirable behaviors and hindering undesirable ones) or dysfunctional 
(i.e., hindering desirable actions and promoting undesirable behaviors), the range of potential 
responses to pay secrecy can be thoroughly investigated.  Finally, integrating instrumental and 
reactive motives from the CWB literature (e.g., Spector & Fox, 2010) aligns these behaviors with 






PAY COMMUNICATION AND THE INCENTIVE EFFECT 
Overview 
 With construct clarification addressed, this manuscript now turns to an exploration of the 
effects of pay secrecy on employee behaviors and attitudes.  Historically, the simultaneous 
examination of multiple outcomes has been an impediment to the development of pay secrecy 
research.  Conflicting findings have left academics and practitioners with an incomplete 
understanding of how pay communication impacts outcomes of interest.  Distinct theoretical 
mechanisms may facilitate clarification.  To untangle the convoluted effects of prior research, the 
incentive and sorting properties of PFP have been selected as suitable tracks for examining the 
discrete dynamics of motivation and satisfaction.    
Toward this end, Chapter 3 uses the incentive effect to emphasize performance and other 
behavioral outcomes driven by motivation.  Extant empirical investigations of the relationship 
between pay secrecy and performance are first reviewed, and findings from both macro and 
micro levels of analysis are discussed.  Expectancy theory is then invoked to explore how 
specific motivational mechanisms may be differentially affected when varied forms of secrecy 
are present.  By examining how pay communication combines with additional elements of the 
compensation system to influence the distinct perceptual components of motivational force (i.e., 
EP expectancy, PO expectancy, and valence; Lawler, 1973, 1981; Vroom, 1964), a range of 
functional and dysfunctional effects can be examined.  Taken together, Chapter 3 investigates 
how secrecy in pay communication influences individual perceptions, and how these altered 




Pay Communication and Performance: Empirical Evidence 
A substantial amount of empirical evidence indicates that PFP can have a positive impact 
on individual performance and productivity via the incentive effect (for recent reviews see 
Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Shaw & Gupta, 2015).  Because “individual motivation theories 
presuppose that accurate information is critical” (Shaw & Gupta, 2002: 909), an implicit 
assumption underlying studies of the incentive effect is that accurate pay information is known.  
This assumption disregards the reality that the communication of pay information may be 
obscured.  As a result, several questions remain unanswered.  For example, is the communication 
of accurate distributive and procedural pay information a necessary condition for the incentive 
effect to motivate performance?  Through what mechanisms does pay communication influence 
employee motivation?  What types of behaviors are likely to result when different characteristics 
of compensation systems are present?  Before exploring how the communication of pay 
information can alter the motivational properties of PFP, a review of performance-focused 
studies from the pay secrecy literature is prudent.   
Pay secrecy research has been plagued by a noted dearth of empirical studies.  A review 
of the extant literature yields only five studies (i.e., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; 
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Futrell & Jenkins, 1978; Greiner et al., 2011; Tremblay & 
Chênevert, 2008) that explicitly measure performance and some degree of secrecy or 
transparency in the communication of pay information.  This paucity of empirical work has 
produced contradictory findings that provide little insight into the performance implications of 
pay communication policies.  Furthermore, investigations aimed at uncovering the mediating 
psychological mechanisms behind these effects have been neglected.  To begin remedying these 




relationship is provided below.  Because both the level of measurement and level of analysis 
have implications for organizational theory and research (Rousseau, 1989), findings are 
categorized by the level at which performance is measured (i.e., macro or micro). 
Macro-Level Studies 
Studies investigating the relationship between pay secrecy and organizational 
performance are rare.  One exception comes from a survey study of Canadian private sector 
industries that examined the effects of transparency of information on two measures of 
organizational performance (i.e., productivity, and a perceptual measure of market performance) 
and three indicators of HR performance (i.e., turnover, and two perceptual measures of work 
climate and discretionary effort; Tremblay and Chênevert, 2008).  Transparency of information 
was measured by asking HR executives to rate six items, including the extent to which the 
organization discloses administrative procedures on how pay levels and pay raises are fixed, 
whether employees are discouraged from disclosing their pay to colleagues, and if managers are 
well-informed of pay policies (p. 280).  Results indicate that greater transparency of information 
is negatively associated with market performance and positively related to work climate, though 
only for sampled firms with high technological intensity.  However, neither relationship was 
statistically significant, and transparency was not significantly related to any of the three 
indicators of HR performance.  Tremblay and Chênevert (2008) suggest these findings emerged 
because information transparency may reduce the discretion that managers have in allocating 
rewards, such that they lack “the freedom to recognize the most productive employees and 
contributors” (p. 295) when pay information is public.  Although employees working in 
technology-intensive firms are more likely to paid on the basis of individual performance (Balkin 




may be minimized to reduce potential employee conflict when pay information is transparent 
(Tremblay & Chênevert, 2008). 
While these findings suggest that transparency of information may have both positive and 
negative effects for organizational-level performance indicators, the outcome measures selected 
by Tremblay and Chênevert (2008) impede a clear interpretation of effects.  Instead of using a 
direct measure of market performance (e.g., comparing ROI or other objective measures of 
organizational performance to industry standards), respondents were instead asked to compare 
the performance of their own firm (based on indicators including growth in sales, profitability, 
market share, and marketing) to that of the industry.  This subjective  measure may not 
accurately reflect a firm’s objective market performance.  Furthermore, the questionnaire design 
of the study does not permit causal inferences, and reverse causality is possible (Shadish, Cook, 
& Campbell, 2002).  For example, while transparency of information could have negative effects 
on perceived market performance, it may also be that firms with lower market performance are 
simply more inclined to be transparent in the sharing of information.  Furthermore, there is no 
theoretical reason to expect a direct effect of transparency on organizational performance.  It is 
therefore more plausible to suspect that transparency moderates additional elements of the pay 
system, rather than having a direct influence on organizational performance.  For example, pay 
communication may alter individuals’ perceptions of motivational antecedents, including the 
perceived relationship between performance and subsequent pay, and the relative size of pay 
raise amounts.  Any individual performance detriments resulting from these altered pay 
perceptions may carry over into negative effects for organizational performance. 
The pay dispersion literature also contains several studies exploring how the 




refers to the degree of variation in pay that exists in a collective (Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 2012; 
Downes & Choi, 2014).  Some scholars contend that professional sports teams – with their 
public pay and performance information – are an appropriate arena for investigating the effects 
of transparent pay information on organizational performance.  With performance information 
public, both the individual and organizational performance of professional athletes and their 
teams can be determined (e.g., by operationalizing team performance as the percentage of games 
each team wins in a given year; Bloom, 1999; Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008).  Using the proposed 
matrix framework, the public salaries of professional athletes represent specific distributive pay 
transparency, accurately communicating who makes what in terms of individual compensation.  
However, procedural information as to how these pay amounts were determined remains secret 
(i.e., Cell 7 in the matrix). 
Extant pay dispersion research has produced conflicting findings about the effect of 
transparency on organizational performance.  For example, Bloom’s (1999) study of MLB 
players found that horizontal pay dispersion (i.e., differences in pay among people performing 
similar jobs; Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 2012; Shaw, 2015) was associated with winning a lower 
percentage of games in the previous season.  This suggests a negative effect of transparent pay 
dispersion on organizational performance.  However, a recent study of MLB players found the 
opposite effect (Hill, Aime, & Ridge, 2017).  Specifically, MLB teams with a high degree of pay 
dispersion saw an increase in the percentage of games won in the previous season, but this 
positive effect on organizational performance only occurred when pay and resource dispersion 
were both congruent and visible.  The findings therefore suggest that “pay transparency must go 
hand-in-hand with performance transparency” (Hill et al., 2017: 3), providing further evidence of 




While public pay and performance data make sports teams an attractive domain for pay 
communication research, transparency is a constant in these studies.  To provide insight into how 
the communication of different types and degrees of pay information may influence 
organizational performance, the results from these transparent sports team studies can be 
contrasted with research conducted in organizational settings that traditionally have more secrecy 
in the communication of pay information.  For example, a survey study of organizations in two 
industries (i.e., motor carrier and concrete pipe organizations) found that pay dispersion had a 
positive effect on organizational performance when individual incentives were used, though this 
positive effect was attenuated in more interdependent work settings (i.e., the concrete pipe 
industry, which requires sequential interdependence for performance; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 
2002).  Thus, Bloom’s (1999) study of MLB players suggests a negative effect of transparent 
dispersion on organizational performance.  In contrast, Shaw and colleagues’ results suggest that 
in more secretive settings, pay dispersion has a positive effect on organizational performance 
when individual incentives are used in a work setting with less interdependence (e.g., truck 
drivers in the motor carrier industry; Shaw et al., 2002). 
In summary, macro-level studies of the relationship between pay transparency and 
organizational performance have produced conflicting findings.  While sports teams have been 
used to investigate the effects of transparency on organizational performance indicators, this may 
be problematic because transparency is a constant in sports samples.  Though research conducted 
in work settings with less pay and performance transparency can be contrasted with the findings 
from sports team samples, the “black box” explaining how the communication of pay 
information influences organizational performance remains unclear.  Evidence suggests that 




incentives, and task interdependence (e.g., Shaw et al., 2002) – to influence organizational 
performance.  To begin untangling these interrelated phenomena, a review of micro-level studies 
of pay secrecy and individual performance may clarify the transparency-performance 
relationship as it exists at higher levels of analysis. 
Micro-Level Studies 
A preponderance of the empirical research on pay secrecy – both in the economics and 
management literatures – has been conducted at the individual level.  In economics, the 
efficiency wage model has been used to investigate how workers may withhold effort when they 
perceive their wages as unfair (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990).  Because perceived fairness is based in 
part on perceptions of coworkers’ wages (Frank, 1984), the efficiency wage model suggests that 
transparency in the communication of pay information may clarify these perceptions.  For 
example, business students in an experimental laboratory simulation were assigned to either a 
private pay condition (and told only their own wage) or to a public pay condition, wherein 
subjects were told not only their own wages, but also the wages of other participants (though it 
should be noted that the authors did not disclose if this information was shared using non-
identifying information such as pay ranges or participant code numbers; Greiner, Ockenfels, & 
Werner, 2011).  Participants in both conditions were paid identical wages in the first round, and 
then given either a 60% wage increase (“high wage” condition), or a 60% wage decrease (“low 
wage” condition) in the following round.  This increase or decrease was applied either to the pay 
rate per number of forms completed during the simulation exercise (i.e., piece rate pay) or to a 
flat payoff amount (i.e., flat wage condition, with a pay amount equal to the average payoff from 
the piece rate condition).  In the public wage condition, individuals receiving a 60% increase 




piece rate pay exhibited more shirking (i.e., improving performance quantity at the expense of 
quality).  In the private wage condition, there were no significant performance differences 
between any of the conditions (high/low wages, or piece rate versus flat rate). 
Greiner and colleagues (2011) suggest that the findings provide “evidence that the 
transparency of wage dispersion strongly affects performance: with public information, 
increasing wages promotes effort of high earners, and lowering wages leads to more shirking” 
(Greiner et al., 2011: 238).  However, this interpretation is problematic.  Assigned wage change 
conditions (i.e., the 60% increase or decrease in wages following round one) were arbitrarily 
administered.  Furthermore, the authors note that “subjects could not assess their own 
performance relative to others” (p. 236), making direct pay-performance comparisons with 
another participant impossible.  As a result, the observed effects of transparency on performance 
quality and quantity may be attributable to the arbitrary introduction and removal of wages, 
rather than the transparency of pay information itself.  While this would not be an issue if the 
experimental design controlled for this, Greiner and colleagues indicate that the only control was 
for subjects’ ability (measured as performance in the first round).  Based on the available 
information provided by the study authors, interpretation of the results is limited. 
In the management literature, Lawler’s (1965, 1966, 1967) survey work in several 
organizations has heavily influenced investigations into the relationship between pay secrecy and 
individual performance.  Notably, none of the original studies include an actual measure of 
performance; only satisfaction and the accuracy of pay-related perceptions were directly 
measured.  The now widely cited performance findings are based largely on inferences and 
theoretical conjecture posed by Lawler.  For example, in a study of four organizations with a 




incorrect estimates when asked to guess the pay of others (Lawler, 1965, 1966).  More 
specifically, managers in these organizations with more restrictive pay communication policies 
tended to systematically overestimate the pay of peers and subordinates, while simultaneously 
underestimating the pay of their superiors.   
In contrast to managers in more secretive organizations, managers in three government 
agencies with published pay scale information made more accurate comparisons (Lawler, 1965, 
1966).  Based on these findings, Lawler suggests that the systematic over- and underestimation 
of others’ pay may have negative motivation effects for two desirable behaviors.  First, 
promotion-seeking may be negatively affected because underestimating the pay of superiors 
makes those positions appear less desirable.  Second, task performance may be negatively 
affected because overestimating the pay of peers and subordinates creates the perception that 
one’s own pay is comparatively lower, which may be interpreted as negative performance 
feedback (Lawler, 1965, 1966).  In a later study, the proposed negative effect of pay secrecy on 
motivation was directly tested (Lawler, 1967).  In an organization with “a policy of strict secrecy 
with respect to pay levels” (Lawler, 1967: 184), manufacturing employees who overestimated 
the pay of superiors self-reported that promotion was relatively unimportant.  These employees 
also indicated that they believed job performance (measured as effort, productivity, and quality 
of performance) was relatively unimportant in determining pay (Lawler, 1967), suggesting that 
secrecy may influence perceptions of the relationship between performance and subsequent pay 
(i.e., the PPay expectancy; Lawler, 1973, 1981; Vroom, 1964). 
Taken together, these findings suggest that pay secrecy may negatively impact 
motivation, and ultimately, individual performance.  Viewed in the context of expectancy theory, 




when pay-related information is restricted; Lawler, 1967), the belief that performance will lead 
to pay as an outcome (i.e., the PPay expectancy; Lawler, 1973, 1981; Vroom, 1964) is unclear.  
As a result, the perceived PPay expectancy may fail to accurately reflect the true strength of 
the relationship between performance and pay.  All else equal, when the perceived link between 
performance and pay is perceived as relatively weak or unimportant, motivation for performance 
should decrease. 
 To test this theoretical proposition, Futrell and Jenkins (1978) conducted a field 
experiment among pharmaceutical salespersons.  The experimental manipulation consisted of the 
introduction of a new pay policy, whereby salespersons were given the individual low and high 
merit raise amounts, as well as the overall average merit raise amount for the previous year.  
Each salesperson’s performance evaluation was also made available for review by other 
salespersons (again, highlighting the importance of considering the extent to which performance 
information is also communicated).  In the experimental (open) condition, salespersons had both 
higher job performance (based on supervisory ratings of five items), and were also more satisfied 
with their pay, promotion policies, and work than salespersons in the control group.  While this 
suggests that open pay and performance information are positively related to job performance 
ratings and satisfaction, the specific mechanisms that drive these effects were not considered. 
 Recent empirical work has started to investigate the psychological mechanisms that 
mediate the effects of pay communication on individual performance.  In two separate 
experimental studies (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014), 
participants were invited to play a “magic stones” game as part of a lab-based simulation to earn 
money.  In both studies, pay communication was manipulated to create a secret condition 




a partially open condition (where the pay – but not performance – of other participants was 
shared by code number).  In each study, perceived instrumentality (i.e., PPay expectancy) was 
also measured as the “percentage of total pay that an individual perceives to be contingent on 
performance” (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 977).  Participants were first asked to estimate 
the likely bonus associated with both a low and a high level of performance.  The difference 
between the estimated bonus amounts of the two conditions was then calculated as a proportion 
of total pay to capture perceived instrumentality, or the relationship between performance and 
pay (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 977).   
Results from these two studies provide insight into the cognitive mechanisms that may 
explain the relationship between pay communication, motivation, and performance.  In the first 
study (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010), individual task performance was significantly lower 
in the secret pay condition than in the (partially) open pay condition, and this negative effect was 
partially mediated by perceived instrumentality.  However, this negative effect on task 
performance only occurred among individuals who were less tolerant of inequity (measured via 
equity sensitivity, a dispositional construct reflecting individual sensitivity to the presence or 
absence of equity in social exchange; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 965).  While the 
authors also tested perceived fairness (both informational and procedural) as potential mediators, 
the hypothesized relationships were not supported.  The non-significance of fairness as a 
potential mediator of the secrecy-performance relationship suggests that equity and fairness 
considerations may operate through separate mechanisms distinct from motivation.  This issue is 
explored in detail in the following chapter.   
A second laboratory study using the same protocol (Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014) 




negative effect was mediated by perceived instrumentality.  Moderating effects revealed that the 
negative effect of secrecy on individual task performance was amplified when pay determination 
criteria were relative, and attenuated when performance assessment was objective.  While this 
provides evidence that other system elements may moderate the secrecy-performance 
relationship, the impact of these elements on specific components of motivation remain unclear. 
Taken together, a negative relationship between pay secrecy and individual performance 
has been theoretically postulated (e.g., Lawler, 1965, 1966, 1967), and empirical evidence 
provides tentative support for this contention (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; 
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Futrell & Jenkins, 1978).  Although instrumentality 
perceptions (i.e., the relationship between pay and performance) may partially explain secrecy’s 
negative influence on motivation (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & 
Bamberger, 2014), the PPay instrumentality represents just one piece of motivational force.  
This narrow focus on instrumentality perceptions has ignored how pay communication may 
influence additional motivational mechanisms, including the EP expectancy (Lawler, 1973, 
1981; Vroom, 1964).  By incorporating the full expectancy model into an investigation of the 
secrecy-performance relationship, we can begin to understand how specific psychological 
mechanisms of motivation are impacted by the communication of pay information. 
Summary 
 While the incentive effect of PFP can motivate performance and productivity among 
employees (Rynes et al., 2005; Gerhart & Fang, 2014), studies often assume that accurate pay 
information is known.  In the pay secrecy domain, scholars have investigated how variations in 
the communication of pay information may impact motivation and individual performance.   




development.  For example, causal inferences regarding the relationship between pay secrecy 
and performance have been limited to a handful of experimental studies (e.g., Greiner et al., 
2011; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014), with most studies 
in the literature utilizing survey methodology instead.  While extant work provides tentative 
guidance for theory development, the exact nature of pay secrecy’s influence on motivation and 
performance remains unclear. 
A second and more serious impediment to theoretical development is that mediating 
mechanisms of the pay communication-performance relationship have only recently been 
considered (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014).  In the 
few instances where these psychological mechanisms have been investigated, it has often been in 
isolation (e.g., the inclusion of instrumentality perceptions but no other motivational mechanisms 
in the Bamberger and Belogolovsky studies).  Theory has neglected to consider how secrecy may 
impact other elements of motivation (besides the PPay expectancy) to alter individual 
performance.  Potential behavioral outcomes beyond performance have largely been ignored (for 
an exception, see Bamberger and Belogolovsky, 2017).  These empirical deficiencies may be 
attributed in large part to the absence of a cohesive theoretical framework that is well-suited to 
investigating how the communication of pay information alters PFP’s incentive effect.  To begin 
exploring how the incentive effect operates when the communication of pay information is 
restricted, expectancy theory is used to examine the perceptual and cognitive components that 
drive motivational force.   
Exploration of Incentive Effects 
 Individuals in organizations “are often forced to choose among a number of behaviors 




of motivation that can be used to predict the specific type of behavior an individual is likely to 
choose.  Generally, the most probable course of action is that with the highest motivational force 
(that is, the highest [EP * ∑ (PPay * V)]; Lawler, 1973; Vroom, 1964).  In the context of 
performance-based pay raises, individuals should be more motivated to choose performance if 
they believe effort will lead to the desired level of performance (i.e., high EP expectancy), if 
they believe that performance is likely to be followed by a pay raise (i.e., high PPay 
expectancy), and if that raise is perceived as relatively desirable (i.e., high valence).  Conversely, 
if individuals feel less capable of performing at the desired level (i.e., low EP), are unsure if 
performance will be followed by a raise (i.e., low PPay), and if the raise is seen as relatively 
less desirable (i.e., low valence), motivational force to exert effort toward performing should 
decrease, and performance becomes a less likely course of action.  It is important to note that 
given the multiplicative nature of the expectancy formula, if either of the two components – 
(EP) or the sum of (PPay * V) – are not present to some degree, there will be no 
motivational force (Lawler, 1973).  That is, if an individual does not believe that any amount of 
effort will lead to performance (i.e., EP is zero), and/or does not believe that at least some 
desirable raise will follow performance (i.e., the sum of [PPay * V] is zero), then motivational 
force will also be zero. 
 It is also important to highlight the distinction between theoretical and actual 
motivational force.  As noted above, the theoretical motivational force of expectancy theory 
states that the motivation to choose to exert effort toward a certain course of action will be 
highest when individuals feel relatively capable of achieving a desired level of performance 
(EP), and when they believe that performing at that level will be followed by a desirable pay 




choice to exert effort toward a certain course of action).  Because the different components of 
theoretical motivational force are perceptual in nature, one would expect that as perceptions of a 
particular compensation system increase in accuracy, so too would the accuracy of predictions 
about actual motivational force also increase.  This means that across the nine cells of the 
proposed matrix framework, actual motivational force could be the same or vary widely – it 
depends on the interaction of perceptual accuracy with the expectancy theory components of 
theoretical motivational force. 
 The communication of pay information can influence the accuracy of the perceptual 
antecedents of theoretical motivational force.  Using the pay secrecy matrix developed in 
Chapter 2, the remaining sections of this chapter explore how different combinations of 
distributive and procedural pay information can alter perceptions of expectancy (EP) and 
instrumentality (PPay) to influence motivation dynamics and performance outcomes.  In short, 
the interactive effects of communicating different combinations of distributive and procedural 
pay information are proposed to alter the accuracy of PPay perceptions by influencing its two 
antecedents (i.e., perceptions of the objective situation and communications from others).  The 
following sections first explore the separate influences of distributive and procedural pay 
information on PPay perceptions.  Next, a cell-by-cell analysis of the matrix framework is 
conducted to understand how the nine distinct combinations of pay information may 
differentially alter motivation and the incentive effect. 
PPay Expectancies and the Communication of Pay Information 
The PPay expectancy is the motivational mechanism most likely to be influenced by 
the interaction of distributive and procedural pay information.  Transparency in the 




While distributive information clarifies pay raise outcomes, procedural pay information 
communicates details about performance and the standards to which pay raises are tied.  
Depending on the type (distributive v. procedural) and degree (none, general, specific) of pay 
information that is shared, the accuracy of the PPay expectancy may vary.  Before exploring 
the interactive effects of the matrix framework, the separate effects of distributive and procedural 
pay information on PPay accuracy are first considered. 
Distributive Pay Information 
The PPay expectancy encompasses an individual’s subjective probability assessment of 
the consequences of a course of action (Lawler, 1973).  For example, if a factory worker believes 
that producing 1,000 units annually will be followed by a $1/hour raise, the PPay expectancy 
will be relatively strong and motivational force to produce 1,000 units should increase.  
Conversely, if an individual is unsure if the organization will distribute a $1/hour raise if 1,000 
units are produced, the PPay expectancy weakens, and – all else equal – the motivational force 
to produce 1,000 units decreases.   
 Distributive pay information communicates particulars about pay raise outcomes, or who 
makes what raise amount.  When distributive pay information is absolutely secret, individuals 
know only the amount of their own pay raise.  With this absolute distributive secrecy, 
information about the pay raise amounts of others remains unknown, and individuals are 
therefore only capable of accurately assessing the link between their own pay raise and own level 
of performance.    
 As described in Chapter 2, the communication of distributive pay information influences 




others (Lawler, 1973).  When an organization formally shares no distributive pay information, 
individuals may turn to other sources to obtain the information needed to form PPay 
expectancies.  For example, individuals may make inferences about the objective situation (i.e., 
the true relationship between performance and pay) by estimating the distributive pay 
information of others.  This is problematic, as research indicates that individuals can be 
inaccurate when estimating others’ pay in the absence of formally communicated pay 
information (Lawler, 1965, 1966, 1967).  As a result of these “inaccurate guesses” (Lawler, 
1965: 18), individuals’ perceptions of the objective situation and subsequent inferences about the 
relationship between their own performance and pay raise may be inaccurate as well.  
Communication from others may further exacerbate these inaccurate perceptions.   
For example, suppose a recently hired factory worker is often seen by coworkers arriving 
late and leaving early, and has been found napping in the office on several occasions.  Although 
the worker did not receive a raise last year (the objective situation), the individual continues to 
brag about receiving a $3/hour raise.  In the absence of accurate distributive information to the 
contrary, other employees may be inclined to believe this informal communication.  The 
inaccurate information suggests that the focal individual – despite appearing to be a low 
performer – received a higher pay raise.  Even though this information is objectively untrue, with 
distributive secrecy, employees lack the accurate information needed to challenge informal 
sources.   
Furthermore, if it is believed that a low-performing employee received a high pay raise, 
this inaccurate information may weaken the PPay expectancy of an otherwise strong PFP 
system.  All else equal, a weaker PPay expectancy lowers motivational force, reducing the 




to receive a raise.  In this example, motivational force for the desirable behavior of productivity 
is hindered by absolute distributive secrecy.  This outcome is dysfunctional for both the 
individual and the organization.  For the individual, lower motivational force to produce 1,000 
units reduces the likelihood that effort will be exerted toward productivity, and receiving a raise 
becomes less likely.  Similarly, it is dysfunctional for the organization to have employees who 
are less motivated to perform. 
Transparency in the communication of accurate distributive pay information could be 
used to clarify the link between performance and pay, improving the accuracy of PPay 
expectancies.  First, organizations may choose to communicate general distributive information 
about pay raises by sharing pay raise ranges and medians for different jobs.  In the preceding 
example, perhaps factory workers actually received pay raises ranging from $.50 to $2 per hour, 
with a median increase of $1.  Sharing this general distributive information would make it 
readily apparent that the employee claiming to have received a $3/hour raise is being untruthful 
(as it is now known that the highest raise received was $2/hour).  When accurate information is 
formally communicated, employees are better equipped to challenge perceptual inaccuracies. 
 Second, organizations may choose to communicate specific distributive information by 
sharing the exact raise amounts given to unique individuals.  If our hypothetical factory made 
specific distributive information transparent, workers could clearly see that the employee in 
question received no raise.  This accurate information should strengthen the belief that pay raises 
are indeed based on performance (i.e., high PPay expectancy), since it becomes clear that the 
employee who is believed to be a low performer received no pay raise.  All else equal then, 




When pay raise amounts are listed individually by name, this reflects specific distributive 
transparency.  However, if no procedural information is also communicated, the reasons as to 
why these amounts were given remain unknown (i.e., Cell 7 of the matrix).  Specific distributive 
transparency without corresponding procedural transparency creates a precarious situation.   
Here, individuals can clearly see who made what, but it is unclear if raises were distributed on 
the basis of performance.  To some extent, individuals may be able to infer the performance level 
of others (e.g., noticing that an employee leaves early and arrives late).  Without accurate 
procedural information however, these inferences may again be based on informal information 
that is inaccurate.  
Returning to the hypothetical employee in question, perhaps the worker’s individual 
performance last year was not sub-par, and instead a newly instituted policy mandating a one-
year pay freeze for all new hires is the true reason a pay raise was not given.  If specific 
distributive information is communicated, individuals could easily see that the employee in 
question received no pay increase.  However, without any procedural information to indicate 
why no raise was given, individuals may continue making inaccurate attributions.  For example, 
perhaps the employee has been working extra hours and performing at a very high level, but this 
has negatively affected the employee’s sleep patterns.  When procedural information is not 
formally communicated, individuals may be disgruntled that a seemingly low-performing 
coworker has not been terminated.  To further enhance the accuracy of PPay assessments, the 
communication of specific distributive information should be accompanied with the 
communication of at least general procedural pay information.  Together, this provides 
employees with the information needed to make more accurate assessments of the relationship 




other organizational members.  When specific distributive information and general procedural 
information are both communicated, individuals can clearly see not only who made what, but 
they also have general insight as to why these raise amounts were given.  Based on the preceding 
arguments it is proposed that: 
Proposition 1:  When pay raises are based on performance, the communication of general 
distributive pay information improves the accuracy of the PPay expectancy for performance. 
Proposition 2:  When pay raises are based on performance, the communication of specific 
distributive pay information improves the accuracy of the PPay expectancy for performance, 
so long as general procedural pay information is also communicated. 
Procedural Pay Information 
 Procedural pay information communicates how and why distributive pay raise decisions 
are made.  With absolute procedural secrecy, individuals lack any accurate information about the 
processes used to distribute pay increases.  To illustrate how secrecy in the communication of 
procedural pay information can impact PPay expectancies, consider the following scenario 
involving employees in a medical research facility.  Assume employees are told that individual 
performance-based pay raises will be distributed, but no additional information is provided.  This 
situation represents absolute procedural secrecy.  While individuals may feel capable of 
conducting medical research (i.e., high EP), they lack the information needed to form accurate 
assessments of the probability that conducting research will be followed by a raise (i.e., PPay).  
In the absence of accurate procedural information, individuals may seek informal information 




 When no procedural pay information is communicated, individuals lack accurate 
information about the processes used to determine pay raise amounts.  For example, although the 
medical researchers have been told that performance-based pay raises will be disbursed, they 
have no information about the specifics of performance measurement.  Without knowing how 
performance is measured (e.g., via results- or behavior-based criteria) individuals may find it 
difficult to alter their behavior to influence the measures to which the pay raise is tied.  For 
example, one of the researchers may believe that “performance” means the publication of 
research in top-tier outlets (reflective of performance quality).  Another researcher may believe 
that the total number of publications in a given year determines performance (reflective of 
performance quantity).  In contrast to what the researchers believe constitutes performance, pay 
raises are actually distributed based on supervisory performance ratings.  In the absence of this 
procedural pay information, the researchers are motivated to exert effort toward courses of action 
(i.e., those associated with performance quality v. quantity) that do not influence the true 
performance measure (i.e., subjective supervisory ratings) used to distribute raises. 
For pay raises to motivate performance, general procedural information must be 
communicated to clarify performance expectations.  For example, the medical researchers may 
be told that pay raises are distributed based on supervisory ratings of two behaviors: observed 
collaboration and attendance.  By sharing measurement criteria information, individuals should 
have a clearer understanding of how to perform, improving the accuracy of the PPay 
expectancy.  With general procedural information transparent, the medical researchers should 
understand that collaboration and attendance – as rated by supervisors – are the measures used to 
determine pay raise distribution.  As a result, individuals can direct their effort toward engaging 




In this instance, the outcome is functional for both the individual and the organization.  For the 
individual researcher, focusing on the desirable behaviors of collaboration and attendance should 
increase the likelihood of successfully influencing the performance measure to receive a raise (a 
functional outcome).  For the organization, this outcome is also functional because employees 
should be more motivated to engage in the specific performance behaviors that the organization 
values.  Based on the preceding arguments it is proposed that: 
Proposition 3:  When pay raises are based on performance, the communication of general 
procedural pay information improves the accuracy of the PPay expectancy for performance. 
 Finally, an organization may communicate specific procedural pay information.  Here, 
pay raise formulas may be shared, further clarifying the link between performance and pay.  For 
example, medical researchers may be told that supervisory ratings of collaboration account for 
80 percent of the subsequent raise amount, while attendance comprises the remaining 20 percent.  
This sends a signal to employees that collaboration is the more valued component of 
performance.  All else equal, with specific procedural information communicated, individuals 
should be more motivated to engage in behaviors that are weighted heavier in the pay raise 
formula.  Again, this desirable behavior is functional for both the individual (whose behaviors 
are focused on influencing the measure of performance that carries a higher weight in the 
determination of pay raises) and the organization (that should have employees who are motivated 
to perform well on the performance measures most valued by the organization).  It is therefore 
proposed that: 
Proposition 4:  When pay raises are based on performance, the communication of specific 





 The communication of both distributive and procedural pay information clarifies the link 
between performance and pay raise amounts.  Whereas distributive information provides 
information about the pay raise as an outcome of performance, procedural information 
communicates details about performance measurement and other processes that underlie the 
distribution of pay raises.  The strength of the PPay expectancy depends on the underlying pay 
system.  For example, procedural transparency will have no benefits for motivation and 
performance if supervisors actually give the highest raises to their favorite employees instead of 
the highest performers.  Transparency is not a substitute for a well-designed PFP system.  The 
propositions presented here assume that the underlying pay system indeed distributes pay raises 
based on performance.   
Pay Communication & the Incentive Effect Across Cells 
In addition to affecting the accuracy of PPay expectancies, the communication of 
different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information are expected to have 
different incentive effects across each of the matrix cells.  Generally speaking, perceptual 
accuracy of the expectancy components for motivation (i.e., EP and PPay) should improve 
as one moves from left to right, or from top to bottom in the matrix framework.  The following 
sections explore each cell in detail. 
Cell 1: No Distributive Information, No Procedural Information 
 With absolute secrecy in Cell 1, individuals formally know only the amount of their own 
pay raise, though they lack the procedural information needed to understand how or why this 
amount was received.  Given this combination of pay information, each perceptual component of 




to procedural secrecy, as individuals will have a difficult time accurately assessing if they can 
perform if no information about what constitutes “performance” is communicated.  Distributive 
secrecy in Cell 1 means that individuals have no accurate distributive information to which they 
can compare their own raise amount.  As a result, individuals will be unable to accurately 
determine if their own raise is relatively large or small. 
 PPay perceptions in Cell 1 are also likely to be inaccurate.  Although individuals in 
Cell 1 know the amount of their own pay raise, procedural secrecy means that no formal 
information about the raise determination process (e.g., pay raise basis, measurement criteria, 
etc.) has been formally shared.  As a result, individuals will have an accurate perception of the 
amount of their own raise, but they will not understand why this amount was received.  Any 
perceptions of performance criteria characteristics (e.g., influenceability, results- v. behavior-
based criteria) are likely to be inaccurate.  Communication from others may further distort the 
accuracy of PPay expectancies.  Due to distributive secrecy, individuals can claim to have 
received a larger (or smaller) raise than was actually received.  With procedural secrecy, they can 
also attribute the stated raise amount to any number of factors, legitimate (e.g., performance, 
effort, attendance) or not (e.g., politics). 
 To summarize, all components of motivational force are likely to be inaccurate with the 
absolute pay secrecy found in Cell 1.  With both distributive and procedural secrecy, individuals 
are incapable of accurately assessing the situation to determine if a course of action is something 
of which they are capable (EP), and if it will be followed by a pay raise (PPay).  In Cell 1, 
motivation for performance (and any other course of action) depends entirely on the accuracy of 
informal information obtained.  Because the accuracy of this information may vary, specific 




PFP to motivate performance are likely to be lost.  Distributive secrecy allows individuals to 
claim they received any raise amount, while procedural secrecy provides the opportunity to 
attribute the stated raise amount to any number of factors.  In short, with absolute pay secrecy in 
Cell 1, all perceptions of motivational force are expected to be more inaccurate than in any other 
cell of the matrix.  It is therefore proposed that: 
Proposition 5:  When distributive secrecy and procedural secrecy occur in conjunction (Cell 1), 
perceptions of (a) EP and (b) PPay will be more inaccurate than in any other cell of the 
matrix. 
Cell 2: No Distributive Information, General Procedural Information 
 In Cell 2, individuals still formally know the amount of their own raise only.  However, 
the addition of general procedural information means that individuals should have an accurate 
understanding of the pay raise basis and how it is measured.  If performance is the basis, general 
procedural transparency enhances the accuracy of perceptions about performance criteria, 
including whether the criteria are believed to be influenceable, and based on results and/or 
behaviors.  Though individuals still do not have accurate information about the raise amounts 
received by others, general procedural transparency should ensure they have a more accurate 
understanding as to why their own raise amount was received (e.g., performance, and how that 
performance is measured). 
 The combination of information communicated in Cell 2 should improve the accuracy of 
some perceptions associated with motivational force.  Distributive secrecy means that 
perceptions of others’ raise amounts may still be inaccurate, as individuals cannot accurately see 




However, the addition of general procedural pay information should improve the accuracy of 
EP perceptions.  When accurate information about performance criteria is communicated, 
individuals should have more accurate perceptions of whether they will be able to perform at the 
desired level.  The accuracy of PPay perceptions should also improve in Cell 2.  The objective 
situation can be perceived more accurately, as individuals have accurate information as to how 
their own raise amount was determined.  Nevertheless, communications from others are likely to 
be just as inaccurate as in Cell 1.  Again, distributive secrecy means that individuals can still 
claim to have received a larger or smaller raise than was received.  General procedural 
transparency, however, means that individuals can no longer claim to have received the stated 
raise amount for any reason (because information about both pay raise basis and measurement 
criteria is formally communicated). 
 Taken together, perceptions of motivational force in Cell 2 are more accurate than those 
found in Cell 1.  General procedural transparency should permit individuals to make relatively 
accurate assessments of the situation to determine if a course of action is something of which 
they are capable (EP).  Finally, the combination of pay information communicated in Cell 2 
means that PPay perceptions of one’s own objective situation should be relatively accurate.  
Communications from others are still likely to be inaccurate, as individuals can lie about their 
own pay raise amounts, and the accuracy of this communication from others cannot be verified 
due to distributive secrecy.  If PFP is used, the incentive effect is more likely to motivate 
performance than in Cell 1.  However, distributive secrecy makes it likely that the full 
motivational benefits of PFP will still go unrealized because individuals are unable to determine 
if higher levels of performance are indeed rewarded with a higher pay raise.  Based on the 




Proposition 6: When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with general procedural 
transparency (Cell 2), perceptions of (a) EP and (b) the relationship between one’s own 
performance and pay raise (PPay) will be more accurate than those in Cell 1. 
Cell 3: No Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information 
 In Cell 3, distributive secrecy combines with specific procedural transparency.  Pay raise 
formulas are open, as is information about the basis for pay raise determination and measurement 
criteria.  Though individuals still do not have accurate information about the raise amounts 
received by others, they have the most accurate understanding as to why their own raise amount 
was received.  Specific procedural information communicates how performance is defined and 
measured, and pay raise formulas indicate how the different facets of performance combine to 
determine the total pay raise amount. 
 Because of distributive secrecy, PPay expectancies based on communications from 
others may remain inaccurate.  Similarly, communications from others may be inaccurate, as 
distributive secrecy means that individuals can still claim to have received larger or smaller raise 
amounts.  The addition of specific procedural information, however, means that individuals can 
no longer claim to have received the stated raise for any reason.  Pay raise formulas clearly show 
the degree to which different facets of performance account for the total raise amount. 
 The communication of specific procedural information should therefore improve the 
accuracy of motivation-related perceptions.  Because pay formulas and performance criteria 
characteristics are communicated through specific procedural transparency, individuals can now 
accurately perceive if a measure is influenceable and based on results or behaviors.  As a result, 




the objective situation should be the most accurate.  In contrast to the general procedural 
information communicated in Cell 2, specific procedural information clarifies – to the greatest 
extent possible – the relationship between pay and performance. 
 Together, perceptions of motivational force in Cell 3 are slightly more accurate than in 
Cell 2.  Specific procedural transparency means that individuals can make accurate assessments 
of the situation to determine if a course of action is something of which they are capable (EP) 
and that will be followed by a pay raise (PPay).  While individuals in Cell 3 can accurately 
assess their own PPay expectancies, they lack any formal distributive information to 
corroborate the accuracy of these perceptions unless performance information is also made 
available (i.e., performance transparency, introduced in Chapter 2).   
 In Cell 3, the incentive effect of PFP should motivate performance.  Although distributive 
secrecy allows others to still provide false information about their own pay raise amounts, the 
addition of specific procedural transparency may allow for the unique raise amounts of others to 
be calculated, but only if performance information is also communicated by the 
organization(e.g., making individual sales numbers public if the commission rate per sales is 
already known through specific procedural transparency).  Based on this information, PPay 
perceptions should be more accurate in Cell 3 than in Cell 2.  The preceding arguments lead to 
the following propositions: 
Proposition 7:  When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with specific procedural 
transparency (Cell 3), perceptions of (a) EP and (b) the relationship between one’s own 





Cell 4: General Distributive Information, No Procedural Information 
 Individuals in Cell 4 know not only their own raise amount, they also know how this 
amount compares to the raise range and median communicated through general distributive 
transparency.  Procedural secrecy prevents individuals from understanding how or why these 
amounts were determined.  Together, the combination of pay information communicated in Cell 
4 means that individuals will understand if their own raise amount is high or low compared to the 
raise range and median, but they may not accurately understand why. 
 The components of motivational force are likely to be inaccurate in Cell 4.  Procedural 
secrecy makes it difficult for individuals to accurately assess whether they can perform at a 
desired level (i.e., EP).  Procedural secrecy increases the likelihood that PPay perceptions of 
both the self and others will be inaccurate.  Furthermore, this combination of general distributive 
transparency and procedural secrecy creates a dangerous situation in Cell 4.  Individuals can see 
if their own raise amount is relatively high or low, but they lack the procedural information 
needed to accurately understand why.  Even if PFP is used, high performers may attribute their 
high raise to any number of factors.  For example, perhaps a salesperson believes that raises are 
distributed based on objective sales numbers.  With procedural secrecy, the salesperson may be 
motivated to improve sales numbers even though in reality – and unbeknownst to the salesperson 
– raises are determined by subjective supervisory ratings of customer service behaviors.  As a 
result, the combination of pay information found in Cell 4 may motivate individuals to engage in 
alternative behaviors beyond the performance that is being measured (e.g., focusing on sales 
numbers, while the organization actually rewards customer service behaviors).  This outcome is 




that is not measured nor rewarded), and for the organization (that must now contend with 
employees who may not be motivated to perform the desired behaviors). 
 Taken together, individuals in Cell 4 cannot accurately determine if a course of action is 
something of which they are capable (EP).  They also cannot accurately assess if the course of 
action is likely to be followed by a raise (PPay).  The probability for dysfunctional outcomes is 
high in Cell 4 due to the combination of distributive transparency and procedural secrecy.  With 
PFP, individuals who receive higher raises in Cell 4 will not understand why a higher raise was 
received.  As a result, they may be motivated to continue pursing whatever course of action they 
believe is being rewarded.  In contrast, individuals who receive lower raises may be unmotivated 
to alter their behavior because they lack the procedural information needed to understand that 
their low raise was the result of poor performance.  Alternatively, the recipients of lower raises 
may also be motivated to engage in whatever course of action they believe is associated with a 
larger raise.  They may also engage in reciprocal deviance (Kemper, 1966) if they believe their 
psychological contract – the terms and conditions of the reciprocal employment relationship 
(Rousseau, 1989, 1995) – has been violated or breached (Robinson, 1996). 
 In summary, the incentive effect is unlikely to motivate performance when pay 
information of the Cell 4 variety is communicated.  EP and PPay perceptions will be just as 
inaccurate as they were in Cell 1 under absolute pay secrecy.  While individuals can see if their 
own raise amount is relatively high or low, they lack the procedural information to understand 
why.  Even if PFP is used, recipients of higher raises will not know this is the result of high 
performance, and a higher raise may fail to motivate continued high performance.  Individuals 
who receive lower raises will not understand this is due to poor performance and may be 




organization (i.e., hindering desirable behaviors), or motivated to engage in reciprocal deviance 
to retaliate against an unexplained low raise (i.e., promoting undesirable behaviors).  Taken 
together, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 8:  When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural 
secrecy (Cell 4), perceptions of (a) EP and (b) PPay will be less accurate than in Cells 2 
and 3. 
Proposition 9:  The combination of distributive transparency and procedural secrecy increases 
the likelihood that dysfunctional outcomes will be motivated. 
Cell 5: General Distributive Information, General Procedural Information 
 In Cell 5, general information about both pay raise amounts and processes are formally 
communicated.  Together, this means that individuals will know if their own raise amount is 
relatively high or low in comparison to the raise range and median (due to general distributive 
transparency, and they will also have an accurate understanding as to why (due to general 
procedural transparency).  Cell 5 represents the first instance in the matrix framework where 
some degree of both distributive and procedural pay information are communicated. 
 Perceptions related to motivation should be relatively accurate in Cell 5.  General 
procedural transparency means that individuals should have more accurate perceptions of 
whether they will be able to perform at the desired level (EP).  Finally, PPay perceptions 
determined by the objective situation are more accurate than in Cell 4, as individuals have the 
procedural information needed to understand why a relatively high or low raise amount was 
received.  However, communication from others may still produce inaccurate PPay 




relationship between performance and pay within the organization.  Without specific distributive 
transparency, individuals can still be untruthful about their own raise amount that was received. 
 With this combination of information, individuals in Cell 5 can make relatively accurate 
assessments of whether a course of action is something of which they are capable (EP) and 
that will be followed by a pay raise (PPay).  Individuals can make accurate self-assessments of 
the relationship between performance and pay.  However, they lack the specific distributive 
information needed to make more accurate assessments of the relationship between performance 
and pay.  Taken together, the components of motivational force in Cell 5 should be more 
accurate than in Cells 1 through 4, leading to the following proposition: 
Proposition 10:  When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with general 
procedural transparency (Cell 5), perceptions of (a) EP, and (b) the relationship between 
one’s own performance and pay raise (PPay for the self) will be more accurate than in Cells 1 
through 4. 
Cell 6: General Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information 
Many of the perceptual determinants of motivation are just as accurate in Cell 6 as in Cell 
5.  General distributive transparency allows individuals to accurately determine the relative size 
of their raise in comparison to the raise range and median.  Similarly, the sharing of pay raise 
formulas should allow individuals to accurately determine if they can perform at the desired level 
(EP).  PPay perceptions in Cell 6 should be more accurate than in previous cells, as open 
pay raise formulas allow individuals to see how the different performance facets contribute to the 
total pay raise amount.  This allows individuals to make more specific PPay assessments of the 




While assessments of the performance-pay relationship of the self should be the most 
accurate, communications from others are likely to remain inaccurate given the pay information 
that is communicated in Cell 6.  While individuals still do not know the unique raise amounts 
received by others, they do have general information about the range and median of pay raises 
that were distributed.  The addition of specific procedural transparency means that individuals 
can no longer claim to have received a raise for any reason – pay raise formulas clearly show the 
degree to which different facets of performance account for the total raise amount.  Depending 
on the type of performance measure that is used and whether performance information is also 
communicated, individuals in Cell 6 may be able to make relatively accurate calculations of 
others’ pay raise amounts.  For example, factory workers in a Cell 6 organization may have 
specific procedural information that a $1/hour raise is given for every 1,000 units produced.  If 
production numbers are also made public (i.e., specific distributive performance transparency), 
then the raise amounts received by unique individuals can be calculated. 
In summary, individuals in Cell 6 should have accurate perceptions of whether a certain 
course of action is something of which they are capable (EP) and if it will be followed by a 
pay raise (PPay).  While individuals can make accurate self-assessments of the relationship 
between performance and pay, they still lack the specific distributive information needed to 
make accurate assessments of the relationship between others’ performance and others’ pay 
raises.  As a result of the combination of information found in Cell 6, the components of 
motivational force are more accurate than in Cells 1 through 5.  Based on the preceding, it is 
therefore proposed that: 
Proposition 11:  When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with specific 




one’s own performance and pay raise (PPay for the self) will be more accurate than those in 
Cells 1 through 5. 
Cell 7: Specific Distributive Information, No Procedural Information 
 In Cell 7, individuals know the exact raise amounts received by others, but they lack the 
procedural information needed to accurately understand why these amounts were received.  
Individuals are able to see if their own raise amount is higher or lower than the raises received by 
distinct individuals.  However, just as in Cell 4, procedural secrecy prevents individuals from 
accurately understanding how or why these raise amounts were determined. 
The perceptions that drive motivational force and behavioral choice are likely to be based 
on inaccurate information in Cell 7.  Without any procedural information, individuals will have a 
difficult time accurately determining if they can perform at a desired level, making EP 
expectancies inaccurate.  Despite the addition of specific distributive information, perceptions of 
the relationship between one’s own performance and subsequent pay (PPay) should be 
relatively inaccurate.  Procedural secrecy ensures that they do not accurately understand why 
their raise amount was received, or why it is relatively high or low when compared to the raises 
of others (e.g., performance or some other factor). 
The second determinant of PPay perceptions – communication from others – is also 
likely to be inaccurate given the combination of pay information communicated in Cell 7.  
Individuals may attribute a high or low raise to any number of factors, and share these 
attributions through communications with others.  Unlike Cell 4, the communication of specific 
distributive information in Cell 7 means that individuals can now direct reciprocal deviance 




twice the amount of employee B’s raise, employee B can make a broad range of attributions for 
employee A’s higher raise (known to be accurate in Cell 7, due to specific distributive 
transparency).  If employee B believes that A’s higher raise was due to illegitimate factors such 
as favoritism, employee B may retaliate against employee A directly.  This outcome is 
dysfunctional for both the organization (that would prefer retaliation and other counterproductive 
behaviors be minimized) and for the individual employees.  For employee B, this situation 
hinders desirable performance behaviors while also promoting undesirable behaviors such as 
retaliation.  For employee A, desirable performance behaviors may be hindered while attempting 
to manage the repercussions of employee B’s retaliatory behavior. 
In summary, though distributive transparency in Cell 7 means that individuals can see the 
unique raise amounts received by others, procedural secrecy means that they lack the information 
needed to accurately understand why any of these raise amounts were received.  Individuals may 
make false attributions as to why raises were received.  Because uniquely identifying distributive 
pay information has been shared, individuals in Cell 7 may be motivated to target other 
employees who they believe have received higher pay for illegitimate reasons.  Individuals who 
receive lower raise amounts will not understand why a low raise was received.  As a result, they 
may be unmotivated, motivated to engage in non-performance behaviors, or perhaps even be 
motivated to engage in reciprocal deviance targeting the unique individuals who have received 
higher raises.  Based on the preceding arguments, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 12:  When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural 






Cell 8: Specific Distributive Information, General Procedural Information 
 In Cell 8, the unique raise amounts of all individuals are known, as is information about 
pay raise basis and measurement criteria.  Together, this means that individuals in Cell 8 can 
compare their own raise amount to that received by unique others; however, the addition of 
general procedural information means that individuals now have a more accurate understanding 
as to why this amount was received (e.g., performance, and the measurement criteria used). 
Perceptions that drive motivational force and behavioral choice in Cell 8 should be more 
accurate than in Cells 1 through 7.  With performance criteria information communicated 
through general procedural transparency, individuals should have more accurate perceptions of 
whether they will be able to perform at a desired level (EP).  Similarly, general procedural 
transparency also means that PPay perceptions should be accurate.  Perceptions of the 
objective situation will be more accurate than in Cell 7, as individuals now have the formal 
information needed to understand why their own raise amount is high or low compared to the 
unique raise amounts of others.  Communications from others should also produce more accurate 
PPay expectancies.  In Cell 8, individuals know the exact raise amounts received by others, 
and the sharing of general procedural information means that individuals will be able to see if 
pay is based on performance, and if so, how that performance is measured.  With this 
information open, communications from others are more likely to be accurate – individuals can 
no longer claimed to have received any raise amount, for any reason. 
Together, the perceptual components of motivational force in Cell 8 are accurate in Cell 
8.  General procedural information about pay raise basis and measurement criteria allows 
individuals to more accurately assess if a certain course of action is something of which they are 




assessments of whether performance will indeed be followed by a pay raise (PPay).  In 
contrast to Cell 5, individuals in Cell 8 have the specific distributive transparency needed to 
make accurate assessments of the relationship between their own performance and pay 
(influencing perceptions of the objective situation that drive PPay expectancies), as well as 
between the performance of others and others’ raises. 
In summary, Cell 8 is the first cell to combine specific distributive transparency with the 
sharing of general procedural information.  As a result, not only can individuals see if their raise 
amount is high or low when compared to the unique raise amounts of others, they also have the 
general procedural information needed to understand why these amounts were received.  
Because individuals know the unique raise amounts of others, they can make more accurate 
assessments of the relationship between performance and pay within the organization.  Together, 
the perceptions that drive motivational force in Cell 8 should be more accurate than in Cells 1 
through 7.  Only the addition of specific procedural information (i.e., Cell 9, or absolute pay 
transparency) can further improve perceptual accuracy. 
Proposition 13:  When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with 
general procedural transparency (Cell 8), perceptions of (a) EP, and (b) PPay will be more 
accurate than in Cells 1 through 7. 
Cell 9: Specific Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information   
 Cell 9 illustrates absolute pay transparency, wherein both specific distributive and 
specific procedural pay information are formally communicated by the organization.  As a result, 




formulas mean they now have the most specific understanding as to why they these raise 
amounts were received. 
 With absolute pay transparency, all perceptual determinants of motivational force are the 
most accurate.  Because the exact raise amounts of all employees are public, individuals can 
make the most specific comparisons of the raise amounts received.  With specific procedural 
transparency, individuals should have accurate perceptions of whether they can perform at the 
desired level (EP), as determined by perceptions of the performance criteria such as the 
perceived influenceability of the measure.  Finally, PPay perceptions should be more accurate 
than in any other cell of the matrix.  In addition to accurate perceptions of the objective situation, 
individuals should also have accurate perceptions based on communication from others.  The 
combination of pay information communicated in Cell 9 means that individuals can no longer lie 
about the raise amount received, nor can they lie about why the amount was received.  All pay 
information is open and available. 
Taken together, the perceptual components of motivational force will be the most 
accurate when transparency of the Cell 9 variety is present.  Individuals can make the most 
accurate assessments of whether a certain course of action is something of which they are 
capable (EP) and if it will be followed by a pay raise (PPay).  When specific information 
about raise amounts are communicated in conjunction with the specific calculations used to 
determine these amounts, individuals should have the most accurate perceptions.  If raises are 
indeed based on performance, high performers should see that they are highly paid in relation to 
others, and will understand how different facets of performance contribute to the total raise 
amount.  As a result, they should be motivated to continue performing at a high level to receive 




will understand how the different facets of performance contribute to their total raise amount.  
Individuals who receive smaller raises should be motivated to improve performance, as this 
combination of pay information improves the accuracy of PPay perceptions of both the self 
and others.  When employees can accurately see how performance is measured, have accurate 
information about the unique raise amounts of others, and can see how different facets of 
performance contribute to the total raise amount, the incentive effect of PFP is able to motivate 
performance.  Taken together, it is therefore proposed that: 
Proposition 14:  When specific distributive transparency and specific procedural transparency 
occur in conjunction (Cell 9), perceptions of (a) EP, and (b) PPay will be more accurate 
than in any other cell of the matrix. 
Summary 
 The matrix framework is useful for understanding how the communication of distinct 
combinations of pay information influence the incentive effect.  As illustrated in the preceding 
sections, perceptual accuracy of the motivational determinants for performance are most accurate 
when both specific distributive and specific procedural pay information are transparent.  To the 
extent that less pay information is formally communicated, individuals can be expected to hold 
more inaccurate perceptions of EP and PPay expectancies.  The different incentive effects 
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Pay Communication & Performance Going Forward 
 Pay systems communicate information.  Understanding the effects of different pay 
communication polices on motivation and performance are imperative if we are to fully 
understand the “informational value of compensation” (Bartol & Locke, 2000: 135).  Using the 
components of motivational force outlined by expectancy theory, a series of propositions have 
been posited to suggest that transparency in the communication of pay information can have 
positive effects on performance and other desirable behaviors, primarily by clarifying the 
accuracy of PPay expectancies.  However, the proposed benefits of transparency will only be 
realized if the underlying pay system has been appropriately designed.  First, for pay to motivate 
performance in a PFP system, pay raises must indeed be distributed on the basis of performance.  
Research suggests this is less common than one may think.  For example, a survey of 335 
employees in an organization that claims to use PFP found that only 35% agreed with the 
following statement: “If my performance improves, I will receive better compensation” 
(HayGroup, 2002, as cited in Gerhart et al., 2009).  Another 38% of the respondents disagreed 
with the statement.  This indicates that the perceived relationship between performance and pay 
(PPay) may not be as strong as many organizations using PFP believe. 
A second factor likely to influence the relationship between pay communication and 
performance is the degree to which transparency is accepted by individuals.  In a survey of 
several organizations both with and without transparency in the communication of pay 
information, 77% of the managers surveyed supported secrecy (Lawler, 1967).  However, this 
preference toward secrecy may be changing, as a more recent study found that 55% of managers 
favored some form of transparency in the communication of pay information (Patton, 2015).   




investigate how individual preferences for or against transparency in the communication of pay 
information can influence motivation, performance, and other behaviors through the incentive 
effect. 
Individual preferences are likely to be an important moderator of the degree to which 
individuals accept the open sharing of pay information, and the extent to which transparency can 
facilitate positive effects for motivation and performance.  If individuals are more tolerant of pay 
information being freely communicated, then more open pay systems may become more readily 
accepted.  Individual acceptance of open pay communication can also be an indicator of the 
strength of the underlying PFP system.  For example, an organization may want to consider how 
high and low performers would react if pay information was made more open.  If high 
performers (who should receive higher performance-based pay raise amounts) are predicted to 
react favorably, this could be interpreted as a sign that the underlying pay system has established 
a strong connection between performance and pay.  Alternatively, if low performers (who should 
receive lower performance-based pay raises) are instead predicted to react favorably, this would 
suggest that the PFP system has fundamental design issues.  Transparency with a weak PFP 
system may have disastrous consequences.  It could amplify the negative motivational effects of 
a PFP system with an already weak relationship between performance and pay.  
Finally, moving forward, it would be beneficial if the effects of pay communication on 
performance continue to be studied in conjunction with other elements of the compensation 
system.  As illustrated here, these different system components do not operate in isolation and 
instead combine to influence motivational force.  The effects of different pay communication 
policies are likely to be contingent on other aspects of the system including characteristics of the 




measurable in many modern organizations, as even “individual” performance is often to some 
extent a joint product reflecting both individual effort and “that of many others” (Zenger, 2016: 
3).  If the communication of pay information is intended to enhance the accuracy of perceived 
PPay expectancies, organizations must also ensure that performance is clearly and accurately 
measured. 
Chapter 3 Summary 
 In summary, Chapter 3 investigates how pay communication influences motivation and 
performance through the incentive effect.  By openly sharing a combination of distributive and 
procedural pay information, organizations may be able to improve the accuracy of individual 
PPay expectancies.  If the underlying pay system is indeed based on performance, 
transparency can be used to strengthen the degree to which individuals believe that pay is 
distributed on the basis of performance.  However, transparency in the communication of pay 
information may also make compensation inequities more salient (Zenger, 2016).  To explore the 
potential affective reactions to pay inequities and how pay communication affects these 
perceptions, Chapter 4 turns to an exploration of how pay raise satisfaction and pay raise equity 
perceptions interact with the communication of pay information to influence turnover and other 











 Chapter 4 investigates how the communication of different combinations of pay 
information may alter the attraction and retention forces of PFP’s sorting effect.  First, the 
influence of pay information on attraction via perceptions of fit or congruence are explored using 
the attraction-selection-attrition or ASA framework (Schneider, 1987).  Next, a brief review of 
the empirical studies investigating the relationship between pay communication and satisfaction 
is provided.  Finally, principles of equity theory (Adams, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler, 
1971, 1981) are used to investigate how pay communication influences perceptions of equity and 
satisfaction to alter the behavioral responses of turnover and retention. 
The Sorting Effect of PFP 
Before exploring how the communication of pay information influences applicant 
attraction and employee retention, a brief discussion of how the sorting effect should function is 
prudent.  The sorting effect describes how compensation can alter an organization’s workforce 
composition by influencing the type of individuals who are attracted to and choose to remain 
with the organization (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003).  When pay is based on individual performance, 
individuals with “higher performance motivation/aspiration/ability or higher actual performance” 
are more likely to be attracted to and remain with the organization (Fang & Gerhart, 2012: 1181).  
Accordingly, organizations can use PFP to help attract and retain higher-performing individuals. 
Implicit in the use of PFP as a sorting device is the assumption that applicants and 
employees have both accurate and complete information about the organization’s compensation 
system.  The sorting benefits of using PFP may go unrealized if individuals lack the information 




following sections, the pay secrecy matrix is used as a framework for investigating how the 
communication of pay information can influence the attraction and retention forces of the sorting 
effect.  
Attraction & Self-Selection 
During the recruitment and selection process, organizations aim to attract high-quality 
applicants, or individuals with the ability and disposition to produce more than a lower-quality 
applicant (Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007).  Though an organization’s open pay system is 
unlikely to be the deciding factor in job choice decisions, research suggests that compensation 
does play an important role in applicant perceptions of job attractiveness and job search choice 
(Rynes, 1987; Cable & Judge, 1994).  Compensation can therefore be used as a recruitment tool 
(Rynes, 1987), with different pay systems likely to attract different types of applicants.  Studies 
suggest that performance-based pay in particular may be more attractive to individuals who 
possess certain traits indicative of high-performance capability, including need for achievement 
(Bretz, Ash, & Dreher, 1989) and cognitive ability (Trank Rynes, & Bretz, 2002).  Similarly, an 
experiment by Dohmen and Falk (2011) found that university students who self-selected into a 
variable performance-based pay condition correctly solved multiplication problems faster (i.e., 
productivity) and had a higher GPA in high school (i.e., ability) than individuals who self-
selected into the fixed pay condition.  Collectively, empirical evidence suggests that 
performance-based pay can be used to attract applicants who are capable of high levels of 
performance. 
Compensation attracts potential applicants during the recruitment process through two 
complementary forces.  First, pay acts as an “important signaling device” (Gomez-Mejia, 




recruit and retain.  For example, a non-profit organization that aims to recruit cooperative team 
members may choose a team-based reward system, while a for-profit financial firm may use 
individual performance incentives to attract competitive applicants who can achieve high levels 
of individual performance.  These different pay systems send unique signals to applicants about 
the results and/or behaviors that are desired and rewarded.  While team-based pay may signal 
that cooperation and team performance are valued, the use of individual incentives instead 
communicates that individual performance is prioritized.  Because pay can “communicate so 
much about an organization’s philosophy, values, and practices” (Rynes, 1987: 190), the open 
communication of accurate pay information should enhance the accuracy of the signals it is 
intended to transmit. 
Next, applicants receive and interpret these signals, influencing the individual’s attraction 
to an organization.  According to the attraction-selection-attrition or ASA model (Schneider, 
1987), individuals are differentially attracted to organizations based on “implicit judgments of 
the congruence between those organizations’ goals…and their own personalities” (Schneider, 
Goldstein, & Smith, 1995: 749).  Generally, applicants prefer organizations with attributes and 
values that align with their own personal characteristics and preferences (Cable & Judge, 1994; 
Judge & Bretz, 1992).  When assessing this alignment, individuals form subjective assessments 
of the degree of perceived fit between their own personal characteristics and those of the 
organization (Kristof, 1996; Chapman, Uggerslev, Carroll, Piasentin, & Jones, 2005).  This 
person-environment or P-E fit can be broadly defined as “the compatibility between an 
individual and a work environment that occurs when their characteristics are well matched” 
(Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005: 281).  Perceptions of P-E fit are important in 




perceptions of fit were one of the strongest predictors of attitudinal attraction outcomes including 
job pursuit intentions, job-organization attraction, and acceptance intentions (Chapman et al., 
2005). 
Consequently, perceptions of fit are one of the primary psychological mechanisms that 
can be used to explain the relationship between the signals pay that information communicates 
and an individual’s degree of attraction to the organization.  However, when the communication 
of distributive and procedural pay information is restricted, both the intended signals and 
subsequent perceptions of P-E fit or congruence may be inaccurate.  In the following sections, 
the pay secrecy matrix provides a framework for understanding how the communication of pay 
information affects the perceptual accuracy of two components of P-E fit. 
Distributive Pay Information & Needs-Supply (N-S) Fit 
One component of P-E fit is needs-supply (N-S) fit, or “judgments of congruence 
between employees’ needs and the rewards they receive in return for their service and 
contributions on a job” (Cable & DeRue, 2002: 875).  Because distributive pay information 
clarifies perceptions of who receives what pay raise amounts, the communication of accurate 
distributive pay information should enhance the accuracy of applicants’ N-S fit perceptions.  For 
example, a firm with secrecy of the Cell 4 variety communicates only general distributive 
information including pay raise ranges and medians for jobs (e.g., current salespersons receive 
average raises between $1,000 and $3,000 annually).  This general distributive information 
provides accurate information about the potential pay raise amounts that could be received.  The 
communication of specific distributive information provides even more detailed information 
about raise amounts currently received by employees.  When distributive pay information is 




information about pay raise outcomes they should be able to more accurately infer if known raise 
ranges (or specific raise amounts) could potentially satisfy their financial needs.  As a result, 
perceptions of N-S fit should more accurately reflect reality.  The preceding arguments lead to 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 1a:  The communication of distributive pay information improves the 
accuracy of N-S fit perceptions. 
Procedural Pay Information & Demands-Ability (D-A) Fit   
Demands-ability or D-A fit describes the extent to which an individual’s knowledge, 
skills, and abilities are commensurate with those required of the job (Kristof-Brown, 
Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005).  When accurate procedural pay information is communicated, 
applicants should have a better understanding of the specific knowledge, skills, and abilities that 
are rewarded by the organization through performance-based pay increases, thereby improving 
the perceptual accuracy of D-A fit.  For example, a sales organization may communicate general 
procedural information to indicate that a pay raise is awarded for every 100 sales (i.e., Cell 5, 
when combined with the above general distributive pay information that indicates a pay raise 
range between $1,000 and $3,000).  Given the combination of pay information that is 
communicated in Cell 5, applicants now accurately know that the results-based, objective 
criterion of number of sales is used to determine pay raise amounts that average between $1,000 
and $3,000 per year.  With procedural information communicated, applicants should be capable 
of more accurately assessing whether the rewarded demands of the job are congruent with their 
own knowledge, skills, and abilities (i.e., “Do I have the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities 




Proposition 1b: The communication of procedural pay information improves the 
accuracy of D-A fit perceptions. 
Summary 
 The communication of distributive and procedural pay information can enhance the 
accuracy of individuals’ fit perceptions, a critical psychological mechanism involved in the 
attraction process.  When distributive pay information is communicated, the accuracy of N-S fit 
perceptions should improve, because applicants can more accurately determine if the potential 
pay raise amounts will satisfy their financial needs.  Returning again to the importance of 
considering the interactive effects that occur when combinations of pay information are 
communicated, the addition of procedural pay information should enhance perceptual accuracy 
of D-A fit.  In short, the ability of PFP to attract high-quality applicants is contingent upon the 
communication of accurate distributive and procedural pay information.  Nevertheless, attracting 
high-quality applicants is only half of the sorting equation – PFP and the communication of pay 
information also influences an individual’s intent to stay with an organization or to leave.  It is to 










Pay Communication and Pay Satisfaction 
Most published studies investigating the effects of pay secrecy on individual-level 
outcomes related to turnover and retention have focused on the mediating mechanism of pay 
satisfaction, or the overall positive or negative affect individuals feel regarding their pay (Miceli 
& Lane, 1991).  When these feelings are positive, pay satisfaction is experienced as a 
“pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s pay situation” 
(Locke, 1976: 1304).  Though individuals can have different affective reactions to the various 
dimensions of pay (including pay level, pay raises, pay structure and administration, and 
benefits; Heneman & Schwab, 1985), this dissertation focuses on reactions to the communication 
of information about performance-based pay raises.  Accordingly, emphasis here is placed on 
pay raise satisfaction, or the positive or negative affect that individuals have toward their own 
pay raise.  Research concerning the pay communication-satisfaction relationship can be divided 
into three distinct phases, each emphasizing different mediating mechanisms and outcomes. 
Phase 1:  Pay Satisfaction and Perceptual Accuracy.  Early research concerning 
individuals’ affective reactions to pay secrecy focused on understanding how secrecy affects 
satisfaction, specifically by altering the accuracy of individuals’ pay-related perceptions.  In a 
series of surveys with personnel managers, Lawler (1965, 1966) found that managers in 
organizations with a “policy of keeping management compensation secret” (1965: 18) and who 
believed their pay was too close to the pay of those above and below them, were more 
dissatisfied with their own pay (Lawler, 1965, 1966).  In a follow-up study conducted in a 
manufacturing company with “a policy of strict secrecy with respect to pay levels” (Lawler, 
1967: 184), only the incorrect estimation of peers’ pay was associated with increased 




Subsequent studies reported both positive and negative effects of transparency on pay 
satisfaction.  For example, in a field experiment of pharmaceutical salesmen, Futrell and Jenkins 
(1978) found that satisfaction with pay was higher following the introduction of a new pay 
policy that shared information on both raises (i.e., individual low and high merit raise amounts, 
along with the overall average for the previous year) and base pay (i.e., salary levels).  In 
contrast, Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) found that satisfaction with compensation amount, 
comparison, and administration was unrelated to the accuracy of pay perceptions, even when 
compensation ranges and midpoints were shared. 
Other studies found a negative relationship between transparency and pay satisfaction.  
When Lawler’s study design (1965, 1966) was replicated in an organization with a relative 
degree of transparency (including open pay ranges and medians), results indicated that managers 
who correctly estimated the salaries of their peers were also the most dissatisfied (Milkovich & 
Anderson, 1972).  Building on this work, research in the second phase began to incorporate pay 
equity perceptions, or the extent to which employees believe their pay is fair (Martin & Peterson, 
1987). 
Phase 2:  Pay Equity Perceptions.  Empirical research indicates that equity perceptions 
may be one of the primary mechanisms linking the communication of pay information and 
affective responses to pay.  For example, Manning and Avolio (1985) studied university 
employees’ reactions following the open publication of salary information in the campus 
newspaper.  Although correlational analyses found a negative relationship between pay 
disclosure and salary equity perceptions (r = -.28, p < .01), equity perceptions are likely more 




In contrast, more recent work suggests a positive relationship between open pay 
communication and equity perceptions.  For example, Day (2011) investigated the relationship 
between pay communication policy (both stated and perceived), four justice dimensions (i.e., 
distributive, procedural, informational, and interactional justice; Colquitt et al., 2001), and pay 
satisfaction in a sample of public university employees.  Structural equation modeling results 
suggest that when employees believe they receive more pay information (e.g., how pay levels are 
determined, minimum and maximum pay levels for one’s pay grade), they feel more fairly 
treated on all four justice dimensions.  In turn, perceptions of both distributive and procedural 
justice mediated the relationship between pay communication and pay satisfaction, suggesting 
that satisfaction with one’s own pay depends largely on equity or fairness perceptions of pay 
outcomes and processes (Day, 2011, 2012).  In addition to influencing satisfaction, pay equity 
perceptions can also impact voluntary turnover (e.g., Summers & Hendrix, 1991) – the primary 
focus of the third wave of pay communication-satisfaction research. 
Phase 3:  Satisfaction and Turnover.  Research suggests that pay satisfaction is 
negatively related to both voluntary turnover and its cognitive and behavioral antecedents.  For 
example, a study of public-school teachers found that satisfaction with pay level, pay structure, 
and pay raise were negatively associated with district-level average teacher turnover intentions to 
find employment in a setting besides public education (Currall, Towler, Judge, & Kohn, 2005).  
At the individual level, pay satisfaction was a significant predictor of withdrawal cognitions 
(including intent to leave and intent to search) across two samples of advertising managers 
(DeConinck & Stilwell, 2004). 
While these results suggest a negative effect of pay satisfaction on turnover intentions 




relationship.  For instance, in the laboratory study conducted by Belogolovsky and Bamberger 
(2014), the secrecy manipulation (i.e., participants given information only about their own pay 
and performance) had a negative effect on individuals’ continuation intentions to participate in 
additional rounds of the experimental task.  Similarly, a field experiment by Card and colleagues 
investigated how the disclosure of peers’ salaries may influence individuals’ pay satisfaction and 
job search intentions (Card, Mas, Moretti, & Saez, 2012).  Following the online publication of 
individual salary amounts for all university employees, those with below-median salaries for 
their pay unit and occupation reported lower pay satisfaction.  Individuals in the lowest pay 
quartile were also 20% more likely to report searching for a job than their peers working under 
pay secrecy.  For employees paid at or above the unit occupational median, no effect of pay 
communication on either pay satisfaction or job search intentions was found (Card et al., 2012).  
These results suggest that while the communication of pay information can influence voluntary 
turnover and its antecedents, the nature of this relationship may vary depending on the 
individual’s position in the pay structure.  Specifically, lower-paid employees may be less 
satisfied and therefore more likely to leave the organization when pay information is transparent. 
Retention & Turnover Intentions 
If the organizational performance benefits of selecting high-quality applicants are to be 
realized, less productive employees must exit the organization to be replaced by these new 
entrants.  Making a distinction between the performance levels of leavers versus stayers allows 
for a consideration of turnover functionality (Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986), a key feature of the 
sorting effect.  Functional turnover occurs when low performers exit the organization, while 




correctly sorts employees, high performers should want to stay, and low performers should want 
to leave – a situation of functional turnover and retention.  
Implicit in the sorting effect’s ability to retain high performers is that pay signals the type 
of employee the organization seeks to retain (Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014).  When 
different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information are communicated, the 
intended signal of PFP (i.e., that the organization rewards performance) may be obscured.  
Empirical studies suggest a curvilinear performance-turnover relationship, such that turnover is 
more likely for both high and low performers than for average performers (Trevor, Gerhart, & 
Boudreau, 1997).  However, pay policy features – including pay communication – can influence 
this relationship.  For example, Trevor and colleagues (1997) found that salary growth among a 
sample of exempt employees moderated the relationship for high performers such that low salary 
growth predicted extremely high turnover among employees with the highest average supervisor 
performance ratings. 
The primary affective mechanism used to explain the relationship between pay, 
performance, and turnover is satisfaction (e.g., Dreher, 1982).  In short, when pay is contingent 
on performance (i.e., high reward contingency), poor performers receive less pay and are less 
satisfied (Podsakoff & Williams, 1986), and should therefore quit at a higher rate than their 
higher-performing counterparts who receive more pay (Williams & Livingstone, 1994).  Implicit 
in these findings, however, is the assumption that employees know that rewards are based on 
performance.  For example, Shaw and Gupta (2007) found that organizational-level quit rates 
among high-performing truck drivers were lowest when pay was more dispersed, based on 
performance, and well-communicated (measured through four items including: “Drivers know 




drivers have a clear understanding of how their pay is set”; “and “We provide drivers with 
extensive information any time we make changes to the pay system,” p. 914).  When pay system 
communication was low, pay dispersion was not consistently related to quit patterns. 
The Evaluation of Pay Information 
Drawing on equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler, 1971), 
Figure 4 (based on the works of Heneman, 1985; Lawler, 1971; Miceli & Lane, 1991; as 
compiled by Williams, McDaniel, & Ford, 2007) illustrates how the communication of pay 
information can influence perceptual accuracy when individuals evaluate pay raise information.  
It should be noted that the model shown in Figure 4 is not intended to be a complete model of 
retention and turnover.  Instead, Figure 4 illustrates how the communication of pay raise 
information may influence retention and turnover cognitions (i.e., intent to stay versus intent to 
turnover).   
In short, the communication of pay information has a direct influence on the accuracy of 
individuals’ perceptions at two points in the model.  First, the communication of pay information 
influences the three antecedents of the perceived pay raise amount that an individual believes he 
or she should receive.  Regardless of accuracy, this information is then used as an evaluative 
standard for developing perceptions about the pay raise amount individuals believe they should 
receive (“a”).  This is then compared to the actual pay raise amount that was received (“b”).  
When individuals compare their standard (“a”) to the actual raise received (“b”), they form pay 




the communication of pay information also influences the relationship between pay raise 
satisfaction and an individual’s intent to remain with the organization.   
Figure 4                                                                                                                                          
The Communication of Pay Information and the Sorting Effect 
 
The Effect of Pay Information on Pay Raise Equity Antecedents 
 The communication of pay information affects the accuracy of three antecedents of the 
pay raise amount that individuals believe they should receive.  First, distributive pay information 
can influence the accuracy of employees’ perceptions of the raise amounts received by referents.  
Research suggests that when distributive pay information is not openly shared, individuals’ 
estimations of the raise amounts of others can be inaccurate.  For example, personnel managers 
working in organizations with a “policy of keeping management compensation secret” reported 
more inaccurate guesses of others’ salaries than managers working in an organization with some 
open information about pay scales, but with “each managers’ exact salary…kept confidential” 
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pay information is communicated, individuals know the exact raise amounts of unique 
individuals. 
Second, the communication of procedural pay information can alter the accuracy of the 
two remaining antecedents of pay raise equity perceptions – the perceived inputs of the self, and 
the perceived inputs of the referent other.  Inputs describe the different “investments” or 
perceived contributions that an individual brings to the job (Homans, 1961), and can include the 
employee’s skill, education, experience, and training, as well as effort and job performance 
(Adams, 1963; Lawler, 1981).  The communication of procedural pay information may improve 
the accuracy of perceptions regarding the perceived raise input requirements – both the inputs 
required of the self, and the perceived inputs of others.  For example, sales representatives may 
be told that raise amounts are determined by the number of individual subscriptions sold.  This 
general procedural information clarifies input requirements by specifying the pay raise basis and 
measurement criteria.  Specific procedural information and the communication of pay raise 
formulas further clarify the different weights of these performance inputs required for a raise. 
Both equity theory and discrepancy theory posit that pay satisfaction results when pay 
equity is perceived (Adams, 1965; Lawler, 1971, 1981).  When pay raise equity is perceived, 
individuals believe their raise amount is fair (i.e., the raise amount that should be received is 
equal to the actual raise amount received, a = b).  If an equitable raise is also recognized as 
relatively large in comparison to the raise amounts received by others, pay raise satisfaction 
should result.  However, when an individual lacks the distributive information needed to 
accurately determine if a raise is relatively high or low, pay raise satisfaction may be based on 




Proposition 2: The communication of distributive pay information has a positive effect on the 
accuracy of individuals’ perceptions of (a) the pay raise amounts of others and (b) pay raise 
satisfaction. 
Proposition 3: The communication of procedural pay information has a positive effect on the 
accuracy of individuals’ perceptions of (a) inputs of the self and (b) inputs of referent others. 
 
 Pay Raise Equity Pay Raise Inequity 
Pay Raise 
Satisfaction 
High raise + (a = b) 
 Satisfied + fair 
 Retention 
High raise + (a < b) 
 Satisfied + fair  guilt 
 Functional inequity reduction 
o Increase inputs 
o Decrease outcomes 
Pay Raise 
Dissatisfaction 
Low raise + (a = b) 
 Dissatisfied + fair 
 Turnover intentions 
Low raise + (a > b) 
 Dissatisfied + unfair  anger 
 Dysfunctional inequity reduction 
o Decrease inputs 
o Increase outcomes 
 
Figure 5                                                                                                                                   
Responses to Perceived (In)Equity and (Dis)Satisfaction 
 
Pay Communication and The Sorting Effect Across Cells 
As shown in Figure 5, different combinations of perceived pay raise (in)equity and pay 
raise (dis)satisfaction produce different cognitions (i.e., intent to stay versus intent to turnover) 
and alternative behavioral responses (i.e., altering inputs and outcomes in accordance with equity 
theory; Adams, 1965).  The following sections investigate the matrix cell-by-cell to explore how 
the communication of pay information may alter perceptions of pay raise equity and pay raise 





Cell 1: No Distributive Information, No Procedural Information 
 Absolute pay secrecy in Cell 1 means that individuals know only the amount of their own 
raise.  As a result of this absolute secrecy, all three antecedents of pay raise equity perceptions 
may be inaccurate.  Distributive secrecy suggests that individuals will have inaccurate 
perceptions of the raise amounts received by referents, while procedural secrecy alters the 
accuracy of perceptions about the performance inputs required for a raise.  Together, inaccurate 
antecedents increase the likelihood that individuals may form inaccurate assessments of the raise 
amount they believe should be received (“a” in Figure 5).  In turn, perceptions of pay raise equity 
are also likely to be inaccurate.  For example, an employee who receives a $1,000 performance-
based pay raise may inaccurately believe the raise was received for obtaining additional 
education in the past year.  Given the absolute secrecy in Cell 1, the individual cannot know that 
education is not the true basis for pay raise decisions.  This produces inaccurate perceptions of 
the inputs required of the both the self and others needed to receive a pay raise. 
 In Cell 1, even if PFP is used, high performers will be unable to see that they received a 
higher raise due to better performance, and may experience pay raise dissatisfaction and 
contemplate leaving.  At the same time, low performers cannot see their raise is low and due to 
poor performance.  If these low-performing individuals are satisfied with their raise amount, they 
may remain with the organization – a functional outcome for the individual (who is still getting 
paid despite being a low performer) that becomes dysfunctional when viewed from the 
organization’s perspective.  With the absolute secrecy in Cell 1, PFP may be unable to retain 





Proposition 4:  When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with procedural secrecy (Cell 
1), perceptions of (a) all pay raise equity antecedents and (b) pay raise satisfaction is more 
inaccurate than in any other matrix cell. 
Cell 2: No Distributive Information, General Procedural Information 
 In Cell 2, the addition of general procedural pay information means that individuals now 
know the pay raise basis and measurement criteria.  While this enhances the accuracy of 
perceived inputs of both the self and others, the final antecedent of pay equity perceptions – the 
perceived pay raise amount of the referent – remains inaccurate due to distributive secrecy.  
Similarly, perceptions of pay raise satisfaction may also be inaccurate, as distributive secrecy 
means that individuals will be unable to accurately determine if their own raise amount is 
relatively high or low.  The preceding arguments lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 5:  When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with general procedural 
transparency (Cell 2), perceptions of inputs of (a) the referent and (b) of the self are more 
accurate than in Cell 1.   Perceptions of both (c) the referent raise amount and (d) pay raise 
satisfaction remain as inaccurate as in Cell 1. 
Cell 3: No Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information 
 In Cell 3, with pay raise formulas open, individuals should have more accurate 
perceptions of their own inputs and the inputs of others.  At the same time, distributive secrecy 
ensures that individuals in Cell 3 cannot accurately infer their position in the pay raise range.  
Pay raise satisfaction is therefore likely to be based on inaccurate information.  Even if PFP is 
used to distribute raises, individuals only know the procedural formula used to determine raise 




their raise is high, and may form intentions to turnover.  Similarly, poor performers may be 
satisfied and intend to stay.  This outcome is functional only for the poor performer, who remains 
satisfied and earning pay.  For high performers and the organization as a whole, the outcome is 
dysfunctional because desired behaviors (e.g., the performance and retention of high performers) 
are hindered.  Taken together, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 6:  When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with specific procedural 
transparency (Cell 3), perceptions of (a) inputs of the referent and (b) inputs of the self are more 
accurate than in Cells 1 and 2; perceptions of (c) the referent raise amount and (d) pay raise 
satisfaction remain as inaccurate as in Cells 1 and 2. 
Cell 4: General Distributive Information, No Procedural Information 
 In Cell 4, individuals know the amount of their own raise as well as the raise range and 
median, but they lack any procedural information to understand why or how these amounts were 
determined.  Cell 4 is notable as it represents the first instance in the matrix framework where 
individuals can accurately compare their own raise amount against the raise range to see if it is 
relatively high or low.  While this should improve the accuracy of the information on which pay 
raise satisfaction is based, perceptions of pay raise equity are likely to be just as inaccurate as 
with the absolute secrecy found in Cell 1.  Despite the general distributive transparency in Cell 4, 
research suggests that perceptions of others’ raise amounts are likely to remain inaccurate (e.g., 
Lawler, 1965, 1966).  Similarly, procedural secrecy obscures any information as to how these 
amounts were determined, and perceptions of self and referent inputs are likely to be inaccurate. 
 Given the combination of pay information in Cell 4, dysfunctional outcomes are likely to 




intend to remain with the organization, though they will not understand the inputs required to 
receive future performance-based pay raises.  Conversely, lower-paid individuals will have no 
information as to why they received a smaller raise, and may seek to restore equity by engaging 
in reciprocal deviance (e.g., Kemper, 1966) or other undesirable behaviors.  The following 
proposition summarizes the preceding arguments: 
Proposition 7:  When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural 
secrecy (Cell 4), perceptions of (a) all pay raise equity antecedents are as inaccurate as in Cell 
1; and (b) pay raise satisfaction is more accurate than in Cells 1 through 3. 
Cell 5: General Distributive Information, General Procedural Information 
 Cell 5 is a unique cell in the matrix, as it represents the first time that employees have 
access to some degree of transparency in the communication of both distributive and procedural 
pay information.  With the addition of general procedural information in Cell 5, individuals 
should have a more accurate understanding as to why their own raise amount is relatively high or 
low.  If performance is the basis for raise determination, individuals now have accurate 
information as to how performance is measured.  This clarifies perceptions of the inputs of both 
the self and others, improving the accuracy of pay raise equity perceptions. 
 Cell 5 is also the first instance in the matrix framework where the sorting effect begins to 
function as intended.  Highly-paid individuals can see they received a higher raise and will 
accurately understand why the raise amount was received.  If performance is the basis, these 
highly paid individuals should be the best performers, and intent to stay becomes the likely 
response.  At the same time, individuals who receive low raises will understand that this was the 




another job with higher pay and/or lower performance requirements.  In each instance, the 
outcome is functional for both the individual and the organization – high performers are satisfied 
and should intend to stay, while low performers are dissatisfied and should therefore consider 
turning over.  Taken together, the sorting effect should largely function as intended in Cell 5, as 
suggested by the following propositions: 
Proposition 8:  When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with general 
procedural transparency (Cell 5), perceptions of (a) inputs of the referent and (b) of the self are 
more accurate than in Cells 1, 2, and 4; (c) perceptions of the referent raise amount remain as 
inaccurate as in Cells 1 through 4; and (d) perceptions of pay raise satisfaction are more 
accurate than in Cells 1 through 4. 
Proposition 9:  Cell 5 represents the minimum distributive and procedural pay information that 
must be communicated for the sorting effect to retain high performers and encourage the 
turnover of low performers. 
Cell 6: General Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information 
 In Cell 6, individuals know how their own raise amount compares to the raise range and 
median.  Because pay raise formulas are open, individuals should have the most accurate 
understanding of the inputs of both the self and others that are required for a raise.  High 
performers can see not only that they receive higher raises due to higher performance, but the 
addition of pay raise formulas means that these employees should have the most accurate 
understanding of how their higher performance inputs result in higher raise outcomes.  At the 
same time, individuals who receive lower raises can use the pay raise formula to make more 




turnover and seeking employment elsewhere is the more appropriate response.  Based on the 
preceding arguments, it is therefore proposed that: 
Proposition 10:  When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with specific 
procedural transparency (Cell 6), perceptions of (a) inputs of the referent and (b) inputs of the 
self are more accurate than in all previous cells except Cell 3; (c) perceptions of the referent 
raise amount remain as inaccurate as in Cells 1 through 5; and (d) pay raise satisfaction is more 
accurate than in Cells 1 through 5. 
Cell 7: Specific Distributive Information, No Procedural Information 
 Cell 7 represents the first matrix cell wherein individuals can directly compare their own 
raise amount to the raise amounts received by unique others.  At the same time, procedural 
secrecy means that individuals lack the accurate information needed to understand the processes 
used to determine the known pay raise amounts.  If individuals do not understand how raises are 
determined, they are unlikely to accurately comprehend the inputs required of the self and others 
for a pay raise.  Taken together, the sorting effect of PFP is unlikely to function as intended in 
Cell 7.  Individuals who receive higher raises can clearly see that their raise is higher than the 
unique raise amounts of others, but they lack any procedural information to understand why.  
Similarly, employees receiving lower raises will fail to understand why a lower amount was 
received.  Dysfunctional outcomes similar to those predicted in Cell 4 are also predicted here, 






Proposition 11:  When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural 
secrecy (Cell 7), perceptions of (a) inputs of the referent and (b) inputs of the self are as 
inaccurate as in Cells 1 and 4; (c) referent raise amounts and (d) pay raise satisfaction are more 
accurate than in Cells 1 through 6.   
Cell 8: Specific Distributive Information, General Procedural Information 
 In Cell 8, individuals know not only how their own raise amount compares to the unique 
raise amounts of others, they should also have a more accurate understanding as to how and why 
these raise amounts were determined.  This makes Cell 8 unique, as this is the first cell in the 
matrix where all perceptual determinants of pay raise equity and pay raise satisfaction should be 
accurate.  The communication of pay raise basis and measurement criteria information should 
produce accurate perceptions of both self and referent inputs, as individuals have more accurate 
information about the pay raise basis and how it is measured.  Similarly, specific distributive 
transparency promotes the most accurate perceptions of referent raises. 
 Taken together, the combination of pay information that is communicated in Cell 8 
allows the sorting effect to function as intended.  Not only will high and low performers each 
recognize their raise amounts as high or low, they can now make direct comparisons with unique 
others.  Furthermore, the addition of general procedural transparency ensures that employees 
should have a more accurate understanding of the reasoning behind these pay raise amounts.  If 
performance is indeed the basis for raise determination, those individuals who accurately 
perceive their raise as higher should also be better performers.  Assuming these individuals are 
satisfied with their raise amount, and believe it is equitable in comparison to the amount they 
should have received, intent to stay should be the most likely sorting response.  Conversely, 




performers find their raise amount to be dissatisfying – yet still believe it is equitably determined 
– intent to turnover is the most likely response.  These arguments lead to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 12:  When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with general 
procedural transparency (Cell 8), perceptions of (a) all pay raise equity antecedents and (b) pay 
raise satisfaction will be more accurate than in any other cell of the matrix except Cell 9. 
Cell 9: Specific Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information   
 The combination of pay information communicated in Cell 9 represents absolute pay 
transparency.  All three antecedents of pay equity perceptions are more accurate here than in any 
other cell of the matrix.  With specific distributive transparency, perceptions of others’ raise 
amounts should be the most accurate, allowing individuals to make direct comparisons with 
others’ raises.  Similarly, the communication of specific procedural information includes the 
sharing of pay raise formulas, allowing individuals to make the most accurate assessments of the 
inputs of both the self and of others that are required for a raise. 
Together, the absolute distributive transparency combined with absolute procedural 
transparency in Cell 9 provides the best theoretical situation in which the sorting effect can 
function as intended.  When all pay information is transparent – including the unique raise 
amounts of others – there remains no pay information to be obscured.  As a result, individuals 
who receive relatively higher raise amounts can see that these raise amounts are high.  If 
performance is the basis, these individuals also have the procedural information needed to 
accurately understand that a higher raise was the result of better performance, should therefore 




see their raises are relatively lower and should be dissatisfied.  If these low performers believe 
the raise amount was equitably determined, then intent to turnover is the likely response.  
However, if inequity is perceived – whether based on accurate information or not – these low 
performers may be motivated to retaliate through various forms of reciprocal deviance (Kemper, 
1966) – an issue addressed in the closing sections of this chapter.  It is therefore proposed that:  
Proposition 13:  When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with specific 
procedural transparency (Cell 9), perceptions of (a) all pay raise equity antecedents and (b) pay 
raise satisfaction will more accurate than in any other cell of the matrix. 
Summary 
 In short, both accurate distributive and procedural pay information are required for the 
formation of accurate perceptions of equity and satisfaction associated with performance-based 
pay raises.  High performers are most likely to be retained when they can see that they received a 
higher raise because they are better performers.  Similarly, low performers have the greatest 
likelihood of voluntary turnover when they can see that a lower raise was received due to poorer 
performance.  However, the unique behavioral response that emerges from individuals’ 
perceptions depends on the specific combination of perceived pay raise (in)equity and 
(dis)satisfaction . 
Sorting Responses & Equity 
It is proposed that when perceptions of pay raise equity combine with either pay raise 
satisfaction or pay raise dissatisfaction, individuals will experience retention or turnover 
intentions associated with the sorting effect.  To promote the functional retention of high 




performance-based pay system must be communicated.  In contrast, perceptions of inequity can 
combine with pay raise satisfaction or dissatisfaction to prompt a range of behaviors aimed at 
reducing the perceived inequity.  Here, the specific behavioral outcome that is likely to emerge 
depends on the type of inequity that is perceived.  While perceived overreward or positive 
inequity is likely to produce largely functional outcomes driven by feelings of guilt, negative 
inequity or underreward may result in reciprocal deviance (Kemper, 1966) and other 
dysfunctional outcomes driven by feelings of anger or hostility.  Before exploring the possible 
behavioral responses to perceived inequity, the outcomes of pay raise equity perceptions are first 
discussed. 
Pay Raise Equity + Pay Raise Satisfaction   Intent to Stay 
When individuals believe they are fairly paid (i.e., pay raise equity is perceived) and also 
hold positive feelings about their pay raise (i.e., pay raise satisfaction), it is unlikely that they 
will have a desire to leave a compensation arrangement that is viewed as both fair and satisfying.  
When no distributive pay information is communicated however, individuals will be unable to 
accurately infer if their own pay raise is relatively large or small in comparison to others.   
When general distributive information is open, individuals should be able to clearly see if 
their own pay raise amount is above or below the median, and near the top or bottom of the 
range.  Similarly, the addition of specific distributive pay information means that individuals can 
now see their exact position in relation to the unique pay raise amounts of other employees. 
When distributive information is open, individuals who receive high raise amounts should 
understand their raise to be high and should be more satisfied.  Similarly, individuals who 
receive relatively low raises should understand their raise to be comparatively low, and should be 




Unless procedural pay information is also communicated, there is no guarantee that 
satisfied individuals will also be the best performers.  Without procedural information, 
individuals may assume that an above-average raise is attributable to a variety of factors (e.g., 
legitimate factors such as education or job experience, or illegitimate ones including favoritism 
or politics).  When both general distributive and general procedural information are 
communicated, individuals can clearly see if a raise amount is high or low and can see if that 
raise is attributable to performance, seniority, or some other factor.  If pay is indeed based on 
performance, individuals who receive the highest raises and are the most satisfied should also be 
the best performers.  Because they perceive their pay raise as fair and are also satisfied, these 
individuals should intend to stay with the organization and the sorting effect of PFP functions as 
intended to retain the best performers.  Based on the preceding arguments it is proposed that: 
 
Proposition 14:  When distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural 
transparency (Cell 5, 6, 8, or 9) pay raise satisfaction perceptions are accurate.  If pay is based 
on performance, and both pay raise equity and pay raise satisfaction are perceived, high-
performing individuals are retained. 
Pay Raise Equity + Pay Raise Dissatisfaction   Intent to Turnover 
 Individuals who believe they are equitably rewarded tend to experience more satisfaction 
than those who believe they are inequitably rewarded (e.g., Hegtvedt, 1987).  And yet, 
individuals who feel their raise is equitable or fair can still experience dissatisfaction.  For 
example, an individual may believe his or her raise amount is fairly determined, but may still be 




Pay raise satisfaction has been empirically identified as an antecedent of voluntary 
turnover (Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Griffeth & Hom, 1995), and is significantly and 
negatively related to both turnover intentions and actual turnover (Tekleab, Bartol, & Liu, 2005).  
If general distributive information is communicated, individuals receiving smaller raise amounts 
have the information needed to see that their raise is relatively low and should be less satisfied.  
If raises are distributed on the basis of performance – and if this procedural information is also 
communicated – individuals who receive lower raise amounts should understand this is due to 
sub-par performance and may consider leaving the organization.  The preceding arguments lead 
to the following proposition: 
Proposition 15:  When distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural 
transparency (Cell 5, 6, 8, or 9), pay raise satisfaction perceptions are accurate.  If pay is based 
on performance, and both pay raise equity and pay raise dissatisfaction are perceived, low-
performing individuals form turnover intentions. 
Summary 
 In summary, for the sorting effect to function as intended, the communication of both 
distributive pay information and procedural pay information is needed.  At a minimum, this 
occurs in Cell 5, with general information about both pay outcomes and pay processes 
communicated.  However, perceptual accuracy improves as this information becomes specific.  
For example, in Cell 9, individuals who receive higher raises should be more satisfied and should 
also be better performers, and intent to stay is the likely sorting response.  At the same time, 
individuals who receive relatively smaller raises should be less satisfied (and if PFP is used, 




Alternative Sorting Responses & Inequity 
The above section considered the behavioral sorting outcomes (i.e., turnover intentions) 
that occur when pay raise equity is perceived.  Of course, not every individual will feel that his 
or her pay raise is fair.  The final sections of this chapter explore the behavioral outcomes that 
occur when positive or negative inequity interact with feelings of pay raise satisfaction or pay 
raise dissatisfaction about the raise amount received.  
Positive Pay Raise Inequity + Pay Raise Satisfaction   Functional Inequity Reduction 
Positive inequity or overreward results when the actual raise amount is greater than the 
amount an individual believes should have been received (i.e., a < b).  Research suggests that the 
threshold for experiencing inequity may be higher in situations of overreward (versus 
underreward), as individuals may “rationalize their overreward as ‘good fortune’ without the 
attendant distress” (Huseman, Hatfield & Miles, 1987: 228).  When distributive pay information 
is communicated, individuals can see if their own raise amount is relatively high or low in 
comparison to the raise range and median (i.e., general distributive) or the unique raise amounts 
received by others (i.e., specific distributive).   
Despite the pay raise satisfaction that should be associated with a high raise amount, 
perceptions of positive inequity or overreward can trigger feelings of guilt for failing to pull 
one’s own weight, or unworthiness at the disproportionate amount of outcomes received (Scheer, 
Kumar, & Steenkamp, 2003; Homans, 1974; Perry, 1993).  Despite these feelings of guilt, it is 
difficult to imagine an overrewarded employee feeling guilty to the extent that they are 




that those who experience overreward will be motivated to reduce the perceived inequity by 
altering the inputs and outcomes of the self and others (Adams, 1965). 
As one option, overrewarded employees may increase their own self inputs to restore 
balance (i.e., moving from a perception of a < b to a = b, in Figure 4).  For example, an early 
experiment by Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) recruited subjects to conduct hypothetical 
employment interviews.  Subjects in the overreward condition were given information to suggest 
that they were not actually qualified for the interviewing task, and conducted more interviews 
than subjects in the equitable condition.  In this case, individuals experiencing overreward 
increased their own inputs by conducting more interviews to increase performance quantity.  
This response is not a viable option under all performance-based pay plans.  As noted by 
Pritchard and colleagues (1972), increasing one’s quantity of performance will not reduce the 
perceived overreward when a piece-rate pay system is in place (Pritchard, Dunnette, & 
Gorgenson, 1972).  With piece rate pay, pay increases as individual production or performance 
quantity also increases – this only exacerbates the perceived positive inequity the individual is 
attempting to balance. 
If specific procedural information is communicated, individuals have the accurate 
information needed to select an appropriate inequity reduction response.  To increase inputs, 
overrewarded individuals may also improve their performance quality.  For example, the 
salesperson experiencing positive inequity may attempt to make deeper connections with 
customers and take more time making the sale to ensure that customers are satisfied.  Other 
behaviors can be used to increase an individual’s inputs or contributions to the organization.  For 
instance, organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) are discretionary, work-related behaviors 




system (Organ, 1989).  Because OCBs are not tied to the reward system, individuals do not 
receive additional compensation for performing these behaviors.  Furthermore, pay equity 
perceptions are often significantly correlated with OCBs and other extra role behaviors (e.g., 
Dittrich & Carroll, 1979; Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna, 1987).  Accordingly, increasing OCBs 
and other desirable discretionary behaviors is a viable option for individuals aiming to increase 
their inputs and reduce perceptions of overreward. 
Finally, equity theory also posits that a second behavioral strategy available for reducing 
positive inequity is to decrease outcomes of the self.  However, when the outcome of interest is a 
pay raise, requesting an outcome reduction becomes unlikely, and individuals should choose 
behaviors aimed at increasing self inputs to alleviate feelings of guilt.  Because individuals feel 
they are receiving a higher raise than is deserved, any behaviors aimed at increasing inputs 
should be largely desirable and functional for both the individual and the organization.  For 
example, performing more OCBs is functional for the individual, who should alleviate some 
feelings of inequity associated with the perceived overreward.  This behavior is also functional 
for the organization, as meta-analytic evidence suggests that OCBs are negatively related to unit-
level turnover and costs, while being positively related to many measures of organizational 
effectiveness (e.g., productivity, efficiency, and profitability; Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & 
Blume, 2009).  The preceding arguments lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 16:  When individuals feel overrewarded, the communication of  distributive 
transparency in conjunction with procedural transparency (Cell 5, 6, 8, or 9), pay raise 
satisfaction perceptions are accurate and behavioral attempts to reduce positive inequity are the 





Negative Pay Raise Inequity + Pay Raise Dissatisfaction   Dysfunctional Inequity Reduction 
Individuals may experience a second form of inequity known as negative inequity or 
underreward, occurring when individuals believe they should have received a larger pay raise 
(i.e., a < b; Lawler, 1971, 1981).  When individuals feel underrewarded, dissatisfaction and other 
negative affective reactions such as feelings of deprivation or being cheated (Adams, 1965; 
Perry, 1993), or even hostility from being “shortchanged” may occur (Scheer et al., 2003: 304).  
Research suggests that individuals who feel underrewarded experience more cognitive 
dissonance and distress than those who feel overrewarded (Lane & Messe, 1971), and this 
distress may increase as the size of the perceived inequity increases (Leventhal, et al., 1969).  
Higher amounts of perceived underreward may therefore trigger more intense feelings of distress 
that necessitate more extreme behavioral action to restore equity. 
As with situations of perceived positive inequity, the type of pay information that is 
communicated impacts perceptual accuracy and influences an individual’s ability to choose an 
appropriate course of action.  Without the communication of distributive pay information, 
individuals who receive a low pay raise will be unable to verify that their raise was low in 
comparison to the raise range and median (i.e., general distributive) or the unique raise amounts 
of others (i.e., specific distributive).  When individuals perceive an inequitable situation of 
underreward, they are more likely to be dissatisfied – regardless of their actual position in the 
raise range.  While individuals experiencing overreward feel inequitably compensated to their 
own advantage, individuals experiencing underreward feel as though they are being 
shortchanged (Scheer et al., 2003) or inequitably compensated at their own expense.  With 
situations of perceived underreward, it is unlikely that the communication of any degree of 




When individuals experience a situation of both perceived underreward and pay raise 
dissatisfaction, feelings of deprivation or hostility are likely (Adams, 1965; Perry, 1993; Scheer 
et al., 2003).  In their attempts to restore balance toward equity, individuals may engage in 
several forms of so-called “reciprocal deviance” (Kemper, 1966).  As originally conceptualized, 
reciprocal deviance has the primary goal of punishing the target, suggesting that individuals can 
use deviant behavior to “harm a target that has harmed them, regardless of whether or not the 
behavior redistributes resources” (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002: 952).  One reason 
that individuals may be motivated to reciprocate harm is because the employment relationship 
between an individual and an organization is governed by social exchange rules (Bordia, 
Restubog, & Tang, 2008).  More specifically, compensation administration is often included as a 
transactional component of psychological contracts, or an individual’s beliefs regarding the 
terms of exchange between themself and the organization (Rousseau, 1989, 1995).  When this 
transactional psychological contract is breached, individuals believe the organization has failed 
to fulfill that which has been promised (Rousseau, 1995).  For example, an individual expecting 
a high raise may cognitively appraise the receipt of a lower raise as a psychological contract 
breach (e.g., Bordia et al., 2008).  In the context of employee compensation, engaging in 
reciprocal deviance may serve an additional function beyond causing harm to the organization.  
Drawing on equity theory, reciprocal deviance may be an appropriate course of action for 
alleviating perceived underreward by altering one’s inputs and outcomes toward a situation that 
is perceived as more equitable. 
As one option of reducing perceived negative inequity, individuals may choose to reduce 
their own inputs.  For example, an individual who feels as though they are being underrewarded 




for the organization, it may be functional for the individual, who is able to alleviate feelings of 
anger and hostility by restoring the input/outcome ratio perceptions to a more equitable situation.  
Because negative inequity causes more cognitive dissonance and distress than overreward (Lane 
& Messe, 1971), individuals may be motivated to reduce their inputs by engaging in reciprocal 
deviance that causes harm to the organization.  For instance, employees may engage in time theft 
by performing non-work activities while at work (Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  By putting less 
time into their work and instead engaging in non-work activities, time theft may help restore 
perceptions of equity by reducing the individuals’ work-related contributions (i.e., inputs).  This 
behavior is largely dysfunctional from the perspective of both the individual and the organization 
as spending time on non-work activities is likely to have negative performance implications at 
both the individual and organizational level of analysis. 
Alternatively, individuals may increase their own outcomes to reduce the feelings of 
anger and hostility associated with perceived underreward.  In the context of pay raises, one 
option to increase self-outcomes is to ask for a larger raise.  For this to be a viable solution, open 
and accurate distributive and procedural pay information must be communicated.  Distributive 
information such as the raise range and median (i.e., general distributive) or the unique raise 
amounts of others (i.e., specific distributive) should improve the accuracy of individuals’ 
perceptions about how much of a raise increase to request.  Similarly, procedural pay 
information improves an individual’s understanding of how the pay raise was determined.  For 
example, if individuals understand the raise basis (i.e., general procedural), they may be able to 
better justify their raise increase request by providing evidence of above-average performance (if 
performance is the basis) or differences in education or experience (if these factors are the basis 




allows individuals to make increasingly accurate requests and justifications for a pay raise 
increase.  All else equal, requests that are grounded in reality and justifiable with open pay 
information are more likely to be viewed as legitimate and to be accepted.  Taken together, the 
communication of both distributive and procedural pay information may decrease the chances 
that reciprocal deviance (Kemper, 1966) may be used for inequity reduction. 
Proposition 17:  When individuals feel underrewarded, the communication of specific 
distributive transparency in conjunction with specific procedural transparency (Cell 5, 6, 8, or 
9), pay raise satisfaction perceptions are accurate and behavioral attempts to reduce negative 
inequity are less likely to be dysfunctional for both the individual and the organization. 
Chapter 4 Summary 
 In summary, Chapter 4 uses the matrix framework to explore how the communication of 
different combinations of pay information impact the different perceptual mechanisms that drive 
the sorting effect of PFP.  Taken together, the propositions illustrate that the sorting effect 
requires – at a minimum – the communication of both general distributive and general procedural 
pay information (occurring in Cells 5, 6, 8, and 9 of the matrix framework).  For the most 
accurate perceptions, both specific distributive and specific procedural pay information (Cell 9) 
should be communicated.  If these combinations of pay information are communicated in 
conjunction with the use of performance-based pay raises, then the sorting effect of PFP should 
largely function as intended to retain high performers and promote the turnover of low 
performers.  Because sorting responses are driven by affective responses such as perceptions of 
pay raise equity and satisfaction, it is imperative that individual employee perceptions be based 




 Taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 have applied the matrix framework developed in 
Chapter 2 to enhance our understanding of how the communication of different types of pay 
information can influence the established incentive and sorting properties of PFP.  In the final 
chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 5 next provides conclusions and suggested directions for 




















DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 A lack of pay secrecy research has helped ensure that the effects of secrecy are not well-
understood.  This dissertation serves as a small advance toward clarifying the construct and its 
effects on employee attitudes and behaviors.  It is therefore a requisite first step toward moving 
the topic from being viewed as the “scanty compensation literature addressing pay secrecy” 
(Colella et al., 2007: 56), to a lively discussion driven by scholarly investigation.  Research has 
been hindered, in part, by a proliferation of construct definitions and measurement 
operationalizations.  Conflicting findings have done little to settle the debate regarding the merits 
of pay secrecy as a pay communication practice.  My goal in this dissertation has been to take a 
step back and focus on clarifying the construct itself, before next exploring its theoretical effects 
on performance and turnover outcomes.  By conceptualizing pay secrecy as the intersection of 
two continua of information – one communicating distributive pay information, and the other 
communicating procedural pay information – the pay secrecy construct can be more clearly 
mapped.  The skeletal matrix (Holtzen & Gupta, 2014) that has been fleshed out here provides a 
framework for understanding the various definitions and conceptualizations of pay secrecy that 
have clouded the literature for some time now. 
Contributions 
The most general contributions of this dissertation are three-fold.  First, it elucidates the 
construct of pay secrecy to produce a comprehensive matrix framework for organizing and 
extending the literature.  Second, the latter part of this manuscript aims to enhance our 




dysfunctional effects as two distinct continua invites further exploration and classification of 
how secrecy may alter perceptions to change behavior.  In making this distinction among 
outcomes, one can simultaneously examine the more HR-focused outcomes of performance and 
turnover, while also incorporating additional behavioral responses from the organizational 
behavior domain.  In addition to these more general implications, several distinct contributions 
are outlined below. 
Implications for Research 
 The conceptual models developed in this dissertation have several implications for HRM 
research generally, and compensation and secrecy research morespecifically.  First and foremost, 
this dissertation indicates that it is not only information content – but also the extent to which 
that information is communicated – that influences how employees perceive pay.  Other scholars 
have noted that many theories of individual motivation “presuppose that accurate information is 
critical” (Shaw & Gupta, 2002: 909).  This means that there is an implicit assumption in many 
compensation studies such that information about the pay system is known to employees.  
Furthermore, one could argue that the logical extension of this assumption is that the 
communication of pay information is also assumed to be an accurate reflection of the actual pay 
system.  As the research cited throughout this manuscript illustrates, this is often not the case.  
Pay communication has already been identified as a “critical contextual factor” (Shaw & Gupta, 
2007: 904) in other areas of compensation research, such as the pay dispersion literature.  If 
scholars are to gain a more complete understanding of how pay secrecy affects employee 
outcomes, we must move past our collective tendency to view the communication of pay 




Second, this dissertation illustrates that pay secrecy, while variable, also has predictable 
forms when viewed through the matrix framework.  By conceptualizing pay secrecy as the 
intersection of two continua of distributive and procedural pay information, we can begin to 
categorically explore the proposed effects of the nine matrix cells in future investigations of the 
topic.  The matrix framework can therefore guide our conversation on pay secrecy research by 
providing a specific definition of the information content of a previously unspecified construct.  
If scholars can begin to agree on a definition for the construct of pay secrecy, we can continue 
moving forward with investigations into the proposed effects on employee attitudes and 
behaviors. 
Third, the model presented here also informs our conversation on compensation and the 
strategic human resource management, by viewing pay system communication as one piece of a 
larger HRM system that is linked to the organization’s strategic goals.  This holistic view of pay 
communication aligns with the configurational approach to strategic human resource 
management, that is generally concerned with “how the pattern of multiple independent variables 
is related to a dependent variable” (Delery & Doty, 1996: 804).  As future work explores how 
different forms of secrecy affect strategically-relevant outcomes such as performance and 
turnover, scholars must remember that these different pay communication policies cannot be 
viewed in isolation from the other HRM system elements.  An organization’s pay 
communication policy is but one piece of the larger compensation system, and it should be 
designed to promote horizontal fit, or the internal consistency of the organization’s selected 
HRM practices.  An organization is unlikely to realize any improvements in performance and 
other outcomes from openly sharing its pay information if the underlying compensation system 




consider the strategic implications of sharing different combinations of pay information to 
differing degrees. 
Implications for Practice 
 The models developed in this dissertation also have implications for compensation 
specialists and other practitioners of HRM.  First, this dissertation suggests that new terminology 
is needed to describe pay secrecy and its different forms.  In short, the verbiage we use to 
describe pay secrecy must match its reality – namely, that secrecy is not a binary phenomenon.  
Practitioners should make a conscious effort to begin using terminology that appropriately 
conveys the different shades of secrecy that exist in organizations today.  While a 
“secret/transparent” dichotomy may be preferred by managers and organizations for simplicity, 
the vocabulary of pay secrecy must continue to evolve as the construct continues to be mapped. 
 A second and more critical implication of this dissertation for compensation practice is 
that organizations should abandon the “all-or-nothing” approach used historically to decide if 
pay secrecy is a beneficial practice.  As illustrated throughout this dissertation, the 
communication of different combinations and degrees of distributive and procedural pay 
information have unique effects of the different theoretical components of motivation, equity, 
and other elements that shape the formation of employee behaviors and attitudes.  Pay secrecy is 
not invariably desirable and good.  It is also not always harmful and undesirable.  Instead, 
different shades of secrecy are capable of producing a range of outcomes, some of which are 
likely to be functional for the individual actor but simultaneously dysfunctional when viewed 
from the perspective of the organization.  Compensation specialists and other practitioners of 
HRM should not fear transparency in the communication of pay.  Rather, managers should be 





As with any research endeavor, this dissertation is limited in certain respects.  First, while 
a comprehensive matrix of pay secrecy is articulated in detail, development of a testable pay 
secrecy measure was beyond the scope of this project.  However, the development of a pay 
secrecy scale could be a logical next step.  We must first have a clear understanding of the 
constructs involved in a phenomenon before attempting to assess the validity of its measures.  
The matrix developed here clearly outlines what is and is not included in the domain of pay 
secrecy (distributive and procedural pay information, varying across three levels of transparency 
that range from none, to general, to the most specific).  The handful of scales for measuring pay 
secrecy that are currently available in the literature – for example, Day’s (2007) 5-item pay 
communication measure, and Noy’s (2007) Perceived Organizational Pay Secrecy (POPS) scale 
– could prove useful in assessing the convergent validity of any newly developed scales.   
While there certainly remains much methodological work to be conducted in the pay 
communication realm, the conceptual groundings of this dissertation should provide a framework 
for future empirical investigations.  Future empirical testing of the propositions developed here 
will be needed to continue illuminating the pay secrecy construct, for “it is the gathering of data 
that provides the grist for debating and refuting the proliferation of conceptualization” (Reichers 
& Schneider, 1990: 26).  Put differently, data will be needed to settle the pay secrecy debate. 
 A second limitation of this manuscript stems from its intentional focus on understanding 
how system characteristics interact with secrecy to affect employee behaviors and attitudes.  The 
influence of individual differences such as personality, tolerance for inequity, and ability have 
been excluded from this dissertation.  Though theoretically relevant, individual differences are 




Although an organization can influence the ultimate composition of its workforce through 
selection procedures (e.g., using an ability test as a selection tool if high-ability applicants are 
desired), the company’s control over the individual differences of its employees ends with 
selection.  The decision in this dissertation to focus on compensation system characteristics and 
not individual differences is therefore largely pragmatic.  Once we understand how system 
characteristics interact with secrecy, an organization can then choose to (a) restructure its 
compensation system by altering certain elements, (b) change its pay communication policy by 
sharing different combinations of distributive and/or procedural pay information, or (c) alter 
both.  We must first understand the basics of secrecy and how it operates generally as a piece of 
the total compensation system.  Only then can we begin to investigate how specific individuals 
may uniquely respond to varying combinations of pay information. 
Directions for Future Research 
 Using the pay secrecy matrix as a theoretical framework, two primary directions for 
future research arise.  First, this dissertation utilized a systems-based perspective to analyze pay 
communication policies from the perspective of the organization and the chosen elements of the 
compensation system (e.g., pay raise basis, measurement criteria, etc.).  While investigating 
these system-based components is a useful starting point, it is also likely that additional 
contextual factors may moderate many of the proposed effects.  At the individual level, 
personality and other individual differences may explain a significant portion of the variance in 
the same employee outcomes that are influenced by the communication of pay information.  
Drawing on expectancy theory and equity theory for variable selection, individual differences 
such as ability (e.g., Lawler, 1971) and tolerance for inequity (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 




individual high in ability may be capable of forming a stronger assessment of the relationship 
between effort and performance (EP).  As a result, a more accurate assessment of total 
motivational force may result for individuals high in ability – even if the accuracy of the PPay 
expectancy has been altered through the restricted communication of distributive and procedural 
pay information.  In contrast, tolerance for inequity may be an important contextual factor for the 
sorting effect.  Equity sensitivity describes an individual’s sensitivity to either the presence or 
absence of equity in exchange relationships (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985, 1987).  In the 
context of the sorting effect, it is possible that individuals high in equity sensitivity may require 
the communication of less specific distributive and procedural pay information in order to 
determine if the amount of their own pay raise (and that of others) is considered equitable or fair.  
For individuals low in equity sensitivity, more specific pay information may be required in order 
to trigger the comparative process that occurs when individuals evaluate pay information in 
relation to the pay received by others. 
 At the organizational level, additional moderators emerge that may influence the 
behavioral outcomes associated with each of the nine cells.  For example, an organization’s 
culture may moderate some of the proposed effects.  If the organizational culture contains values 
(i.e., social principles, goals, philosophies, and standards; Schein, 1985) and/or assumptions (i.e., 
the taken-for-granted beliefs held by organizational members about reality and basic human 
nature; Schein, 1985) that hold secrecy in high regard, the open communication of pay 
information may not be well-received, and the proposed effects may be altered.  This dissertation 
has proposed that the open communication of pay information may improve perceptual accuracy 
of individual employees as they evaluate their pay, thereby allowing the incentive and sorting 




of high and low performers.  If the organization’s values and/or assumptions do not align with 
this openness, even the most well-communicated pay system may do little to alter employee 
attitudes and behaviors.  An organization that holds secrecy as a basic assumption or value of its 
culture is unlikely to benefit through the open communication of pay information. 
 Several features of the organization – in addition to its culture – may also predict in 
which unique matrix cell that its pay secrecy policy is likely to fall.  As noted above, an 
organization that values secrecy and ambiguity may choose to enact a more secretive pay 
communication policy, perhaps of the Cell 1 or 2 variety.  The organization’s culture may be 
further influenced by characteristics of the industry in which it primarily operates.  For example, 
organizations doing business in industries with heavy R&D investments into top-secret product 
development may choose to guard the pay information of employees just as closely as they 
choose to guard all other aspects of the organization’s day-to-day functioning.  For these 
organizations, it may be that this secrecy is viewed as a strategic choice, thereby limiting the 
likelihood that any information – even that related to pay raise administration – is openly 
communicated and shared.  Similarly, an organization may choose a specific pay communication 
policy from the matrix cells as a strategic choice.  For example, an organization with the strategic 
goal of promoting intense competition among employees may choose a pay communication 
policy of the Cell 8 or Cell 9 variety.  By communicating specific distributive information in 
conjunction with at least general procedural information, individuals may be primed to make 
direct comparisons with others.  With procedural information also communicated, individuals 
will know if performance is the basis for pay raise distribution, and may be motivated to compete 





 Organizational size may also influence the type of pay communication policy that is 
chosen.  On the one hand, a smaller organization with fewer employees may be more capable of 
executing a Cell 9 pay communication policy.  With fewer employees, there are less direct 
comparisons to be made, but the comparisons that are made may be viewed as more personal and 
emotionally-charged, simply because interpersonal relationships may be based on deeper 
connections than in organizations with thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of employees 
on its payroll.  With fewer employees to manage, smaller organizations are more likely to have 
the additional time and resources needed to explain the reasoning behind the pay information that 
is communicated.  Smaller organizations are also more likely to be able to take the time to 
individually address any questions and concerns that may arise among employees in response to 
the pay communication policy.  Conversely, a larger organization may choose to communicate 
only general distributive and procedural pay information (i.e., Cell 5).  For the very largest of 
organizations, any pay comparisons that are made are more likely to be general in nature (i.e., 
making comparisons with averages, ranges, etc.).  Any direct comparisons made are likely to be 
bounded by job family, work group, or some other factor that makes these comparisons more 
salient by reducing the number of individuals cognitively available for comparison.  Finally, 
larger organizations may not have the additional time and resources needed to address employee 
concerns and complaints that may arise if the unique raise amounts of other employees are made 
public.  These large organizations should be especially careful to avoid pay communication 
policies of the Cell 4 or Cell 7 variety, as communicating distributive pay raise information 
without corresponding procedural information may ignite workplace gossip regarding who 




An obvious second direction for future research in this area involves data collection and 
the empirical testing of the stated propositions.  More generally, management scholars must 
continue investigating how the communication of different combinations of pay information 
influence the psychological mechanisms of motivation and satisfaction.  At the same time, 
careful attention must be paid to ensure that pay communication is not studied in isolation from 
other compensation system elements.  As noted by Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010), 
“several researchers have warned of the risk of making incorrect inferences by studying pay 
strategy in isolation (Gerhart, 2000; Bamberger & Meshoulam, 2000)” (p.991).  Similarly, pay 
communication policies should not be studied in isolation from other compensation system 
elements such as pay basis, measurement criteria, and allocation rules. 
Moving forward, the next step for this project involves testing the theoretical framework 
and propositions developed here.  Two research designs are particularly well-suited to the testing 
the model developed here.  Any design has strengths and weaknesses, and more than one 
research design and study will be needed to empirically address the full range of secrecy’s 
effects.  First, an experimental design is outlined below as a quantitative method for investigating 
the causal nature of the proposed relationships.  Next, a parallel mixed methods design is 
explored as a means to assess both exploratory and confirmatory questions while generating new 
theory. 
Experimental Design 
 The development of the pay secrecy literature has been hindered by a lack of empirical 
investigations, particularly those using a research design that permits causal inferences.  As an 
alternative to the over-abundance of survey methodology used in the investigation of pay 




proposed effects, the nine cells of the matrix can be used to create experimental conditions.  
Using this design, participants could be brought into a laboratory setting and randomly assigned 
to one of the nine conditions.  The study could be framed to participants as a study on the effects 
of performance-based pay raises.  Participants could perform a specific performance-based task, 
such as the “magic stones” game from the Bamberger and Belogolovsky studies (2014, 2017), or 
other tasks commonly used by researchers in studies of performance-based pay (e.g., basic 
addition or subtraction, entering data into a spreadsheet, etc.).  Measures of pay raise satisfaction 
and pay raise equity perceptions could be collected from participants as self-report measures.  
Dependent variable information could be gathered from objective performance data (e.g., 
number of rows “turned to gold” if the magic stone game were used, or the number of correct 
math problems or data entries, etc.) and self-reported turnover intentions (i.e., by asking if the 
participant wants to continue to additional rounds of the task). 
Turning to the actual experimental pay communication manipulations involved, the 
distributive pay information independent variable requires three levels (none, general, specific), 
and the same three levels exist for the procedural pay information independent variable.  
Participants can be paid a set base amount (e.g., $1.00), and then told that pay increases may be 
available as they progress through the three to four rounds of the experimental task.  The 
communication of no distributive pay information may be manipulated by telling participants 
that, “You will receive a pay increase at the end of each experimental round” (with the 
individual’s own raise amount becoming known upon receipt of the pay amount).  For general 
distributive information to be communicated, participants could be told that, “Total pay increase 
amounts for all participants range from $0 to $1.00, with a median value of $.60.”  The median 




median pay raise amount, to reflect high v. low range position.  To communicate specific 
distributive pay information, participants may be provided with the following prompt: “Shown 
below is a list of the pay increase amounts received by you and your fellow study participants 
during the last experimental task round.  Pay raise amounts are listed by seat number, and are 
posted above each cubicle in the lab so that you may identify who was paid what amount.”  By 
explicitly identifying the raise amounts of unique individuals instead of using confidential code 
numbers, participants now have the identifying information needed to make direct pay 
comparisons with unique others.  This design feature should help overcome some of the issues in 
prior experimental studies identified at the beginning of this dissertation, particularly in relation 
to the use of code numbers to protect participant privacy (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 
2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014). 
The communication of procedural pay information manipulation also contains three 
levels.  To communicate no procedural information, participants may be told that, “You will 
receive a pay increase at the end of each performance round.”  To communicate general 
procedural pay information, participants may be told this pay increase is given “for every row 
that is turned to gold by placing stones such that they match the adjacent stones in color, shape, 
or both.”  To communicate specific procedural information about the pay raise formula, 
participants may be told that “The total raise amount is determined by multiplying the number of 
rows correctly turned to gold by the pay increase amount”.  Depending on the type of distributive 
information that is also communicated (i.e., to which of the nine matrix cell conditions the 
participant has been randomly assigned), participants may or may not know the actual pay 




The distributive and procedural pay manipulations could then be integrated to produce 
experimental conditions that replicate the nine matrix cells.  For example, an individual assigned 
to the Cell 3 condition (no distributive, specific procedural) would be told: “You will receive a 
$.50 pay increase at the end of each performance round (secret distributive), for every row that is 
turned to gold by placing stones such that they match the adjacent stones in color, shape, or both.  
The total raise amount is determined by multiplying the number of rows correctly turned to gold 
by the pay increase amount (specific procedural)”  In contrast, a participant randomly assigned 
to the Cell 4 condition (general distributive, no procedural) could be told, “You will receive a 
$.50 pay increase at the end of each performance round, with total pay increase amounts for all 
participants ranging from $0 to $1.00, with a median value of $.60.”   Finally, a participant 
randomly assigned to the Cell 8 condition (specific distributive, general procedural) could be 
provided the following prompt: “You will receive a $.50 pay increase at the end of each 
experimental task round, for every row that is turned to gold by placing stones such that they 
match the adjacent stones in color, shape, or both (general procedural).  Total pay increase 
amounts for all participants range from $0 to $1.00, with a median value of $.60.  Shown below 
is a list of the pay increase amounts received by you and your fellow study participants during 
the last performance round.  Pay raise amounts are listed by seat number, and are posted above 
each cubicle in the lab so that you may identify who was paid what amount (specific 
distributive).”  In addition to the nine pay communication manipulations, pay raise amount (and 
how it relates to the raise range and median values) would also need to be manipulated using a 
high and a low condition, in order to test the propositions developed in relation to the sorting 




The primary benefit of experimental design is that it allows for causality to be inferred.  
Through manipulation and control in a laboratory setting, plausible alternative explanations can 
be eliminated, and confidence in the observed results increases.  Second, the use of nine different 
pay communication manipulations aligns with the matrix framework.  It also remedies some of 
the issues noted with extant experimental studies that have manipulated transparency simply as 
the dissemination of pay amount (e.g., Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner, 2011), often by code 
number alone (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014).  In 
this proposed experimental design, raise amounts will be attached to unique study participants by 
identifying numbered seating locations within the lab. 
While random assignment with experimental manipulation allows for causal inferences, 
the design also has limitations.  With any laboratory setting, there will be questions about 
whether the findings generalize to external settings.  It would therefore be interesting to conduct 
a field experiment to test the model in a real organization, with employees performing real work 
in exchange for actual performance-based pay increases.  However, this would require finding a 
company that already distributes raises on the basis of performance, and that is also willing to 
reconsider its pay communication policy.  Again, using the distributive/procedural framework 
outlined here, the organization could explore the effects of the communication of different 
combinations of pay information on employee performance, satisfaction, perceptions of equity, 
and turnover intentions. 
Despite the inherent difficulties of finding an appropriate organization for study, field 
experiments and other variations of field research are being used by a growing number of 
management scholars, in order to study “real people, real problems, and real organizations” 




management field studies, Edmondson and McManus (2007) suggest that theory development in 
management research is also best conceptualized as a continuum.  At one end of this continuum 
is mature theory, involving the study of well-developed constructs and precise models; at the 
other end of this continuum is nascent theory, which “proposes tentative answers to novel 
questions of how and why, often merely suggesting connections among new phenomena” 
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007: 1158).  Near the middle of the continuum is intermediate 
theory, presenting “provisional explanations of phenomena, often introducing a new construct 
and proposing relationships between it and established constructs” (Edmondson & McManus, 
2007: 1158).   
This conceptual dissertation is one illustration of intermediate theory development.  The 
construct of pay secrecy, though not new, continues to be conceptualized and reintroduced by 
different scholars in a variety of different forms.  This dissertation aims to reconceptualize the 
pay secrecy construct, and then propose relationships between this new conceptualization and 
established constructs associated with the incentive (e.g., motivation, performance) and sorting 
(e.g., pay raise satisfaction, pay raise equity, and turnover intentions) effects.  As such, the 
framework developed by Edmondson and McManus (2007) suggests that studies of intermediate 
theory should integrate both quantitative and qualitative data, primarily to aid in the assessment 
of the external and construct validity of newly developed measures through triangulation (Jick, 
1979).  Toward this end, the following section details one possible mixed method design that 
could be used to integrate quantitative and qualitative methods into a single study of pay secrecy.  
Mixed Methods Design 
Mixed methods research involves the integration of both quantitative and qualitative data 




mixed method design involves the use of “at least two parallel and relatively independent 
strands: one with QUAL questions, data collection, and analysis techniques and the other with 
QUAN questions, data collection, and analysis techniques” (2009: 152).  For the quantitative 
strand of the mixed design, a survey could be administered in a field setting to measure different 
components of the proposed models, such as employee perceptions of equity antecedents (i.e., 
perceived pay raise amount of referent, and perceived inputs of self and referent).  Pay raise 
satisfaction, turnover intentions, and each individual’s perceived position in the pay raise range 
could also be captured using a survey methodology.  Still within the quantitative strand of the 
mixed method design, individual performance data could also be collected on each employee 
from organizational records.   
Parallel to this quantitative research strand is a relatively independent qualitative strand.  
Simultaneously, the qualitative strand of this parallel mixed design could be used to ask 
exploratory questions to begin understanding why individuals are more or less satisfied when 
different types and degrees of pay information are communicated.  Because the domain of pay 
secrecy is still being mapped as part of this intermediate theory investigation, unstructured 
interviews could be used to gather rich qualitative data from employees in a field setting.  This 
dissertation has organized employee outcomes along the incentive and sorting tracks.  Pay 
communication policies should have additional effects beyond performance and turnover, 
however.  Qualitative interviews could therefore be used to explore these effects and aid in the 
identification of variables warranting inclusion in future investigations of pay secrecy. 
The proposed parallel mixed method design outlined above provides several benefits that 
single approach designs do not.  First and foremost, this parallel mixed design of quantitative 




from each strand are integrated during the interpretation phase (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, 
& Hanson, 2003/2008: 183).  Second, this specific mixed method approach allows for 
confirmatory and exploratory questions to be addressed simultaneously (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 
2009: 33).  While the quantitative survey data could be used to gather evidence to examine the 
validity of the stated propositions, qualitative interview data may generate new information 
about unknown aspects of employee attitudes toward pay secrecy policies.  Because pay secrecy 
research has been hindered by a lack of theoretical development, a mixed methods approach 
could be a first step toward addressing this deficiency. 
Mixed methods research is also popular because it uses methods “mixed in a way that has 
complementary strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses” (Johnson & Turner, 2003: 299).  
While closed-ended, quantitative surveys are useful in generating large numbers of responses 
both quickly and inexpensively, this data collection strategy simultaneously suffers from 
potentially low response rates and missing data (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 239).  To address 
these shortcomings, qualitative interviews could ask probing questions while gathering rich 
information from participants, moving towards a deeper understanding of employees’ 
perceptions of pay secrecy policies.  Although these qualitative interviews will likely be 
expensive and time consuming, these weaknesses can hopefully be offset via the strengths of the 
quantitative survey component of the parallel mixed design (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 239). 
Finally, it is important to note that parallel mixed designs are subject to several 
limitations.  The primary concern is that it “requires considerable expertise to examine the same 
phenomenon using two different approaches in a parallel manner” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 
153).  Furthermore, it can be difficult to compare the results of two analyses based on different 




al., 2003/2008: 184).  Nevertheless, pay secrecy and its intermediate level of theory development 
is a primary candidate for investigation using a mixed methods approach. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation develops a novel theoretical framework for understanding how the 
communication of different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information 
influence the incentive and sorting properties of performance-based pay.   Propositions have 
been presented about the potentially beneficial effects that the communication of open pay 
information may have on employee motivation and performance via the incentive effect, as well 
as on satisfaction and turnover intentions via the sorting effect.  When pay information is 
transparent, the signals that pay communicates to employees (e.g., regarding the results and/or 
behaviors that are valued and rewarded) have a greater likelihood of being clearly received by 
employees.  And yet, an important caveat about the potential benefits of pay transparency must 
be stated. 
In short, transparency will only have beneficial effects if an organization’s implicit or 
actual pay policy is congruent with its espoused pay policy.  The assumption throughout this 
dissertation has been that the theoretical propositions apply to performance-based pay raises.  For 
the propositions to hold true, pay raises must actually be distributed on the basis of performance.  
If an organization says one thing and does another in regards to how it pays employees, the 
proposed relationships no longer apply.  Transparency will be of little help to an organization 
claiming to use PFP but that actually distributes raises using non-performance criteria.  If an 
organization claims to distribute pay raises on the basis of performance, it must ensure this is 
actually the case.  Otherwise, making pay information transparent could have disastrous effects.  




criteria used to distribute raises – legal repercussions may surface if discrimination has occurred.  
When pay is based on criteria other than performance (or some other legitimate factor), making 
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